Britain and the United States in the Gulf : roles and responsibilities, 1892-1979 by Al-Otaibi, Faisal Ali
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE GULF: 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, 1892-1979 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Wales 
BY 
Faisal All A1-Otaibi 
March/ 1996 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The generous assistance of many people and 
institutions assisted in making this research effort possible. 
First and foremost is my adviser Vice-Chancellor: Professor 
Keith Robbins. Without his teaching, guidance, and 
numerous suggestions and helpful criticism throughout the 
planning and writing of this dissertation, it would never 
have been written. I am immensely indebted to my parents 
and all my family and friends. Their determined assistance 
and confidence in me have secured me from depressive 
moments and for that I will always be thankful. Especial 
gratitude is owed to my wife, Eman. Her patience and 
support was of immeasurable value. Finally, I would like to 
express my appreciation to the University of Kuwait for 
granting me a scholarship and the University of Wales for 
providing me the opportunity to do this study. 
1 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses Britain's and the United States' 
policies in the Gulf as an external factor of instability in an 
extremely volatile region. It begins with the 1892 British 
'Exclusive Agreements' with the former Trucial emirates and 
Bahrain and ends with the 1979 fall of Shah Muhammad 
Reza of Iran. 
To illustrate the roles and responsibilities of the two 
Western powers in Gulf instability the study examines and 
evaluates Britain's attitude towards internal border disputes 
and the question of a 'United Arab State' in the region, and 
the United States' arms policy (Nixon Doctrine) as a 
response to the supposed Russian threat to the Gulf after 
the 1971 British departure. 
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Introduction 
The Gulf is one of the two arms of the Indian Ocean --the 
other is the Red Sea. The Gulf lies between Shatt al-Arab (Bank 
or coast al-Arab) at its north-west and Ras al-Hadd at the eastern 
tip of the Arabian Peninsula. In size, the Gulf consists of 238,800 
sq km/92,200 sq mi. ' Apart from the deep and narrow waters of 
the Hormuz Strait leading into the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian 
Sea, the Gulf is a shallow sea. The Gulf is bound by the Arabian 
plateau on the west and the Iranian plain on the east. Today, the 
Arabian side is composed of the Republic of Iraq, the State of 
Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the State of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). The eastern side of the Gulf is wholly occupied by the 
Republic of Iran which gives her the longest coastline among the 
Gulf states stretching in a south-easterly direction to the Gulf of 
Oman. The archipelagic State of Bahrain lies between the 
Peninsula of Qatar and the Saudi mainland. 
The Gulf area is, as has been described, "a region that 
scarcely reaches a state of stability"2, or as another author states 
11 a region where change is perhaps the only certainty. "3 
Geographical location and oil have introduced prestige and 
wealth to the Gulf, but equally they have brought instability. 
' David Crystal, et. al.. "The Gulf. " The Cambridge Encyclopaedia 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 497. 
2 Ahmad A1-Mavval, The Political Boundaries of the State of Kuwait: A 
Study in Political Geography (University of London: Unpublished Ph. D.. 
1986). p. 13. 
3 Robert Tucker, "American Power & the Persian Gulf. " Commentary 70 
(November 1980), p. 25. 
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Being attracted by its strategic location and economic interests, a 
long-standing rivalry occurred between the colonial powers over 
the region. The British and United States governments' relations 
with the Gulf revealed that these economic and strategic factors 
were all the time closely interlinked. 
The determination of the Britain to protect her commerce 
with India --the jewel of her imperial crown-- was behind the 
British coming to the Gulf region. The discovery of oil in the 
region at the beginning of the current century reinforced the 
British interest in the Gulf and attracted the United States. 
Despite her early commercial and missionary contact in the 
nineteenth century, the American oil companies' Gulf concessions 
in the 1920s and 1930s were the genuine start of the United 
States' relations with the region. After the end of the Second 
World War, the British and United States interests in the Gulf 
strengthened more by the beginning of the 'Cold War' and India's 
independence of 1947. 
For most of the nineteenth century, the British authorities 
managed, despite the challenge of other European imperial 
powers, through treaties and gun-boat diplomacy, to be the 
predominant power in the Gulf. The British signed the 1798 
treaty with Oman; and three years later concluded two more 
agreements with the Shah of Iran. After destroying the Qawasim's 
maritime power, Britain signed the 'General Treaty' of 1820 with 
the Trucial emirates and Bahrain. These treaties remained in 
force until 1971, when they were substituted by agreements of 
friendship. To control the waters of the Gulf, the 1820 treaty was 
supplemented by various other treaties, the most important of 
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which were the 'Exclusive Agreements' of 1892 with the Shaikhs 
of the Trucial emirates and Bahrain. In 1899, the British signed a 
similar trea ty with Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwai t. According to the 
conditions of the 1890s treaties, the Arab Shaikhs were not 
allowed to cede, sell. grant, or mortgage any part of their 
territory to anyone except the British, or to have relations with 
any foreign power without British government approval. 
In 1914 the Great War exploded between the great 
European powers. As far as the Gulf was concerned, the war left 
the British, powerful before it, in a supreme position in that 
region. The Ottoman Khilafah had been removed from the scene, 
the threat from Russia and Germany, for the time being, had been 
eliminated; and the moment of the United States in the region had 
not yet come. The Gulf on both sides, the Arabian and Persian, 
was under British control or influence. Therefore, for all the 
world, the Gulf looked like a British lake. 
In 1908 oil was discovered in Iran. In the inter-war years, 
oil began to be found on the Arabian side of the Gulf. The British 
government sought to exclude foreign oil companies from the 
Gulf areas which had been under her influence. This policy did 
not satisfy the Americans who claimed that much of their own oil 
deposits had been depleted during the First World War. The 
United States government insisted on establishing an 'open door' 
arrangement to be the basis of negotiation for new oil 
concessions in the region. As a result, great power rivalry 
between the two governments was to have serious implications 
for British hegemony in the Gulf. However, the proficiency of the 
United States during the First World War and possible future 
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needs convinced the British government to give way in the Gulf 
in return for the Anglo-American alliance. 
In the period between World Wars One and Two, successive 
United States governments followed an isolationist foreign 
policy. Her ultimate refusal to take part in the League of Nations 
was one of the best examples of this. The explosion of World War 
II, however, ended America's isolationism. At the beginning of 
the war the United States sold arms to the allies. Then, in 194 1, 
the Lend-Lease scheme began, and a few months later the United 
States joined the war against Germany and Japan. In the same 
year, Russia also entered the war on the side of Britain and 
France. 
The Second World War's Western-Russian alliance against 
Hitler did not last for long. A new world system emerged after 
the end of the war. With this new system, the United States and 
the Soviet Union were the world's two superpowers. The 
expansionist policy of the Soviets caused considerable anxiety in 
Britain and the United States. In addition to their threats in 
Europe, the Russians refused after the end of the war to evacuate 
Iran as had been agreed (with Britain and the United States) in 
the Teheran Conference of 1943. 
To face the Soviet challenge both the British and the 
American governments recognised that each country needed the 
support of the other. While the British needed America's 
economic and military support, the Americans believed that the 
British empire was very important to United States security. The 
New York Times commented after World War Two "that the 
4 
Introduction 
British Empire is our first line of defence. " 4 An American 
official (Philip C. Jessup) stated on 24 April 1950, "We fully 
agree that [the] UK is and should be [a] world power", and "the 
more powerful and more worldly the better. "5 This alliance of 
the British and the United States against the Russians fuelled the 
myth of a 'special relationship'. 
The fears of United States governments that the Russians 
would try to spread communism persuaded them to use all 
possible means to contain the communist regimes within existing 
territorial limits. Some of the major policies of the United States 
governments included: the 'Truman Doctrine' (March 1947), a 
declaration by which the United States announced that it would 
come to the support of 'free peoples' whenever their freedom was 
threatened by the communists; the 'Marshall Plan' (June 1947), a 
scheme to provide American economic aid to Western Europe; 
and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) in 1949, a military alliance by which the United States 
pledged to defend Western Europe against the eastern bloc. With 
these policies and the Soviets' counter policies the Cold War, 
which persisted until recently, started between the two 
superpowers. 
In January 1944 a distinguished geologist, Everett Leede 
Goyler, confirmed that the centre of gravity of the world's oil 
production was shifting from the Caribbean to the Gulf with 
New York Times (6 April 1946). 
Event Gleason, et. al.. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. 
(Washington. D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1977), vol. III, p. 855 
Introduction 
"reserves of great magnitude" still to be discovered 6 
Subsequently, the Gulf became very valuable to the West's 
economy. Maintaining access to the region's oil in either peace or 
in war has been the major British and American concern in the 
Gulf. It has been considered by both governments as a very 
important region in the balance of power. A United States State 
Department memo concluded after World War II that, "The oil 
reserve of Saudi Arabia is among the greatest in the World, and 
it must remain under American control for the dual purpose of 
supplementing and replacing our dwindling resources and from 
preventing this power potential from falling into unfriendly 
hands". 7 In a memorandum called 'Middle East Policy' circulated 
to his colleagues in the Cabinet in August 1949, the Labour 
Foreign Secretary (1945-51) Ernest Bevin described the Middle 
East (including the Gulf region) as "In peace and war an area of 
cardinal importance to the United Kingdom, second only to the 
United Kingdom itself. " He added that "Strategically the Middle 
East is a focal point of communications, a source of 0 il. "8 
Consequently, the United States started to share with the 
British the responsibilities of protecting the interests of the 
Western industrial countries in the Gulf. Her role in the 
Mossadeq crisis of 1951-3 in Iran pointed to this. Moreover, with 
her bilateral defence agreement with Iran of 5 March 1959 and 
6 William Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab 
Nationalism, The United States. and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1984). p. 188. 
A. Miller, "The Influence of Middle East Oil on American Foreign 
Policy. " The Middle East Review 9 (Spring 1977). p. 22. 
Louis, op. cit.. pp. 15-6. 
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Kennedy's pledge of 25 October 1962 to maintain the integrity of 
Saudi Arabia the United States even took the lead. 9 
The real significant strategic concern of the United States 
in the Gulf, however, began in 1968. In that year the British 
announced their intention to withdraw their forces from the 
region in 1971. The United States government strongly opposed 
the British withdrawal on the grounds that it would pave the way 
for the communist regime in the Soviet Union to fill the so-called 
'power vacuum' in the region. The Americans believed that the 
Soviets would seek to control the Gulf's oil and, in turn, the 
West's industries. 
After the British Labour government's announcement, 
American decision-makers paid greater attention to the Gulf. 
Their judgement was that the American Administration must carry 
the burden of protecting the interests of herself and her allies in 
the region. At that time, direct American involvement was 
virtually impossible. This was due to American public opinion 
being against overseas deployment of forces following their 
unsuccessful involvement in Vietnam. Therefore, the strategy of 
the United States government was to arm the Shah of Iran and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to be able to bear the burden of 
local defence. This new American policy was indeed the 
application of the 'Nixon Doctrine'. In practice, however, the 
United States governments' policy of the 1970s was to support 
9 George Lenczo«'ski, "Conditions and Prospects for Tranquillity in the 
Middle East. " in George Lenczo«ski, (ed)., United States Interests in the 
Middle East, (Washington. D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research. 1968). p. 98. 
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her surrogates by a gradual spreading of America's naval forces 
in the Gulf region and the areas around it. 
It can not be disputed that the stability or instability of a 
given area is an outcome of interaction between internal and 
external policies. Therefore, this thesis is a study of external 
factors in the Gulf's instability; namely the roles and 
responsibilities of Britain and the United States. Britain's 
policies on land border disputes and her attitude towards a 
'United Arab State' in the Gulf, and the United States' arms 
policy of the 1970s in the region are the policies examined. 
Internal factors, therefore, are not discussed unless they are 
directly related to these policies. 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. It consists of ten 
chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. The first six deal 
with Britain's role and responsibility, as the dominating colonial 
power in the region for almost a century and a half, for stability 
in the Gulf. In other words, a return to the roots of the unstable 
situation which the Gulf states still witness. Therefore, the 
British part will have the lion's share of this study. The second 
part examines in four chapters the role of the 1970s United 
States arms policy in the instability of the region. 
The thesis has relied on historical documents from the 
Public Record Office and India Office Library & Records, official 
documents and reports, books, papers of specialised agencies, 
and articles from professional journals and newspapers in both 
English and Arabic. 
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Part I: Instability in the Gulf Region: the British Legacy 
The threats of other European imperial powers to Britain's 
interests in the Indian sub-continent were behind her decision to 
enter into treaty relations with the Gulf states and the Shaikhs of 
the Arabian tribes whose territories were adjacent to the coast. 
The major British concern during their long stay in the Gulf was 
to secure the passage of Britain's ships via the Gulf waters as one 
of the main routes to India. To ensure the upper hand in the Gulf, 
the British used all possible means to guarantee the creation and 
continuity of small, autonomous but weak emirates in the Arabian 
side of the region. Britain's treaty relations of the nineteenth 
century, her effort in the post-World War One peace conferences 
and her role in defining the borders between the Gulf states 
prevented the establishment of an independent united state on the 
Arabian side of the Gulf. There are many examples which support 
this hypothesis, but since it is not possible to analyse all of them, 
we shall concentrate on those which we believe to be central. 
This part is divided into six chapters. The first focuses on 
British victory over other European imperial powers in the Gulf 
region since the sixteenth century. The next chapter deals with 
British governments' techniques to dominate the local Shaikhs. 
The British role in the emergence and political evolution of the 
present-day UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait will be the central 
focus of the third chapter. The fourth examines Britain's promises 
to the Arabs, represented by Sharief Hussein of Makkah, of an 
independent and united Arab Kingdom after the end of the Great 
War. The fifth and sixth chapters discuss the effect of the British 
9 
policies on some of the major problems or conflicts which still 
carry a great potential threat to Gulf stability. 
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Chapter I Britain's Victory over Other Imperial Powers 
in the Gulf Region: Historical Overview 
Sir Arnold Wilson wrote in 1928 in his famous book The 
Persian Gulf: "No arm of the sea has been, or is of greater 
interest, alike to the geologist and archaeologist, the historian 
and the geographer, the merchant, the statesman, and the student 
of strategy than the inland water known as the Persian Gulf. "'o 
The strategic location of the Gulf enabled it to be one of the 
major trade routes linking East with West. Through it the goods 
of India, China, and the Eastern Archipelago travelled, looking 
for markets in Persia and the Levant, and back passed the goods 
of Arabia, Persia, and Europe to India and the Far East. 
Therefore, the European great powers never seemed very 
interested in the inland area of the Gulf. Their concern was 
restricted to the coastal region. As a result, there has been a 
struggle for power in the Gulf in which the local (the Arabs) and 
the regional powers (the Ottomans and Persians), as well as the 
European powers: Portuguese, Dutch, French, Russians, Germans 
and British, all participated. Amongst the Europeans, the British 
in particular played a major role in the Gulf's politics. 
As far as the regional powers are concerned, the Ottoman 
Sultan claimed, as a Khalifah (Ruler) of Muslims, the leadership 
of the Muslim world. Accordingly, the Arabian Gulf and the 
Arabian Peninsula regions, as parts of that world, came, at least 
nominally, under Ottoman rule. As the British Ambassador in 
I' Arnold Wilson, The Persian Gulf: an Historical Sketch from the Earliest 
Times to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century (London: Allen and Unww in. 
1928), p. 1. 
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Turkey once stated the Ottomans felt that "as the dominant 
Islamic power they have undefined right to bring under their 
allegiance and to protect the small Arab tribes in the Arabian 
Peninsula. "" However, in practice the Ottomans were the leaders 
of the large Sunni section of the Muslim world only. 12 The other 
major section was the Shia world, of which Persia was the 
centre. 13 Persia was transferred from the Sunni to Shia world in 
the time of Shah Ismail Al-Safavi, the founder of the Safavids 
dynasty in Persia in 1501. With the rise of the Safavids the 
relations between the Ottoman and the Persian empires were 
characterised by a long and severe disagreement and hatred. 14 
Although following the details of this dispute would divert 
the study from its aim, an important point needs to be mentioned 
here. The inconclusive wars of the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries 
wasted the two empires' resources and exposed them to 
commercial penetration by the European powers which led to 
their subsequent helpless manipulation in the nineteenth century. 15 
Furthermore, when the European powers were finding in 
themselves not only the capability but also the motives to enlarge 
" John Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers: the Story of Britain's Boundary 
Drawing in the Desert (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991). p. 85. 
12 Sunni is one who follows the path of Sunna (the words and deeds) of 
Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). The majority sect in Islam is 
Senna. 
13 The Arabic word shiai means partisan. The Shia split from the Islamic 
community in their belief that the Khilafah should have gone to Ali. 
Prophet's cousin and son -in- law, and his descendants. 
14 The rule of the Safavids last until 1736. H. Roemer, "The Safavid 
Period, " in Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, (eds. ). The Cambridge 
History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. XI. P. 
189. 
', George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East. from the Rise of 
Islam to Modern Times (London: Methuen, 1964). p. 58. 
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their mastery to forgotten areas of the world such as the Gulf, no 
one in that region held sufficient power to deter a foreign 
invasion. The Gulf was a power vacuum in a world where power 
ultimately decided the destiny of nations. 
1.1 The Beginning of European Colonialism 
In 1497 the Cape of Good Hope was discovered to the 
Europeans by the Portuguese Navigator Vasco da Gama. Da 
Gama's expedition paved the way for the establishment of the 
first European empire in India and the East by the Portuguese. 16 
For the Gulf region, the Portuguese attacks started in 1506. By 
1515, the Portuguese had occupied the strategic and trading 
posts of Muscat, Hormuz, and Bahrain. By governing these cities 
the Portuguese controlled the Gulf trade. Portugal's triumph in 
the East was so great that their kings soon came to describe 
themselves as 'Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce 
of India, Ethiopia, Arabia and Persia'. 17 The Portuguese victory 
attracted the competition and enmity of stronger rivals, the 
Dutch, English and French. 
From the end of the sixteenth century the Portuguese faced 
serious difficulties that resulted in the decline of their empire in 
the Gulf. In 1580, the Spanish annexed their country. The 
Spanish rule lasted until 1640. The rise of the Safavids in Persia 
16 In 1524 Vasco da Gama was sent as Viceroy to India. Crystal, "Vasco da 
Gama, " The Cambridge Encyclopaedia, p. 450. 
F For more details of the Portuguese voyage in the Gulf region see Wilson. 
op. cit., pp. 111-21, and Donald Hawley, The Trucial States (London: George 
Allen & Unw in, 1970), pp. 69-73. 
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and the Yaaribah in Oman and the arrival of the English to the 
Gulf waters were other important factors that helped to bring the 
Portuguese supremacy in the Gulf to an end. The Portuguese had 
been evicted from Bahrain in 1602.18 In 1603, the Persian Shah 
appealed for help to the French government, and to the English in 
1610.19 In the coming years, the Persians were determined to use 
the English against the Portuguese. The mutual interests of 
England and Persia eased their co-operation against the 
Portuguese 
. 
20 In 1619-20 the Persians took over Ras al- 
Khaimah. 21 In January 1622 a joint successful Anglo-Persian 
expedition ousted the Portuguese from Hormuz --their 
headquarters in the region. 22 The fall of Hormuz marked the 
beginning of the end to the Portuguese control in the Gulf. In 
1640 the Portuguese lost Basrah, today's second largest city of 
Iraq, to the Ottomans. 23 Finally, the Yaaribah expelled them on 
23 January 1650 from Muscat, their last stronghold, which 
indicated that their influence in the region was effectively 
24 ended. 
18 John Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf. 1795-1880 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 51. 
19 W. Hunter, History of British India (London: 1919). vol. I. p. 329. 
2) Badrraddean A1-Khusousv, Studies in the Modern and Contemporary 
History of the Arabian Gulf (Al-Kuwait: That al-Salassel, 1978), vol. I. p. 
29. 
21 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 51. 
21 Reader Bullard. Britain and the Middle East (London. Hutchinson 
University Library, 1951), p. 26: Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 51: 
and Hunter, op. cit., p. 329. 
,j John Marlowe, The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century (London: The 
Cresset Press, 1962), p. 7. 
24 Wilson. op. cit., p. 155, and Kelly. Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 8. 
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The Portuguese decline was almost simultaneous with the 
arrival of the Dutch power. In 1581, the Spanish rule over the 
Netherlands came to an end. Consequently, the Dutch had begun 
to develop as a great maritime and commercial state. In 1602 
they established the 'Dutch East India Company', which would be 
the basis of their future overseas empire. In the following years, 
the Dutch became one of the principal rivals to the Portuguese in 
the Far Eastern trade. The others were the English and the 
French. However, after the expelling of the Portuguese from the 
Gulf the Dutch proved commercially very successful. The Dutch 
commercial success persuaded the English Parliament to pass in 
1651 the Navigation Act, the aim of which was to destroy the 
Dutch commercial trade and fleet. In the following year, England 
declared war against the Dutch state. 25 
By the 1750s the Dutch began to yield to the British. They 
withdrew their factory at Basrah in 1752.26 A year later they also 
closed their factory at Bushire. 27 In 1759 the Dutch were forced 
to give up their only settlement on the Persian mainland at 
Bandar Abbas. 28 The abandonment of Kharg island, near the head 
of the Gulf, in 1765, marked the end of their dominance in that 
region. 
29 
25 Wilson, op. cit., p. 165, and Abdul-Aziz Ibrahim, Britain and man 
Coast Emirates: A Documentary Study (Al-Riyad: Darat al-Malik Abdul-Aziz 
27,1982), p. 62. 
, `' Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 54. 
2 AI-Khusousv. op. cit., p. 40. 
, `S Wilson, op. cit., p. 181: and Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 34. 
Wilson. op. cit.. p. 181, Hawley, op. cit., p. 76; and Marlowe, op. cit., 
p. 8. 
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It was, finally, France and England who struggled for 
mastery in the Indian Ocean areas. France, under Louis XIV (r. 
1643-1715), had begun to plan the creation of a maritime 
commercial empire. In 1602, France established the 'French East 
India Company'. With regard to the Gulf, she sent an embassy to 
Persia in 1664 and obtained trading-rights at the Persian cities of 
Bandar Abbas and Isfahan. 3° In 1708, the Shah signed a 
commercial treaty with the French government by which Persia 
granted some capitulations to France. Moreover, the 
governments of France and Persia signed in 1715 a new treaty of 
Friendship and Commerce. 32 However, France's plans in the 
Indian Ocean areas were blocked by her continuous wars, 
especially the Seven Years War (1756-63) between herself and 
Britain. " Though, the French lost most of their possessions in 
India as a result of their defeat, this had by no means 
extinguished their interest in the affairs of the Indian Ocean. 
The Anglo-French struggle in the Gulf came to a peak with 
the French invasion of Egypt in 1798. On 12 April the French 
government decided to send an expedition to conquer Egypt, 
since a direct invasion across the Channel was considered to be 
too difficult. A decree of the French Directory instructed 
Napoleon Bonaparte, the future Emperor of the French (1804- 
14), to expel the "English from all their possessions in the Orient 
3" Ibrahim, Britain and Oman Coast Emirates, p. 65. 
31 The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary 
Record, compiled, translated, and edited by J. Hurewitz. (Ne« Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1975), vol. I. pp. 49-55. 
32 Ibid., pp. 57-8. 
33 Muhammad Murad, Britain and Arabs: the British Colonial Histor` in 
the Arab World (Dimashq: Dar Tlas. 1989). p. 32. 
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which he can reach and shall in particular destroy all their 
factories on the Red Sea. "34 To win friends, Napoleon proclaimed 
himself the protector of Islam and saviour of the Egyptian people 
on 2 July 1798, after his entry to Alexandria, today's second 
largest city of Egypt 35 
These activities persuaded the British to take counter- 
measures. Aiming to protect their interests in India and to keep 
the road to it safe, the British began a new negotiation with the 
Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the new Qajar Dynasty (rulers of 
Persia since 1796). The British strategy was that no help should 
be given to the French by the local authorities as long as 
animosity dominated their relations with Britain. The British 
Governor-General of India, in his instruction letter of 10 October 
1799, ordered the British negotiator, Captain John Malcolm to 
"act vigorously and heartily against the French in the event of 
their attempting at any time to penetrate to India by any route in 
which it may be practicable for the King of Persia to oppose their 
progress. 1136 
On 12 October 1798, the Sultan of Muscat signed the 
Cawlnamah or written engagement. According to Article 3 of the 
Cawlnamah, the Sultan promised that, as long as war continued 
between Britain and France, he would never, throughout all his 
territories, give the French "a place to fix or seat themselves in, 
34 Hurew itz, op. cit.. vol. I, pp. 115 -6. 
3'ý Ibid., pp. 116-7. 
; `' Article 1) of the Governor-General of India's instructions to Captain 
John Malcolm. Ibid.. pp. 118 -22. 
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nor shall they get even ground to stand upon. "'' On 18 January 
1800, a new agreement signed between the two parties affirmed 
the 1 798 Cawlnamah. "' 
As far as Persia was concerned, the Treaties of Alliance and 
Commerce were concluded on 28 January 1801. Article 5 of the 
Political Treaty declared that "Should it ever occur that an a rmy 
of the French nation, actuated by design and deceit, attempts to 
settle with a view of establishing themselves on any of the isla nds 
or shores of Persia, a conjunct force shall be appointed by the 
two high contracting States to act in co-operation for their 
expulsion and extirpation, and to destroy and put an end to the 
foundation of their treason. " The same Article added that if any 
French men "express a wish or desire to obtain a place of 
residence or dwelling on any of the islands or shores of the 
Kingdom of Persia that they may there raise the standard of 
abode or settlement, such request or representation shall not be 
consented" by the government of Persia. 39 
All France's schemes for establishing an empire in the East 
were, however, brutally interrupted by her quick defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. Subsequently, the French 
3' Translation of the Cawlnamah in A Collection of Treaties. Engagements 
and Sanads Relating to India and Neig hbouring Countries. compiled by C. 
Aitchison, (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1933), vol. XI, pp. 287-8; and 
Hurew itz, op. cit., vol. I. pp. 124-5. 
38 Agreement entered into by Imam of Muscat with Captain John Malcolm. 
Aitchison. op. cit., vol. XI, p. 288. 
31' Aitchison, op. cit. , vol. 
XIII, pp. 45-53, and Hurewitz. op. cit.. vol. I. 
pp. 122-4. 
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government's imperial activity centred mostly on her important 
colonies in north-west Africa. 40 
1.2 The British Era 
From the second half of the sixteenth century, England 
emerged as a great maritime and major European power. In 1601, 
the English 'East India Company' was established for the purpose 
of trading with the East Indies. In 1608, the Company founded a 
trading station at Surat, on the western coast of India. 41 In 1616, 
the Company was permitted to trade into Persia by Shah Abbas 
I. 42 In the following years a few factories were opened at the 
important cities of Persia, such as Shiraz and Isfahan in 1617 and 
Jask in 1619.4 Also, a factory was established by the Company 
aa at Basrah in about 1640. 
Up to the mid-eighteenth century, the East India Company 
had been a purely commercial enterprise. Britain's victory in the 
Seven Years War, however, brought an important change to the 
Company's character. It had come out of the war as a territorial 
power in the Indian sub-continent, therefore political 
considerations became relevant to the Company's decisions and 
policies. The Company began to work for the security of its naval 
routes to India. As one of these routes, the Gulf started to hold a 
40 Kirk, op. cit., p. 86. 
-" Marlowe, op. cit.. p. 5. 
a, Kelly. Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 50. 
aj Ibid., pp. 50-1. 
44 Bullard, op. cit., p. 26. 
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strategic importance it had earlier lacked. 45 In 1784, the British 
government became officially responsible for the political, 
military, and financial supervision of the British assets in India. 
In the words of a leading authority on the modern history of the 
Gulf: "At the close of the eighteenth century an era in British 
relations with the Persian Gulf was coming to an end, an era in 
which commercial interests had predominated, and another, in 
which political considerations were to become paramount, was 
about to dawn. X46 In September 1858, the British government 
took over the duties of the East India Company. 47 
As we shall see in more detail in the following chapter, the 
British government, during the nineteenth century, signed several 
treaties with almost all the Shaikhs of the Arabian side of the 
Gulf. The most important of them were the treaties of the last 
decade of the century. The misgivings of the British government 
about the increasing Russian, French and German activities in the 
Gulf persuaded her to seek the conclusion of the 1891 treaty with 
Muscat, the Exclusive Agreements of March 1892 with Bahrain 
and the Trucial emirates, and the 1899 treaty with Shaikh 
Mubarak of Kuwait. 
These moves, which Britain had taken to confirm her 
influence in the Gulf waters, were disliked by her competitors. 
a' Wilson. op. cit.. p. 169; and V. Moidu, "A Survey of British Policy in 
the Persian Gulf: from the Early Days to Mid-Twentieth Century, " Journal of 
Indian History 56 (1978), pp. 366-7. 
a`' John Kelly, "The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position in 
the Persian Gulf, " St. Antony's Papers, No. 4. Middle Eastern Affairs. 
Number one, (1958), p. 120. 
'l Marlowe, op. cit., p. 11. 
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The Ottoman government viewed them as an encroachment by the 
British on their territorial sovereignty over the Arabian coast of 
the Gulf, which they were, at that time, intending to make more 
firm. The 1871 expedition to al-Hasa (the Eastern province of 
present-day Saudi Arabia) was an obvious sign of the new 
determination of the Ottomans. 48 The British occupation of 
Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt (including the Suez Canal) in 1882 
prejudiced her further in the eyes of the Ottomans. 49 
The British 
not to give any 
British represen 
conducting their 
government was 
Shaikhs. 50 
treaties' restrictions on the local Shaikhdoms 
facilities to any power other than Britain or 
tatives persuaded her European rivals that 
policies in the Gulf through the Ottoman 
easier than to deal directly with the local 
Since the time of Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725), the 
Russians worked hard at getting a warm-water harbour. With 
regards to the Gulf, the Russian Consul at Baghdad was scheming 
to secure a Russian port and naval base. " In July-August of 
1898, Count Vladimir Kapnist, the nephew of the Russian 
Ambassador to Vienna, had also applied to the Ottoman 
government for a railway concession. The concession was 
supposed to run from the Syrian port of Tripoli (present-day 
48 For further discussion on the 1871 Ottoman expedition to al-Hasa see 
Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, chp. XV, and Abdul-Aziz Ibrahim. 
Princes and Invaders, the Story of Local Boundary and Sovereignty in the 
Gulf: A Documentary Stuff (London: Dar Al Saqi, 1991). clip. I. 
49 Kirk, op. cit., p. 90. 
' Foreign Office Confidential Print. The Affairs of Arabia. 190-1906, 
edited by Robin Bidwell. (London: Frank Cass. 1971). vol. I. p. vii. 
5' Kirk, op. cit.. p. 89. 
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Lebanon) on the Mediterranean Sea to Kuwait on the Gulf waters 
(the 'Kapnist Project'). 52 
As far as Germany is concerned, her commercial influence 
by the end of the nineteenth century was a dominant force in 
Turkey, and she was a source of a large share of Ottoman 
armament demands. 53 The Germans had also sent a warship on a 
visit to Muscat in 1894 and opened a consulate at Bushire in 
1897.54 Two years later, the German government put to the 
Ottoman government their proposals for the extension of the 
Anatolian Railway to the head-waters of the Gulf in Kuwait (the 
55 'Berlin-Baghdad Railway) 
Britain, with her preoccupation with the defence of her 
Indian empire, could not view with indifference the Russian and 
German schemes in the Gulf. In the words of an American 
specialist on this episode of Gulf history, the Russian and 
German efforts raised issues concerning 'defense of India'. 56 In 
January 1899, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India (1899-1905), sent 
the British Political Resident in the Gulf (1897-1900), 
Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm Meade, to conclude a secret 
agreement with Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait in which he undertook 
', Ravinder Kumar, India and the Persian Gulf Region. 1858-1907: A Study 
in British Imperial Policy (India: Asia Publishing House, 1965) p. 141; and 
Ahmad Abu-Hakimah, The Modern History of Kuwait, 1750-1965 (London: 
Luzac. 1983), pp. 117-8. 
'j Kirk, op. cit.. p. 92: Muhammad Anis. The Ottoman State and the Arab 
East, 1514-1914 (Al-Qahira: Maktabat al-Anglo al-Massriah. 1985). p. 211. 
'a Bidwell. The Affairs of Arabia, vol. I. p. xvii. 
'-5 For further discussion on the 'Baghdad Railway' see Kumar. op. cit., pp. 
151-93, and Briton Busch. Britain and the Persian Gulf. 1894-1914 (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press. 1967). pp. 187-234. 
N, Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 3 
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to grant no future leases or concessions to any foreign powers 
without the approval of the British government. 
Although Britain issued a declaration pointing out her 
determination to preserve her position in the region. Lord 
Cranborne, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office, 
stated in Parliament in 1902, "Our position in the Persian Gulf, 
both commercially and politically, is one of a very special 
character, and His Majesty's Government has always considered 
that the ascendancy of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf was the 
foundation of British policy. This is not merely a question of 
theory; it is a statement of fact. "57 It was not until the beginning 
of 1903, that Britain started to think about using force to 
preclude the Germans or the Russians from enjoying the use of a 
factory or a port in the Gulf. Lord Lansdowne, Britain's Foreign 
Secretary (1900-5), stated very clearly on 5 May 1903 before the 
House of Lords that: "our policy should be directed in the first 
place to protect and promote British trade in those waters.... I 
say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a 
naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other 
power as a grave menace to British interests, and we should 
certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. "58 
The Russian and German efforts to develop interests in the 
Gulf did not, however, worry all the British officials. On 18 
Ibid.. p. 248. 
Sx Hurewitz. op. cit., vol. I. p. 507. Lord Curzon. then Under-Secretary. 
wrote in 1892 that "I should regard the concession by any Power of a port 
upon the Persian Gulf to Russia as a deliberate insult to Britain, as a wanton 
rupture of the status quo. and as an international provocation to war, and I 
should impeach the British minister who was guilty of acquiescing in such a 
surrender as a traitor to his country" Kirk, op. cit.. pp. 88-9. 
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February 1898 Admiral I. A. Beaumont of the Admiralty agreed 
that Kuwait was a good harbour, but "it is on the way to nowhere 
and I cannot conceive why the Russians should desire to have 
it. X59 On 1 February 1900, Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of 
State for India (1895-1903) stated "I say frankly that I cannot 
see what harm would be done to British interests by Germany's 
having a railway terminus in the Persian Gulf. "'O 
In 1899, however, Britain was involved in the Boer War. It 
is a name given to the South African War, fought between the 
British forces and the Boer descendants of Dutch settlers in 
Orange Free State and Transvaal. The war was caused by the 
resentment of the Boers, under the leadership of Paulus Kruger 
(1825-1904), at the colonial policy of the British government. 
The war was ended on 31 May 1902 by the Treaty of Vereeniging. 
It had demonstrated how Britain stood alone in the world 
political arena. An argument soon followed on the importance of 
coming to agreement with other powers. 
Within seven years of the beginning of the new century the 
long-standing and bitter conflicts of interest between Britain on 
the one hand, and her hi storic adversaries in Asia --Russia and 
France-- on the other, were abandoned in place of their 
increasing fear of the expansionist policy of Germany. The 
Anglo-French neg otiations climaxed in the 1904 Entente 
Cordiale, by which their old differences in the Middle East as a 
'9 Admiral Beaumont to Foreign Office. Foreign Office Confidential Print. 
The Affairs of Kuwait. 1896-1905. edited by Robin Bidwell. (London: Frank 
Cass, 1971), vol. I. part I. p. 27. 
`'`' Busch. Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 192. 
24 
Britain's Victory over Other Imperial Powers 
whole were settled. Above all, the two powers settled their 
differences over Egypt and Morocco. The British control of 
Egypt was recognised and in return France was given a free hand 
in Morocco 
. 
61 That the Anglo-French Agreement helped to 
remove at once "all risk of a quarrel between the United Kingdom 
and France" was Sir Edward Grey's, the Foreign Secretary (1905- 
16), assessment in 1911.62 
After her defeat in the Japanese War of 1904-5, Russia was 
more ready to compromise. The Anglo-Russian disputes over 
Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet were solved by the concluding of 
the 1907 convention. 63 Without consulting the Persian 
government, Britain and Russia outlined their spheres-of-interest 
in north and south Persia respectively, leaving a no-man's-land 
between them. 64 By the 1907 agreement, the Russian and British 
governments succeeded in controlling all sources of disagreement 
over the Persian question. Grey stated to the Committee of 
Imperial Defence (CID) that "I believe the Anglo-Russian 
61 Hurewitz, op. cit., vol. I pp. 507-10. 
62 Grey's statement to the British Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) on 
26 May 1911. G. Gooch and H. Temperley. (eds. ). British Documents on the 
Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1926-38). 
vol. XI, p. 782. 
63 Hurew itz, op. cit., vol. I. pp. 538-41. 
64 For the Persian point of view see E. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 
1905-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), chp. VI. pp. 
172-195. Habl al-Matin (Strong Robe). a Tehran newspaper--which reflected 
the nationalist opinion in Iran, noted "To-day it is necessary that the 
Foreign Minister of Persia should clearly inform the two Po«ers [Britain and 
Russia] that no Agreement having reference to Persia and concluded without 
her knowledge is valid or entitled to the slightest consideration, and that 
any Power desiring to enter into relations with Persia must address itself 
directly to the Persians themselves. no one else having any right to intervene 
in any way. " Habl al-Matin. 11 September 1907. Quoted in Browne. op. cit., 
p. 187. 
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Agreement has been of enormous relief to the Government of 
India. "65 
With the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman regime 
was too weak to challenge the ever-growing British influence in 
the Gulf. While the Ottoman authority over the region was 
nominally asserted, the British strengthened their influence there 
by persuading the Shaikhs of the Gulf Coast to undertake to give 
them the rights and privileges for oil and pearling concessions, 
and postal and telegraph services. In 1912 an understanding was 
reached between the Ottoman and British governments in which 
they agreed not to extend the Berlin-Baghdad Railway beyond 
Basrah to the head-waters of the Gulf without Britain's consent. 
The Ottomans also accepted the British request to police the 
waters of the Gulf and agreed that Britain should have the right 
to navigate on the Shatt al-Arab and share in the control of the 
port of Basrah. Eventually this reality was written into an Anglo- 
Ottoman Draft Convention of 1913.66 
In conclusion, the long history of British diplomatic and 
military policies in the Gulf had achieved success. The 
Portuguese and the Dutch powers were expelled militarily in the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries respectively, and they 
never came back. The British forces played a major role in these 
actions. After a long rivalry with the French and the Russians, 
65 Gooch and Temperley, op. cit., vol. XI, pp. 788-9 
66 Marlowe. op. cit., pp. 39-40. The 1913 convention is in LP&S/18/B381. 
The convention is a collection of documents signed on 29 July 1913. 
originally a French version. The prologue of the 1913 Convention stressed 
that it formed a wide settlement to Britain's and the Ottoman empire's 
differences in the Gulf region. The convention reproduced in Hurewitz, 
cit., vol. I, pp. -567-70. 
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the British won them to their side in the 1904 Anglo-French 
Entente and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. As a result of 
this rapprochement, the French and Russian activities in the Gulf 
ceased to disturb the British. The two governments acknowledged 
the British special interest in the region. In the following few 
years, the British and Ottoman governments negotiated an overall 
settlement for their differences in the Gulf. In 1913, they 
concluded the Anglo-Ottoman Convention. Though unratified the 
convention showed Britain's regional dominance over the 
Ottoman and the German empires. The First World War, however, 
gave the British the chance to complete what they had started in 
diplomacy. With the defeats of the Ottoman and German powers, 
Britain was the sole master of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
regions. 
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of British Domination over the Gulf Region 
Lord Curzon in his Persia and the Persian Question (1892) 
said: "The Pacification of the Persian Gulf in the past and the 
maintenance of the status quo are the exclusive work of this 
country [Britain]; and the British Resident at Bushire is to this 
hour the umpire to whom all parties appeal, and who has by 
treaties been entrusted with the duty of preserving the peace of 
the waters. "67 
To secure the access of their ships sailing to and from India 
the decision-makers of the British government realised that 
Britain needed to control not only India, but also the roads to it. 
This belief drove successive British authorities to use all possible 
policies available to them to bring the Gulf, as one of these 
roads, under British mastery. The most common and general 
policies the British followed were prohibiting war at sea, piracy, 
slavery, and arms and ammunition trade; securing the right of 
arbitration in the local disputes; controlling the foreign relations 
of the local Shaikhs and winning all concessions from them. It is 
worth mentioning here that these policies were, in practice, 
interconnected and interwoven and splitting them is only for 
reasons of clarity. 
67 Qouted in Denis Wright. "The Changed Balance of Power in the Persian 
Gulf, " Asian Affairs 60 (October 1973). p. 255. 
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Although the British Indian government has used both force 
and diplomacy to achieve its objectives in the Gulf region, this 
chapter will concentrate only on its treaty relations with the 
local forces. During her long stay in the region Britain signed 
many treaties with the Shaikhs, but only those which have 
relations with the aim of this chapter will be mentioned and 
discussed in the following pages. 
2.1 Prohibiting War at Sea, Piracy, Slavery, and Arms and 
Ammunition Trade 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century and the 
beginning of the nineteenth, the increased attacks (and 
competition) exercised by the Qawasim's ships in the Gulf started 
to be a real threat to British trade with India. These operations 
persuaded the British Indian government that the best way to face 
this new threat was to send its maritime forces to the Gulf 
waters. Indeed, just as the activities of the great European 
powers, especially the French, influenced the British government 
to sign a number of treaties with the Sultanate of Muscat and 
Oman and Persia, the challenge of the Qawasim convinced the 
British that they must carry out strong action against the so- 
called 'piratical Shaikhs'. 68 
Before examining British policy in confronting the so-called 
'piracy', a brief word about the basis of the accusation is 
necessary. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the 
decision-makers of the British Indian government classified any 
68 Kelly. Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 99. 
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attack in the Gulf waters as an act of piracy. The Qawasim, who 
were involved in wide trading in and around the Gulf, were the 
number one target for these allegations. In recent times, the issue 
has become more controversial. Many modern historians of the 
region have challenged the use of the word piracy in this context 
and the accusations that the Qawasim were 'pirates'. They have 
argued that what the British called piracy was really another form 
of warfare, no different from what they themselves did. A former 
British Ambassador in the Middle East questioned: "Were the 
Qawasim in truth congenital pirates? Or were they rather 
established maritime traders whose merchant fleets posed an 
obstacle to the [British] East India Company in its aim of 
cornering the profitable sea-trade between India and the Gulf? " 
He added: "Who, in fact, were the real pirates? "69 The Qawasim 
themselves rejected the British and others' accusations. The 
present Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 
wrote in a Ph. D. study that, "Every misfortune that befell a 
British ship inside the Gulf --and sometimes outside it-- was 
attributed to the 'piracy' of the Qawasim. .. . 
Rumours were taken 
as facts and compounded by other dubious hearsay, and were 
submitted as reports by various British agents who tried to trace 
every event and prove it to be the work of the mischievous 
Qawasim 'pirates'. When the culprits could not be identified, it 
was reported without a shade of doubt that it was the Qawasim 
who were responsible. When Agents and Residents wanted to 
69 Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's 
Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies. Cambridge 
Middle East Library 2 -5 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1991). p. 
98. 
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justify a certain action or to defend their policy or behaviour 
regarding an incident, the Qawasim provided a convenient 
scapegoat and the blame was laid on them. All these accusations 
were part of a deliberate policy which can only be described as 
the 'Big Lie'. 11 70 
Under the pretext of suppressing piracy and the slave-trade 
the East India Company dispatched three naval expeditions to the 
Gulf. 71 The three expeditions were undertaken in 1806,1809 and 
1818. Ras al-Khaimah, the Headquarters of Al-Qawasim, was 
totally crushed in 1819. The British navy then went to al-Hamrah, 
Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman, Sharjah and Dubai where they smashed 
the defences of the emirates and burned their ships. Before the 
British force left for Bombay in March 1820 they destroyed the 
Qawasim's ships which were landing or hiding in the islands of 
Qais, Lingah, Mughu, Asalu and Kangun. 72 As a result of this 
devastation, the Arab Shaikhs agreed in January 1820 to sign an 
agreement known as the 'General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of 
the Persian Gulf'. ' 
By forcing the Arab Shaikhs to sign the General Treaty the 
British succeeded, theoretically, in prohibiting war, piracy and 
slave trading in the Gulf waters. Article 4 of the 1820 treaty 
stated that the contracting tribes "shall be at peace with the 
70 Sultan Al-Qasimi. The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf (London: Croom 
Helm, 1986), p. 32. 
71 Anis, op. cit., p. 198, and Abdul-Aziz A. Ibrahim. The British Peace in 
the Arabian Gulf. 1858-1914: A Documentary Study (Al-Rivad: Darat al- 
Malik Abdul-Aziz 26,1982), p. 15. 
- Al-Khusousy, op. cit., p. 207. 
R/15/1/736. 
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British Government, and shall not fight with each other. " The 
Shaikhs promised in Article 1 not to commit any acts of "plunder 
and piracy by land and sea. " Article 2 warned any Arab individual 
belonging to the signatory tribes that if he attack "any that pass 
by land or sea of any nation... he shall be accounted an enemy of 
all mankind, and shall be held to have forfeited both life and 
goods. " Article 7 added "If any tribe, or others, shall not desist 
from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them 
according to their ability and circumstances. " Article 9 dealt with 
the slave trade. The Article declared that "The carrying off of 
slaves, men, women, or children, from the coasts of Africa or 
elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and 
piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature. " 
On 21 May 1835, the Shaikhs signed a maritime truce in 
which they pledged to end offences by sea against one another 
during the pearl diving season. 74 The signatories of the treaty 
were henceforth referred to as Trucial Shaikhs and the coast as 
Trucial instead of piratical 7' The 1835 truce was renewed every 
year until June 1843, when the Shaikhs agreed that the maritime 
truce would last for 10 years. 76 In 1853 a 'Treaty of Maritime 
peace in Perpetuity' was signed under British auspices. " By the 
74 The text is in Kelly. Britain and the Persian Gulf. Appendix II. pp. 840- 
1. 
Anis, op. cit., p. 198. 
76 Terms of a Maritime Truce for Ten Years agreed upon by the Chiefs of 
the Arabian Coast. under the mediation of the British Resident in the Gulf. 1 
June 1843. Aitchison. op. cit., vol. XI, pp. 250-1- 
77 Treat), of Peace in Perpetuity agreed upon by the Chiefs of the Arabian 
Coast on behalf of themselves. their heirs and successors, under the 
mediation of the British Resident. 1853. R/15/1/736. 
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first Article of the treaty the Shaikhs promised "a complete 
cessation of hostilities at sea... for evermore. " 
In January 1847 an imperial firman, or decree, was issued 
by the Ottoman government prohibiting engagement in the 
African slave trade . 
71 News of granting the firman encouraged 
the Trucial Chiefs to do the same. The Shaikhs promised, in the 
same year, to abolish the slave trade. They pledged to prohibit 
"the exportation of slaves from the coasts of Africa and 
elsewhere. "79 The 1847 agreement also granted British ships of 
war the right to search, seize and confiscate any vessels 
belonging to the contracted emirates that breached this 
agreement. The commitments of the 1847 agreement were 
repeated by the Shaikhs in 1856.80 In the period between August 
1872 and March 1873, all the Trucial Shaikhs repeated their 1847 
and 1856 promises to suppress the slave trade. 81 Moreover, at 
the end of November 1902 the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman undertook to "prohibit the 
78 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 587. Moreover. an Anglo- 
Ottoman Slave Trade Treaty was concluded on 26 August 1881. The two 
parties agreed to co-operate for the abolition of the African slave trade. 
Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XIII, pp. 20-8. 
79 Engagement entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr. Chief of Ras al- 
Khaimah and Sharjah, for the abolition of the African slave trade in his 
ports. 1847. The Shaikhs of Dubai, Ajman. Umm al-Qawain, and Abu Dhabi 
also signed the agreement. R/15/1/736. The Indian government sent presents 
of gold and silver watches, Kashmir shawls, and telescopes to the Shaikhs in 
return for their concessions. Kelly. Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 589. 
note: 2. 
8u Further engagement entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr with the 
British government, for the more effectual suppression of the Slave Trade- 
1856. A similar engagement was entered into by the Shaikhs of Umm al- 
Qawain, Dubai. Ajman, and Abu Dhabi. R/15/1/736. 
81 Letters of the Shaikhs of Ajman, Umm al-Qai«wain and Dubai. to the 
acting Political Resident. Lewis Pelle. L/P&S/3/84. For the letters of the 
Shaikhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah and Abu Dhabi, to the acting 
Resident see Aitchison. op. cit.. vol. XI. p. 256. 
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importation of arms for sale into... our territories, or the 
exportation therefrom. "82 
The Bahraini Shaikhs also engaged not to commit any act of 
war, piracy or slavery. They accepted the 1820 General Treaty 
and the Slave Trade Agreements of 1847 and 1856.83 On 31 May 
1861, the Shaikh of Bahrain promised in a new treaty with the 
British government to refrain from "all maritime aggressions of 
every description, from the prosecution of war, piracy, and 
slavery by sea" in return for "the support of the British 
Government in the maintenance of the security of my own 
possessions against similar aggressions directed against them by 
the Chiefs and tribes of this Gulf. "84 In 1872, Bahrain confirmed 
its previous anti-slave trade engagements. 85 On 30 April 1898, 
the Shaikh agreed that "the importation of arms and ammunition 
into the islands of Bahrain, and the exportation of the same 
therefrom, is absolutely prohibited. "86 
On 12 September 1868, Shaikh Muhammad bin Thani 
agreed to sign an agreement with the British Resident in the Gulf, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Pelly, whereby the Shaikh promised 
that "on no pretence whatsoever will I at any time put to sea with 
x, Agreement for the Prohibition of the Arms Traffic. 1902. R/15/1/736. 
83 For the 1820 General Treaty see R/15/1/736, and for the texts of the 
1847 and 1856 agreements see L/P&S/20/C 158D. 
xa Article II of the 1861 Friendly Agreement between Britain and Bahrain 
in L/P&S/20/C 158D. 
x-ý For the 24 August 1872 engagement of the Bahraini Shaikh see 
L/P&S/3/84. 
86 A proclamation and notification by the Shaikh of Bahrain prohibiting 
the importation and exportation of arms into and from Bahrain, 30 April 
1898. L/P&S/20/C 1 58D. 
34 
A 'British Lake' by Treaties 
hostile intention. " 87 During the First World War a new treaty was 
signed between the British government and the Qatari Shaikh, 
Abdullah bin Jasim. 8 8 Acco rding to Article 1 of the 1916 treaty 
the Shaikh undertoo k that he would "co-operate with the High 
British Government in the suppression of the slave-trade and 
piracy and generally in the maintenance of the Maritime Peace. " 
In a separate proclamation announced on the same day of the 
treaty the Shaikh also declared that "the importation and sale of 
arms, cartridges, and all munitions, into our territory, and the 
exportation of the same to other places, are absolutely 
prohibited. X89 
As far as Kuwait is concerned, Shaikh Sabah bin Jabir, on 
behalf of his father the Ruler, announced in April 1841 Kuwait's 
adherence to the Maritime Truce for one year. 90 This was the 
first official contact between the British government and the Al- 
Sabah family. 91 The Shaikh agreed to "the maintenance of truce 
and peace against the exercise of aggression at sea. " Britain did 
not ask Kuwait to renew her adherence to the Maritime Truce in 
the following year or to join the 1853 Treaty of Maritime peace 
87 Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XI, p. 255. Bin or Ibn means in Arabic son of. - 
e. g. Ibn Sabah, meaning the son of Sabah. 
88 Treaty between the British government and Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim of 
Qatar, 3 November 1916. L/P&S/20/C158E. 
89 Proclamation by Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim. 3 November 1916. 
L/P&S/20/C 1 58E. 
90 Adherence of the Shaikh of Kuwait to Maritime Truce for one year. 24 
April 1841. L/P&S/10/606. 
91 In 1809, Abdullah bin Sabah (r. 1756-1814) offered his help to the 
British expedition against the Qa« asim of Ras al-Khaimah. Bidwell. The 
Affairs of Kuwait. vol. I. p. xi, and Kuwait's Centre of Information, The 
Legend of Iraq's Historical Rights in the State of Kuwait (Al-Qahira: 
Kuwait's Centre of Information, 1990). p. 28. 
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in Perpetuity. The belief was that the Kuwaitis were not involved 
in what the British regarded as piracy. 92 Moreover, Shaikh 
Mubarak bin Sabah undertook in May 1900 that "the importations 
of arms and ammunition into Kuwait... and the exportation of the 
same are absolutely prohibited. "93 The Saudis' collaboration in 
stopping the Slave trade came only in the 1927 Jeddah Treaty. 94 
By Article 7 of the treaty Ibn Saud undertook "to co-operate by 
all means at his disposal with His Britannic Majesty in the 
suppression of the Slave trade. " 
During the British expeditions of 1806,1809 and 1818 the 
Omanis were fighting on the British side against the 'piratic' 
Qawasim. The Imams of Muscat also agreed in 1822,1839,1845 
and 1873 to prohibit the exportation and importation of slaves 
from their African Dominions. 95 In April 1873, Sultan Turki bin 
Said issued the following proclamation "To all who it may 
concern let it be known that we have entirely forbidden all traffic 
in slaves either publicly or privately and that in the event of our 
finding any one engaged in the same in our dominions or 
dependencies he will forfeit his property as well as his personal 
safety. "96 As far as the arms trade was concerned, the Omanis 
92 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in 
Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge Middle East Library 24 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1995), p. 17. 
93 Notification by Shaikh Mubarak bin Sabah of Kuwait, 24 May 1900. 
L/P&S/10/606. 
94 Treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the 
Hejaz and of Najd and its Dependencies. 20 May 1927. L/P&S/10/1166. 
95 For the 4 September 1822 and 17 December 1839 agreements see 
Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XI, pp. 287-8 and pp. 299-300 respectively. Also, 
see the 2 October 1845 and 14 April 1873 treaties in R/15/1/737A. 
96 Proclamation issued by Sayv-id Turki bin Said on 17 April 187 3. 
R/15/1/737A. 
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Imams issued many proclamations and notifications in 1898,1903 
and 1912. The common point between these proclamations was 
the Omanis' commitment to prevent the illegal arms and 
ammunition trade. Imam Faisal bin Turki's Proclamation of 6 
September 1912, for example, declared that "the sale of arms and 
ammunition or component parts... or their removal from place to 
place in my dominions is prohibited. "97 Moreover, on 17 February 
1921 Sultan Taimur bin Faisal adhered to the International Arms 
Traffic Convention of 1919. In a letter to the British Consul in 
Muscat, R. Wingate, the Sultan wrote that he accepted "the 
conditions of the Arms Traffic Convention. "98 
2.2 Securing the Right of Arbitration Between the Local 
Shaikhs99 
After prohibiting war at sea, piracy and slavery, the British 
Indian government worked for its Political Resident in the Gulf 
to be the absolute arbitrator in local disputes, and for his 
decisions to be accepted by the Shaikhs. The British government 
wanted all Shaikhs to inform its representatives in the region of 
all aggression upon their territories, ships or subjects. At the 
time of any aggression, the British demanded the Shaikhs promise 
not to retaliate against the attacker without seeking the 
permission of the British officials in the Gulf. By these 
`'' Proclamation by Savyid Faisal bin Turki in R/15/1/737A. For the 13th of 
January 1898 Proclamation and Notification and the 17th of October 1903 
Notification see R/15/1/737A. 
98 Undertaking by Sultan Taimur to Adhere to the Arms Traffic Convention 
of 1919 in R/15/1/7 37A. 
99 Chapters five and six of this dissertation will examine Britain's 
arbitration practice in some of the major disputes between the Gulf states. 
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arrangements, the British succeeded in limiting disturbance in the 
Gulf waters. 
In Article 3 of the 1843 Maritime Truce the Shaikhs of Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Umm al-Qaiwain and 
Ajman undertook that "in the event of any acts of aggression 
being committed at sea upon any of our subjects or dependants" 
they will not retaliate immediately, "but will inform the British 
Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take 
the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury 
inflicted. " Ten years later, the 1853 treaty of Maritime peace in 
Perpetuity recognised the British Political Resident's right of 
arbitration in local disputes and acknowledged the British as the 
guarantor power of security in the Gulf. The Shaikhs agreed that 
"the maintenance of the peace now concluded amongst us shall be 
watched over by the British Government. " 
In Article 3 of the Anglo-Bahraini Treaty of 1861 the 
Shaikh of Bahrain agreed "to make known all aggressions and 
depredations which may be designed, or have to place at sea, 
against myself, territories, or subject, as early as possible, to the 
British Resident in the Persian Gulf, as the arbitrator in such 
cases, promising that no act of aggression or retaliation shall be 
committed at sea by Bahrains or in the name of Bahrain, by 
myself or others under me, on other tribe, without his consent or 
that of the British Government, if it should be necessary to 
procure it. " The Shaikh also promised, as the Ruler of Bahrain, 
to redress "all maritime offences which in justice can be charged 
against my subjects or myself" by the Resident. 
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Shaikh Muhammad bin Thani of Qatar promised in the 1868 
agreement that, "in the event of disputes or misunderstanding 
arising, will invariably refer to the" Political Resident. The 
Shaikh also agreed in the same agreement that "in the event of a 
difference of opinion arising as to any question, whether money 
payment or other matter" with the Bahraini Shaikh, to refer it to 
the British government. 
2.3 Controlling the Foreign Relations of the Local Shaikhs 
As the study explained in the previous chapter, preventing 
other great European powers from enjoying any foothold in the 
Gulf was one of the principal pillars of the British policy 
practised in that region. Britain's treaties with Muscat (1798, 
1800) and Persia (1801) were the starting point of this policy. A 
few decades after the crushing of the Qawasim in 1818, the 
British came to the conclusion that --in addition to forbidding 
war, piracy, slavery, arms and ammunition trade and precluding 
the local disputes-- the success of their policy in the Gulf 
depended on controlling the foreign relations of the local 
Shaikhs. The Arab Shaikhs must not be allowed to cede, sell, 
lease, mortgage or give any part of their territories to any power 
other than Britain, and not to enter into any agreement or 
correspondence with any foreign power without the consent of 
the British government. By signing a new round of treaties with 
the local forces the British succeeded in committing them to the 
aforesaid conditions. 
39 
A 'British Lake' by- Treaties 
The Shaikh of Bahrain was the first who gave up his control 
of foreign affairs to the British. In December 1880 and again in 
March 1892 the Shaikh signed two Exclusive Agreements with the 
British government. '00 The terms of the 1892 agreements were 
accepted by the Shaikhs of the Trucial emirates. lo' One year 
earlier, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman also accepted not to 
cede, sell, mortgage or give any part of his territory "save to the 
British Government. i102 In two secret agreements, the 1899 
Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty and the Bandar Shwaikh Lease of 15 
October 1907, Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait committed himself and 
his heirs and successors to the same promises. 103 In Article 3 of 
the 1916 Anglo-Qatari Treaty the Qatari Shaikh also abandoned 
his control of foreign affairs to the British government. 
As far as Ibn Saud was concerned, until the outbreak of 
World War One in 1914, he had no agreements with the British 
government. 104 In order not to antagonise Ibn Saud and to gain 
100 Translation of Agreement signed by the Chief of Bahrain, 22 December 
1880. Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the British 
government, 13 March 1892. Both agreements in L/P&S/20/C158D. 
'01 The 1892 Exclusive Agreements are in R/15/1/736. According to Kelly, 
the 1892 treaty was not the first Exclusive treaty the British signed with the 
Trucial Shaikhs. He said in his Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 834-5, that 
in December 1887 the Trucial Chiefs undertook that they would not enter 
into official communication with any foreign government without British 
approval. 
1U2 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Britain and 
Muscat, 19 March 1891. R/15/1/738. 
103 Agreement of 23 January 1899 with Ruler of Kuwait in L/P&S/10/606; 
and Article 5 of the Lease of Land at Bandar Shwaikh, 1907. in 
L/P&S/ 10/606. 
104 In the period from May 1902 to February 1911 the British government 
rejected ten overtures of protection made by Ibn Saud before they finally 
signed the 1915 Darin Treaty. Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi 
Arabia: the Formative Years, 1902-1918, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies 19 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1986). pp. 50-80. 
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his support against the Ottoman empire in the war, the British 
signed the first formal treaty with Abdul-Aziz in December of 
1915.105 In return for Britain's protection of his emirate, Ibn 
Saud undertook in Article 3 to "refrain from entering into any 
correspondence, agreement, or treaty, with any Foreign Nation or 
Power, and further to give immediate notice to the Political 
authorities of the British Government of any attempt on the part 
of any other Power to interfere with" his territories. In Article 4 
Ibn Saud also agreed not to "cede, sell, mortgage, lease, or 
otherwise dispose" some of his territory or any part of them to 
"any Foreign Power, or to the subjects of any Foreign Power, 
without the consent of the British Government. " The same Article 
concluded with Ibn Saud's promise to "follow her [Britain] advice 
unreservedly. " 
Even Iraq, when she was under British mandate, agreed to 
follow British advice in foreign relations. On 10 October 1922, 
the British signed a Treaty of Alliance with the Iraqi 
government. 106 In Article 4 the Iraqi government committed itself 
to follow the advice of the British High Commissioner in Iraq "on 
all important matters affecting the international and financial 
obligations and interests" of the British government. The Iraqi 
government also promised in Article 8 of the same agreement that 
"No territory in Iraq shall be ceded or leased or in any way 
placed under the control of any Foreign Power. " 
" The treaty was signed at a meeting of the British Resident in the Gulf 
Sir Percy Cox and Ibn Saud near Bahrain. L/P&S/20/C 158E. 
106 Treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq. 
L/P&S/18/B384. 
41 
A 'British Lake' by Treaties 
Britain's Political Residency and Political Agencies in the 
Gulf, however, were the centre of her local power and influence. 
Through them the British government controlled the foreign 
policy of the local forces. The Political Resident and Political 
Agents watched the adherence of the local forces to the 
commitments they were obliged to respect in their treaties with 
the British government. Lord Curzon noted in August 1903 that 
the British Resident was the real "uncrowned King of the Gulf. "107 
Dr Paul Harrison of the American Arabian Mission described the 
British political Agent as "an absolute czar. "los 
2.4 Winning All Concessions from the Shaikhs 
By their commitments not to cede, sell, give, mortgage and 
lease any part of their territories to other than Britain, and their 
promises not to enter into correspondence or agreements with 
any foreign power or receive any representative of any foreign 
power without the consent of the British government, the local 
Shaikhs were committed legally not to grant any concession to 
other than Britain. However, to ensure the success of her policy 
in the region the British government obtained new direct 
engagements from most of the local forces whereby the latter 
promised not to give any concession to any foreign government 
or subject. And sometimes if it happened that one of the local 
Shaikhs granted a concession to an unacceptable quarter, the 
British would force him to cancel it. In 1906, for example, the 
Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 258. 
'"ý Robert Lacey. The Kin gdom (London : Hutchinson. 1981), p. 74. 
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British Resident used his influence to make the Ruler of Sharjah 
renounce a concession for the exploitation of red oxide on Abu 
Musa island formerly granted to a German Company. '°9 It is not 
the intention to follow the history of all local forces concessions 
as a selection will provide sufficient illustration. 
2.4.1 The Communication Concessions 
In 1864 the Trucial Shaikhs engaged on behalf of 
themselves, their heirs and successors, to "respect and abstain 
from all and every interference with the ... telegraphic operations 
that may be carried on" by the British government in or around 
their territo ry. "0 In November 1864 the Sultan of Muscat 
promised to do the same. " Moreover, Articles I and II of the 
agreement allowed the British "to construct one or more lines of 
telegraphic communication anywhere within the territories 
appertaining to the State of Muscat" and also in the territories 
the Sultan "may hold in lease from the Shah of Persia. " Two 
months later, the Muscati Sultan gave the same concession with 
regard to "any portion of territory subject to the sovereignty of 
His Highness, both in Arabia and Mekran. "112 In 1912, the 
Shaikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait accepted the establishment of a 
109 From Government of India to HM Secretary of State for India, 27 June 
1907. R/15/1/254. 
110 Additional Article for the protection of the Telegraph Line and Stations. 
agreed to before Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Pelle. Acting Political Resident. 
and appended to the Treaty of Peace of 4 May 1853,18 April 1864. 
R/15/1/736. 
11 Article III of Agreement between the British government and the Sultan 
of Muscat, 17 November 1864. R/15/1/737A. 
", Article I of the 1865 Convention between the British government and 
Muscat, 19 January. R/15/1/737A. 
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wireless telegraph installation in their territories. 113 By Article 9 
of the 1916 treaty the Qatari Shaikh undertook "to allow the 
establishment of... a Telegraph installation anywhere in my 
territory whenever the British Government should hereafter 
desire. " 
In a letter dated 28 February 1904 Shaikh Mubarak 
promised on behalf of himself and his successors "not to allow 
the establishment of a Post Office" in Kuwait by any government 
other than the British. 114 Also, the Bahraini Shaikh, Isa bin Ali, 
undertook in 1911 to reject any Foreign government's offer to 
establish a Post Office in his territory. "5 Article 9 of the 1916 
Anglo-Qatari Treaty dealt with the Post Office concession. 
According to this Article the Shaikh pledged to "allow the 
establishment of a British Post Office" in his territory and to 
protect it when established. 
On 22 July 1932, an agreement between Shaikh Sultan bin 
Saqr, Ruler of Sharjah, and the British government for the 
establishment of an Air Station at Sharjah was concluded. 116 On 
23 May 1934, Shaikh Ahmad Al-Jabir signed the confidential 
'Kuwait Civil Air Agreement' whereby he granted the British 
113 For the Bahraini commitment see Shaikh Isa bin All Al Khalifah. Chief 
of Bahrain, to Political Resident, 19 June 1912, in L/P&S/20/C 158D. For the 
Kuwaiti concession see Undertaking of Ruler of Kuwait with regard to 
establishment of a Wireless Telegraph Installation at Kuwait. 26 July 1912. 
in L/P&S/10/606. 
114 Postal Agreement of 28 February 1904, with the Shaikh of Kuwait in 
L/P&S/ 10/606. 
"ý A letter from Shaikh Isa to the Political Agent at Bahrain, Captain D. L. 
R. Lorimer. 4 September 1911. L/P&S/20/C 158D. 
116 Agreement between Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr and the British government 
for the establishment of an Air Station of Sharjah. R/15/1/742. 
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government "exclusive rights to establish and maintain... an 
aerodrome or aerodromes and ancillary services" within Kuwait's 
territories. 117 In 1934, Bahrain and Muscat agreed to concede to 
the British the same rights, as did the Ruler of Dubai on 28 May 
1960.118 
In 1947, a British company signed Cable and Wireless 
Concession Agreements with Kuwait and Bahrain, and in 1951 
with the Shaikh of Dubai. 119 According to its terms the Shaikhs 
granted the company, for a period of twenty years the right "to 
establish, maintain and operate telecommunication services" 
between their emirates and the outside world. 120 
2.4.2 The Pearling Concessions 
In a letter dated 20 July 191 1, the Political Resident 
warned the Bahraini Shaikh and the Trucial Chiefs "that you 
1 17 Heads of Agreement between British government and the Shaikh of 
Kuwait, in R/15/1/742. This concession was confirmed later by another two 
agreements. The first was concluded on 21 June 1949 and the second on 5 
September 1950. For both Agreements see R/15/1/742. 
118 Heads of Agreement between British government and Shaikh Hamad bin 
Isa Al Khalifah, in R/15/1/742. In the case of Muscat, the Sultan renewed 
the concession on 5 April 1947. For the 1934 Muscat Civil Air Agreement 
see L/P&S/18/B443 and for the 1947 Agreement see R/15/1/742. For the 
Shaikh of Dubai's concession see his letter to the Political Agent. Trucial 
States, 28 May 1960, in FO 371/149071. 
119 For the Agreement between Shaikh Ahmad Al-Jabir of Kuwait and the 
British Company, Cable and Wireless Limited, 1 May 1947. see 
L/P&S/12/4115A. For the 28 July 1947 Bahraini concession see Historical 
Summary of Events in the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms and the Sultanate of 
Oman, 1928-1953, Appendix N. Paragraph 139, pp. 233-4. For the 
Agreement between the Ruler of Dubai and the Cable and Wireless Limited 
of 31 January 1951 see FO 1016/83. 
120 A similar licence granted by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman to Cable 
and Wireless Limited on 1 January 1939. The concession was renewed on 1 
December 1951. For the Licences see Cabinet Office, Historical Summary 
Events, Appendices. 
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should on no account respond to overtures from any quarter for 
concessions for fishing on pearl banks over which you possess 
rights without first consulting the Residency. "121 In their replying 
letters, all the Trucial Shaikhs promised not to grant any pearling 
and sponge fishing concessions to other than the British 
government. 122 The Shaikh of Bahrain promised to do the same. 123 
In July 1911, Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait pledged to consult the 
British officials in the Gulf before giving concessions for sponge 
and pearl to anyone. 124 The Shaikh of Qatar agreed in the 1916 
treaty, Article V, that "without the consent of the High British 
Government, I will not grant pearl-fishery concessions, or any 
other monopolies, concessions... to anyone whosoever. " 
2.4.3 The Oil Concessions 
On 29 May 1901, Shah Muzaffar Al-Din of Persia (r. 1896- 
1907) granted William Knox D'Arcy, a British financier, the 
rights of drilling in Persia for sixty years, excluding only the five 
northern provinces. 125 In 1908, oil was discovered in the Persian 
edge of the Gulf. As a consequence, the hope of the British of 
discovering oil in the Arabian side of the Gulf increased. They 
121 A letter from the Political Resident to the Rulers of Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman and Umm al-Qai«ain in R/15111736. 
122 Letters from the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi. Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman. Umm al- 
QawA ain and Ras al-Khaimah to the Political Resident, 27 July-6 November 
191 1. R/15/1/7 16. 
123 A letter from Shaikh Isa of Bahrain to Colonel Percy Cox, 29 July 1911. 
in L/P&S/20/C 1 58D. 
'24 The letters of Captain W. Shakespear. Political Agent at Kuwait. to 
Shaikh Mubarak and Mubarak's reply. regarding Pearling Concessions, 29 
Ju1v 1911. L/P&S/10/606. 
', ý For the text of the concession see Hurewitz_ op. cit.. vol. I. pp. 483-4 
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began to secure the oil concessions from the local Shaikhs. 
Shaikh Mubarak Al-Sabah was the first who committed himself 
not to give an oil concession to anyone except a person 
nominated by the British. 126 Shaikh Isa of Bahrain undertook in 
May 1914 not to "embark on the exploitation" by himself and 
would not "entertain overtures from any quarter" without the 
approval of the British Political Agent in Bahrain. 127 
In 1922 the Rulers of Sharjah (17th February), Ras al- 
Khaimah (22nd February), Dubai (2nd May), Abu Dhabi (3th 
May), Ajman (4th May) and Umm al-Qaiwain (8th May) sent 
letters to the Political Resident Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Trevor 
undertaking that, if oil was found in their territories, no 
concession would be given "except to the person appointed by the 
High British Government. i128 In 1923, the Sultan of Muscat 
undertook that he "will not exploit any petroleum which may be 
found anywhere within our territories and will not grant 
permission for its exploitation" without the consent of the British 
government. 
129 
As regards Qatar, the Political Resident threatened on 11 
May 1935 that British protection to the Qatari Shaikh was on 
condition that the oil concession was given to the Anglo-Persian 
', `' A letter from Shaikh Mubarak to the Political Resident regarding oil 
deposits at Kuwait. 27 October 1913. L/P&S/10/606. 
127 Shaikh Isa to Major A. P. Trevor, Political Agent in Bahrain. 
L/P&S/20/C 1 58D. 
1-x The Trucial Shaikhs' letters are in R/15/1/738. 
129 A letter from Sultan Taimur bin Faisal of Muscat to Major Rae. Britain's 
Consul at Muscat. 10 January 1923. Aitchison. op. cit.. vol. XI, p. 319. 
47 
A 'British Lake' by Treaties 
Oil Company (APOC). 130 Six days later Qatar signed the 
Concession Agreement with the said Company. " By Article 1 the 
Shaikh agreed to grant the Company "the sole right, throughout 
the principality of Qatar, to explore, to prospect, to drill for, 
and to extract and to ship and to export, and the right to refine 
and sell petroleum and natural gases, ozokerite, asphalt, and 
everything which is extracted therefrom. " 
On 18 August 1953, Shaikh Muhammad bin Hamad Al 
Sharqi of al-Fujairah, one of the seven emirates of today's United 
Arab Emirates, also gave the oil exploration concession to a 
British Company. 132 According to Article 3 of the concession, the 
Shaikh granted the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) 
Limited an "exclusive right to explore and search for natural gas, 
asphalt, ozokerite, crude petroleum and their products and 
cognate substances within the State. " 
Conclusion 
It is clear that, by encouraging and facilitating the above 
truces and treaties between and from the Arab Shaikhs of that 
time, Britain's only concern was to secure the passage of her 
ships via the Gulf waters. However, watching the Gulf waters was 
130 Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. Fowle, Political Resident. to Shaikh Abdullah 
Al-Thani of Qatar. 11 May 1935. R/15/1/632. 
131 Concession Agreement between the APOC and the Ruler of Qatar. 17 
May 1935. Foreign Office, A Collection of Oil Agreements and Connected 
Documents Relating to the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms and the Sultanate of 
Muscat and Oman (1954), pp. 111-6. 
13, Exploration Agreement between the Ruler of Fujairah and Petroleum 
Development (Trucial Coast) Limited. 18 August 1953. in FO 371/104401. 
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an important part in the success of British policy in the region. 
By the treaty system the British increased their control over the 
Gulf region. Britain formalised the presence of her cruisers and 
ships in the Gulf waters. Her treaty relations with the Gulf 
Shaikhs had granted the British ships of war the authority to 
intervene whenever they thought there was a threat to the safety 
of the Gulf waters. The British navy had the right to search, 
seize, confiscate, and even bombard any vessels belonging to the 
contracted Shaikhs if caught violating their engagements. The 
appointment of a full Political Resident and Agents in the region 
also helped in checking the local Shaikhs from breaching their 
promises to the British. In short, with her fleet escorting the 
Gulf waters and her Political Resident and Agents watching the 
activities and policies of the local Shaikhs, the Gulf was a 
'British lake' 
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Chapter III Britain and the Emergence and Political 
Evolution of the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and 
Kuwait 
Although, as the previous chapter illustrated, each of the 
above four modern Gulf emirates had individual treaty relations 
with the British government, the main theme of this chapter is 
pointing out the importance of the British role in their emergence 
and their political-historical evolution as independent states. 
While the second section concentrates on the British role, the 
first gives a general social and political background to the 
Arabian side of the Gulf prior to the British arrival. 
3.1 Before the Advent of the British 
It would be very difficult to understand the emergence and 
political evolution of modern UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait 
emirates without pondering, briefly and generally, the tribal and 
political structure of their societies. Throughout its long history, 
most of the Arabian Gulf region inhabitants belonged to tribes. 
Collectively, the Arabs comprised hadar and bedou. The 
individual Arab tribe could be composed solely of one or the 
other or a combination of the two. 133 Usually the hadaris centred 
on coastal towns or in oasis settlements and the bedouins moved 
from place to place in search of pastures and wells for their 
herds. 
133 It must be borne in mind that the terms 'tribe' and 'bedou or nomad' are 
not synonyms. 
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The inhabitants of the four emirates were dependent for 
their livelihood on pearling, shipping, fishing, trading, 
agriculture and herding. The pearling industry, specifically, was 
the crucially important national resource for the economies of 
these emirates. In the case of Bahrain, Lorimer estimated that the 
annual value of the emirate' s pearling trade in 1790 was near half 
a million Bombay Rupees . 
134 Ten years later, according to 
Captain John Malcolm's assessment, the figure had even increased 
to one million. 135 Moreover, in the 1820s about 2,500 boats were 
busy in pearl fishing. 136 
An Arab chief substantiated his claim to authority on three 
basic grounds: the loyalty of tribes within a given area, which he 
protected and dominated and from whom he collected Zakat 
(Alms)137, his possession of property therein, and his authority in 
enforcing a settlement, either personally or through a deputy, of 
disputes between the inhabitants of the areas he claimed. 138 
Nevertheless, there had never been definite territorial frontiers, 
in the western perspective, separating the neighbouring tribes' 
land or sea. Julian Walker, Assistant to the British Political 
Agent in the former Trucial emirates in the 1950s, described in 
13-' Al-Qasimi, op. cit.. p. 10. 
'; ' Ibid. 
136 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 30. 
"- Zakat is one of five pillars upon which Islam is based. The Zakat is 
levied on property. It is collected by the state and used for the benefit of the 
poor. 
'ix John Kelly. "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in Eastern Arabia. " 
International Affairs 34 (January 1958). pp. 20-1. 
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an article published in 1994 the frontiers that separated the small 
emirates of today's UAE as "the squiggly tribal frontiers. 11 139 
Although the western idea of territorial sovereignty was 
unknown, or at least unclear, for both the inhabitants and their 
Shaikhs in the Arabian Gulf region, some local territorial 
structures did indeed exist. 140 The tribes had the perception that 
their right and authority had an earthly domain which should not 
be transgressed. The competition of the neighbouring tribes for 
access for their flocks to grazing lands or for their ships to 
pearling banks often caused disputes and constant clashes 
between them. 141 This certainly indicates that they were 
definitely aware whether they were carrying out their activities in 
an area which belonged to their tribe or whether they were in an 
area strange to them where others had authority. In short, 
neighbouring tribes knew that any sort of trespassing would be 
considered a violation or transgression resulting in a dispute or 
even a war between the respective tribes. 142 
In the period extending from mid-eighteenth century to the 
early years of the nineteenth three major factors, politically 
speaking, played a decisive role in providing the framework of 
the modern Arabian side of the Gulf. They were the birth and 
: 139 Julian Walker, "Practical Problems of Boundary Delimitation in Arabia 
the Case of the United Arab Emirates, " in Richard Schofield, (ed. ). 
Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, The SOAS/GRC Geopolitics 
Series 1 (London: University College London Press. 1994), p. 109. 
''" John Wilkinson. "Britain's Role in Boundary Drawing in Arabia: a 
Synopsis, " in Schofield. Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States. p. 97. 
141 John Anthony. Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics. 
Petroleum (Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute. 1975). p. 22. 
142 Muhammod Tawfiq. "An Introduction to the Arabic Political Borders 
Map, " Al-Siassa Al-Dawlva 111 (January 1993), p. 166. 
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raising of the Muwahiddun (Unitarians)"' movement in Najd (the 
central province of what is now Saudi Arabia) and its consistent 
efforts to spread its Dawa (call) 144 into the Gulf emirates; the 
weakness of the Ottoman Khilafah's influence in the Arabian Gulf 
region; and the coming of the British to the Gulf waters. These 
three factors, as the following pages will explain, were in 
practice interconnected. 
Historically, the Arabian side of the Gulf and the Arabian 
Peninsula regions were regarded, at least theoretically, as parts 
of the Ottoman Khilafah. '45 The principal aim of the Ottoman 
governments, as the centre of leadership of the Muslim world, 
was to guarantee the safety of the Hajj146 (Pilgrimage) road to the 
holiest cities in Islam: Makkah and Madinah. 14' The Ottomans, 
143 Though the movement of the Aluwahiddun is known by the West as 
Wahhabism (after its founder Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab), its 
followers like to call themselves Muwahiddun. This study prefers to use the 
term which Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and his followers chose for themselves. 
144 Dawa means propagating Islam through word and action, calling the 
people to follow the orders of -lllah (God). 
'11' Halford Hoskins, "The Background of the British Position in Arabia, " 
The Middle East Journal 1 (1947), pp. 146-7; and Herbert Liebesny, 
"International Relations of Arabia: The Dependent Areas. " The Middle East 
Journal 1 (April 1947), p. 149. Present-day Iraq was exception. The 
Ottomans ruled it directly by appointing an Ottoman H'alis (governors) in 
Baghdad and Basrah. 
146 Hajj is one of the five Pillars of Islam. Therefore every Muslim must 
perform the pilgrimage to Makkah at least once in his lifetime. However. 
Hajj is a must only for those who are able to afford it. 
1' Makkah and Madinah (the birthplaces of Islam) are the principal cities 
of the present-day Saudi Arabia Kingdom. Makkah. the Holy City as well as 
the spiritual capital of Islam, embraces the ancient House of God, the Holy 
Kaahah, which stands in the middle of the Great Mosque. The Holy Kaahah 
is the gihlah, or direction, towards which Muslims turn in Salaat (prayer) 
five times a day. Madinah was the capital of Islam at the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad (Peace be upon him) and the orthodox Khalifahs who followed 
him. From this city, the Prophet and his faithful launched the call to Islam. 
Madinah also hosts the Magnificent Mosque of the Prophet which in turn 
houses his tomb. 
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therefore, were happy to control the routes to these cities and to 
leave the remote areas of these regions to the local chiefs to 
administer "in return for a vague acknowledgement of 
submission. i 148 
As a consequence of loose Ottoman administration and 
weakness of control in the Arabian Gulf and Peninsula regions, 
some powerful Shaikhs set up native principalities and chiefdoms, 
which preserved their autonomy until the advent of the British. 
Despite their internal freedom the local Shaikhs did not deny the 
Ottoman authority over them. There were many ways and means 
by which the Shaikhs acknowledged it. Openly admitting Ottoman 
authority, raising the Ottoman flag over their forts or ships, 
accepting the Ottoman title of qaimmaqam (governor) and paying 
Zakat or tribute were some of these means. 
Besides experiencing division, most parts of the Arabian 
Gulf and Peninsula regions had suffered from ignorance and 
poverty. Successive Ottoman governments shared the 
responsibility. They did not pay great attention to spreading the 
right Islamic education and beliefs. In 1744, Ibn Abdul-Wahhab 
made a compact to replace the anarchy and irreligion into which 
tribal Arabia had descended with a state based upon a reformed 
and a purified Islam. 149 A recent study conducted by J. 
Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontier, states rightly that the development 
148 Bidwell, The Affairs of Arabia, vol. I. p. xi. 
149 George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia. " in Derek Hopwood. (ed. ), 
The Arabian Peninsula. Society and Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1972). p. 56. 
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of Ibn Abdul-Wahhab's movement "represented, at least in part, a 
reaction to... the corruption of the Ottoman order. "lso 
The Muwahiddun religious reform movement was 
established by Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab, who was 
born at Uyaynah in 1703 and died at Dariyyah in 1792 15' 
Uyaynah and Dariyyah are both Najdi principalities. The 
movement subscribed to the majority Sunni sect of Islam, and its 
major objectives were to call the people away from associating 
others with Allah (God) and to adhere to the Koran (Allah's 
revelation) and Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad's sayings and 
deeds). 152 An observer noted that it was a puritanical movement 
that sought to unify the Muslim nation "into its pristine form by 
rigid conformity to the precepts of Islam. "153 
In 1744-45, Muhammad bin Saud (the father of today's 
Ruling family in Saudi Arabia), then the Ruler of Dariyyah town, 
campaigned for Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and became the patron of his 
mission in fighting all opposing forces in the region. '54 By the 
early years of the nineteenth century, with the spiritual force of 
the Muwahiddun revival and the fighting power of Al-Saud, a 
great part of the Arabian Peninsula, including Makkah and 
150 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, p. xv. 
'; ' For Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahab's bibliography see Shaikh 
Uthman bin Bishr, The Sign of Glory in the History of Najd (Al-Riad. Darat 
al-Malik Abdul-Aziz 27,1983). vol. I, pp. 180-99. 
'5, Shaikh Abdul-Aziz bin Bazz. Imam Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab: His 
Call and Biography (Al-Rivad: Maktabat Dar al-Ssalam. 1412/1992). pp. 50- 
2. 
1'; Wilkinson. Arabia's Frontiers. p. xviii. The word Islam itself means 
submission and obedience to Allah. Submission is acceptance of Allah's 
orders. Obedience means putting Allah's commands into practice. 
'S' Ibn Bishr. op. cit.. vol. I, pp. 41-3 
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Madinah, had fallen under the mastery of the Muwahiddun. "' 
Wilkinson believes that by that time, the movement "presented a 
major challenge" not just to the Ottomans, but even to the British 
and the French. '56 
By the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the Qawasim 
confederation of the Omani Coast had accepted the call of the 
Muwahiddun. The Qawasim, in the scale of that time, was a 
strong regional maritime power. Their naval force at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century consisted of, approximately, 
8,000 belligerents and 900 ships. 157 Their influence extended to 
both the Persian and Arab coasts. The Qawasim acted as if they 
were the naval extension of the Muwahiddun movement. 158 In 
return for their secure passage in the Gulf waters, the European 
ships, including the British, were required by the Qawasim to pay 
a tribute. If any vessel refused to do so, the Qawasim navy would 
attack it. 
The British believed that there was a relation between the 
influence of the Muwahiddun on the Qawasim tribe and the raids 
which the latter began to undertake on their ships. Aitchison, 
then Under Secretary in the Foreign Department of the 
'') Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 101, and Ibn Bazz, op. cit., pp. 
47-9. 
Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, p. xv. 
Rosemarie Zahlan. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait. 
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1989), p. 6. Al-Qasimi stated that the Qa«vasim naval force at that time 
consisted of 63 large and 669 small ships. with a crew of 18,760 men. Al- 
Qasimi. op. cit.. p. 31. 
''x Zahlan. op. cit., p. 7: Ibn Bishr, op. cit., vol. II, p. 52, and Muhammad 
Keshk. The Saudis and the Islamic Alternative: the Source of Legitimacy for 
the Saudi Regime (Massachusetts: Halliday Lithograph Corporation. 1982). 
p. 202. 
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government of India, commented that "It was by instigating the 
Qawasim tribe of Arabs to acts of piracy in the Persian Gulf that 
Wahhabis first attracted the attention of the British 
Government. i159 For that reason, the decision-makers of the 
British Indian government watched the Muwahiddun movement 
with worry. The government feared that the success of the 
movement would lead gradually to the control by the Muwahiddun 
of the Coastal emirates of the Gulf and this was, according to the 
British imperial agenda, a forbidden area none was permitted to 
come close to. Thus action must be taken. 
The accomplishment of the Muwahiddun also convinced the 
Ottoman government that they must put an end to the former's 
rule. In 1811, the Khalifah authorised his viceroy of Egypt, 
Muhammad All (r. 1805-48), to send an expeditionary force to 
Arabia. By 1813 the Egyptian-Ottoman forces, under the 
leadership of Muhammad Ali's son--Ibrahim Pahsh, had retaken 
Makkah and Madinah, and after a long blockade they captured 
and destroyed the Muwahiddun's capital of Dariyyah in 1818 160 
The achievements of the Egyptians encouraged the British Indian 
government to send its third naval expedition of 1818 to the Gulf 
waters in order to suppress the piratic, i. e. the Qawasim and 
their supporters, and from then began the long British stay in the 
Gulf waters. 
Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XI. p. 182. 
A full detail of the Egyptian expedition is in ibn Bishr's book: The Sign 
of Glory. vol. 1, pp. 32 1- 3 2.366-79,184-422. 
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3.2 The British Role in the Emergence and Political 
Evolution of the Four Gulf Emirates 
Looking in retrospect at the history of the British treaty 
relationships with the Shaikhs of the Arabian tribes whose 
territories were adjacent to the Gulf waters reveals that the 
modern emirate of the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait owe so 
much of their emergence, survival and political evolution to the 
British. Had it not been for British acknowledgement and 
protection policies, these emirates (or at least large parts of 
them) would have undoubtedly been absorbed by, or united with, 
their larger powerful neighbours. Bahrain would be either an 
Iranian or a Saudi island. The Qatari Peninsula, or a large section 
of it, would belong either to Bahrain or to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. The whole of mainland Kuwait, or great parts of it and/or 
some of her islands would be controlled by one of her big 
neighbours: Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Iran. A large part of present 
UAE, and especially of Abu Dhabi, would now belong to Saudi 
Arabia or even Oman. Glen Balfour-Paul, a former British 
Ambassador, argued that "By signing individual treaties with 
whatever shaikhly figures were dominant at the time along the 
route through the Gulf to the Indian empire, Britain's policy had 
the effect, wittingly or not, of 'legitimising' and perpetuating the 
fragmented political system which happened then to prevail. it 161 
Though Britain's relations with the four emirates went 
through several principal stages, the remainder of this chapter 
161 Glen Balfour-Paul, "Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: 
Political and Social Evolution, " in Ian Netton. (ed. ). Arabia and the Gulf: 
from Traditional Society to Modern States (London: Croom Helm. 1986), p. 
157. 
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will study only the consequences of British acknowledgement and 
protection policies in the region. It is felt that speaking in more 
detail about British policies towards each of the four emirates 
individually is the most appropriate way to examine the British 
role. 
3.2.1 The United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates lies in the east of Arabia and is 
bordered by the Sultanate of Oman to the south and south-west, 
by the Gulf of Oman to the west, and by the Gulf and Qatar to 
the north. It is bounded by Saudi Arabia from east and south- 
east. The UAE, a federal state, consists of seven small, sovereign 
Arab emirates --Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, 
Umm al-Qawain, Ajman and al-Fujairah. Each emirate has its own 
Ruler. Their territories spread on the southern shores of the 
Gulf, extending eastwards to the Gulf of Oman. Six of the 
emirates front the southern shore of the Arabian Gulf, and al- 
Fujairah faces the Gulf of Oman. The UAE constitute a land area 
of 83,600 sq km/32,300 sq mi. Abu Dhabi is not only the capital 
of the federation, but is also the most important emirate . 
162 In 
1970, the population of the UAE was about 230,000.163 
As already explained in the previous chapter, the record of 
the historical Anglo-Trucial emirates' treaty relations testified 
16 -2 Abu Dhabi has more territory than all the others combined (67.000 sq 
km/26.000 sq mi). Economically. speaking. Abu Dhabi's large oil reserves is 
another factor of her predominant position in the federation. 
163 United Nations Statistical Pocketbook. World Statistics in Brief (New 
York: United Nations. 1979). p. 141. 
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that throughout the nineteenth century the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman and Umm al-Qawain 
participated in all principal treaties. 164 They all signed the 1820 
General Treaty, took part annually in the 1835-42 maritime truce, 
endorsed the ten years Maritime truce of 1843, engaged in the 
1853 Treaty of Maritime peace in Perpetuity, and signed the 
Exclusive Agreements of 1887 and 1892. By these truces and 
treaties the British acknowledged and confirmed the divided 
societies that happened to exist at that time in that part of the 
Gulf. Indeed, repeated British dealings with these emirates 
served to raise the feeling of independence of their Shaikhs, and 
thus formed a basis for their claims of independence in future 
time. 
In the case of protection, although Britain granted her 
formal protection to the Trucial Shaikdoms only in 1892, in 
practice the British government defended the emirates before that 
date. The long-standing rejection by British governments of 
Persian and Saudi claims in particular support the above 
assumption. Up to Britain's 1968 announcement of withdrawing 
her forces from the Gulf, successive British governments denied 
the Iranian claims to some of the emirates' islands, especially 
Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. On 29th and 30th November 1971, 
only hours before the British withdrawal from the region took 
place, Iran seized the three small islands. The Iranian operation 
provides a distinct indication of Britain's historical protective 
role in the region. However, chapter six will examine the Iranian- 
164 With regards to al -Fujairah, the British recognised her as an 
independent Shaikhdom only in 1952. 
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UAE dispute over the three islands and the British government's 
role in it in more detail. 
As far as the Saudi threat was concerned, the Saudis 
promised in 1866,1915 and again in 1927 not to attack the 
territories of the Gulf emirates who were in special treaty 
relations with the British government. Imam Faisal bin Abdullah, 
the Saudi leader, assured the British Resident in 1866 that he 
"will not injure or attack the territories of the Arab tribes in 
alliance with the British Government. " 165 Ibn Saud repeated in 
1915 the same assurance in return for British recognition of him 
as the independent Sultan of Najd and its dependencies and 
guaranteed him their assistance if any foreign power should 
attack his territories. Although the effect of the 1915 treaty 
ceased when the two parties signed on 20 May 1927 the Jeddah 
Treaty, Ibn Saud undertook in Article 6 of the latter treaty "to 
maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of 
Kuwait, and Bahrain, and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman 
Coast, who are in special treaty relations" with the British 
government. 
Ibn Saud's striving efforts before, in and after World War I 
to re-establish his forefathers' rule in the former Ottoman 
provinces of Najd, al-Hasa and Hejaz (the Western region 
bordering the Red Sea) increased the number of boundary 
1(S A declaration by Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Manah, a representative 
of Imam Abdullah bin Faisal. at Bushire. on 21 April 1866. Aitchison. , 
op 
cit.. vol. XI, p. 206. 
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disputes in the Arabian Gulf/Peninsula regions. 166 And although 
the 1922 Uqair Treaty delimited the northern boundaries of Najd 
with Iraq and Kuwait and the 1925 Hadda Agreement defined the 
Najd-Jordan frontier, no agreements were concluded to fix the 
Kingdom's eastern and south-eastern boundaries with Qatar, the 
Trucial emirates, Oman and Yemen. 167 As a result of this policy, 
the Buraimi dispute, which exploded in the 1930s, between the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and the Shaikhdom of 
Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, on the other, 
was one of these erupted disputes. 
The Buraimi Oasis is situated in the south-eastern corner of 
Arabia. According to Lorimer, the oasis' location is "a little 
south of a straight line drawn between the coastal towns of Sohar 
and Abu Dhabi about 65 miles west by south of the former, and 
85 miles east by south of the latter. "168 The Buraimi Oasis is a 
cluster of nine villages. They are: Hill, A1-Qattarah, Al-Qimi, Al- 
Mutaradh, Al-Ain, Al-Muwaiqii, Sara, Hamasa and Buraimi. Six 
of them were claimed by Abu Dhabi and three by Muscat, while 
Saudi Arabia demanded them all. 
166 On 16 January 1902, Ibn Saud began his conquests by capturing Riyadh. 
With the aid of the Ikhwan (brothers), Ibn Saud achieved all his following 
victories. He retook al-Hasa from the Ottomans in 1913. In 1922 he crushed 
Ibn Rashids' capital. Hail. Two years later. he obtained Makkah from the 
Hashemites and in the following year seized all the Hejaz. Furthermore. in 
1934, two years after the declaration of today's kingdom, he ended with 
occupying the Asir region. 
16T For the Uqair Treaty of 2 December 1922 see L/P&S/20/C 1 58E: and for 
the Hadda Agreement of 2 November 1925 see L/P&S/20/CI58E. 
168 J. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf: Oman and Central Arabia 
(Calcutta: Publication of the Government of India. 1908-1915), vol. II. p. 
260. 
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In the Buraimi dispute the British government defended the 
interests of her proteges, Abu Dhabi and Oman. Acc ording to its 
special treaty relationship with Abu Dhabi, which gave Britain 
the right to conduct Abu Dhabi's fo reign relations , and at the 
request of the Sultan of Oman, the British government 
represented their case both in direct negotiations with the Saudi 
government and in front of an international tribunal. 169 
Throughout its negotiations with the Saudis, the British 
government always rejected the Saudi claims. Moreover, when, in 
August 1952, the Saudi government sent her forces to control the 
oasis, the British government named the Saudi behaviour an act 
of invasion. 170 On 26 October 1955, Anthony Eden, the British 
Prime Minister (1955-7), announced that the Saudi forces had 
been compelled to leave Buraimi by the British-officered forces 
of Muscat and Abu Dhabi. 171 
The dispute over Buraimi continued until the British 
withdrew their forces from the Gulf at the end of 1971. 
Thereafter, it took the governments of Saudi Arabia and the 
newly established UAE federation only three years to reach an 
agreement over this long-running dispute. The two governments 
agreed to start direct negotiation over all their differences. The 
bilateral discussion culminated in the concluding of the 1974 
agreement. According to the terms of the 29 July agreement, the 
Saudis' acknowledgement of Abu Dhabi sovereignty over the 
169 John Kell`. "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute. " International Affairs 32 (July 
1956), p. 3 18. 
170 George Lenczow ski, Oil and State in the Middle East (New York: 
Cornell University Press. 1960), p. 146. 
171 Ibid., p 147 
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Buraimi Oasis was given in exchange for an equal share in the 
rich Zararah oilfield with Abu Dhabi and a corridor to the Gulf 
shore through Abu Dhabi's territory at Khour al-Udayed (the 
northern region bordering Qatar). 172 
The British role in the emergence of the UAE federation 
was more obvious. Despite its motives, the British government 
formed a number of important local institutions, which some 
observers believe constitute the essence of today's federation. In 
1951, a British trained and equipped mercenary force was 
established under the name of Trucial Oman Scouts. In the 
following year, the Trucial States Council was formed, an 
organisation in which the Shaikhs of the emirates met once a year 
presumably to talk about matters of joint interest. In 1965, the 
third important institution, the Trucial States Development 
Council --a body to permit and supervise area 
development 
projects-- was organised. 173 
British policy proved that Britain did not believe that these 
emirates would be able to survive separately in the turmoil of the 
region. Before its 1971 withdrawal, the British government 
proposed to the rulers of the seven small emirates, as well as 
Bahrain and Qatar, that they enter into a federated state. In other 
words, Britain's insistence on withdrawal and its encouragement 
to confederate presented the motivation for the Trucial emirates, 
along with Bahrain and Qatar, to form a federation . 
Several 
1 Anthony. op. cit.. pp. 148-9, and David Long and 
Bernard Relch. (ed. ). 
The Government and Politics of the Middle East and 
North Africa (Boulder. 
Westview Press. 1980). p. 150. 
III Anthony. op. cit.. PP. 98-9. 
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obstacles, however, including disputes over borders and the 
degree of influence each emirate should have, obstructed rapid 
agreement on federation, and both Bahrain and Qatar decided 
against joining and to become independent instead. 174 
On 1 December 1971, Britain formally abandoned its 
protective role over the seven Gulf Shaikhdoms. In a step seeking 
to affirm their independence, on the following day, six of the 
former Trucial emirates declared the establishment of a new 
federation in the politics of the Gulf. For different reasons from 
those of Bahrain's and Qatar's, the seventh emirate, Ras al- 
Khaimah, did not join the federation when it started, but 
followed on 10 February 1 972.15 The UAE became a member of 
the United Nations and the Arab League in December 1971. 
3.2.2 Bahrain 
Bahrain is an Arabian Shaikhdom comprised of a group of 
35 islands in the Gulf. The archipelago of Bahrain lies halfway 
between the Qatari Peninsula and the Saudi coast at al-Hasa. 
Qatar being about 29 km distant and al-Hasa about 32 km. 
Bahrain, with an area of 678 sq km/262 sq mi, is the smallest 
'la For the Trucial emirates' attempts. along with Bahrain and 
Qatar. to 
form a federation see Riad El Ravv es, Arabian 
Gulf Documents (1968-1971): 
_ 
Attempts at Federation and Independence (London: 
Riad E1-Rav vas Books, 
1989). 
1-' Ras al-Khaimah's reluctance was 
due to two reasons. Ras al-Khaimah 
was disappointed by the reactions of the other 
emirates to the Iranian 
occupation of the three islands. 
Ras al-Khaimah insisted on the right to veto 
decisions of the majority. as the larger and wealthier emirates 
of Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai. in the supreme council. 
Frauke Heard-Bey. From Trucial States 
to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition 
(London. Longman. 1982). 
p. 369. 
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country in the Gulf. The largest island is Bahrain itself, 48 km 
long and 13-16 km wide. Bahrain's capital, Manama, is situated in 
the north-eastern section of the country. In the year of its 
independence (1970), Bahrain's population was approximately 
220,000.176 
The Bahraini island was ruled by the Portuguese from the 
early years of the sixteenth century to 1602, when it passed into 
Persian control, 177 On 28 July 1783, the Al-Khalifah family, who 
emigrated from Najd in the early eighteenth century and settled 
at Qatar, took Bahrain from the Persians and established the 
present dynasty. 178 For the next several decades, the Al-Khalifah 
encountered threats from the Persians, Saudis, and the Omanis 
(who captured the islands in 1800 for only one year). 179 
Bahrain's entry to Britain's 1820 General Treaty with the 
Omani Coast emirates was the British acknowledgement 
certificate to the island's existence as an independent 
principality. In 1861, the independence of Bahrain was confirmed 
by its concluding a new treaty with Britain. The Preliminary of 
the 1861 Anglo-Bahraini Agreement described the Shaikh of 
Bahrain, Muhammad bin Khalifah, as an independent Ruler. In 
other words, in the Anglo-Bahraini Treaty Britain declared its 
recognition of Bahrain as a separate political unit not belonging 
176 World Statistics in Brief, p. 10 
"' Iran's rule in this period Ni as not direct, but through her Arab client 
followers who accepted Persian authority nominally. Abdullah Al-Ghareeb. 
The Magians Time has Come: the Historical. Doctrinal and Political 
Dimensions of the Iranian Revolutions (n. a., 1985), p. 302. 
Fs Atichison, op. cit.. P. 190. 
119 Ibid: and Ibn Bishr. op. cit.. vol. I. p. 258 
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to the regional powers (the Ottomans and the Persians) or to the 
local (the Omanis or the Saudis). 
Throughout Britain's long stay in the Gulf, successive 
British governments played an indispensable role in defending the 
Bahraini island. Article 2 of the 1861 agreement made Bahrain, 
officially, the first emirate in the region to secure British 
promise of protection in time of outside aggression. The British 
determined to protect the island against the Saudis, the Ottomans 
and the Iranians. As far as the Saudi threat was concerned, the 
Saudis undertook in their promises of 1866,1915 and 1927, 
which we quoted in the UAE section, to respect the independence 
of Bahrain. With regards to the Ottoman threat, the British 
government rejected all Ottoman claims over the islands, 
especially after the latter's 1871 expedition to Najd. At the end 
the two governments signed the 1913 agreement by which the 
Ottomans recognised the independence of Bahrain (Article 13). 
The most dangerous and longest threat to the Bahraini 
island was the Iranian one. Iran's claims to Bahrain as one of its 
provinces have generally been based on three bases : former 
Persian rule during the period from 1602 to 1783, upon an 
agreement signed in August 1822 by the Political Resident, 
Captain William Bruce, whereby he admitted the sovereignty of 
Persia over the island180, and upon Lord Clarendon's Note of 29 
April 1869 to Mohsin Khan, the Persian Charge d'affairs in 
London. 'g' Successive British governments rejected the Iranian 
'X" L/P&S/20/C248C. pp. 143-5- 
191 FO 248/251. Lord Clarendon was three times British Foreign Secretary 
(1853)-8,1865-6,1868-70). 
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claims. Bruce's agreement was condemned and denounced by the 
British as violating every principle of British policy in the 
Gulf. 182 They added that Bruce signed the 1822 agreement 
without the authorisation of his government. 183 Concerning Lord 
Clarendon's Note, the British denied that Lord Clarendon had 
ever recognised the Iranian claim to the island. 184 
This long-standing claim by Iran was recalled occasionally 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On one of these 
occasions, the Persian government presented, in 1927, the 
Clarendon Note before the League of Nations as a proof of the 
fact that Britain had accepted Persia's claim over the island 
before. " Thirty years later, the Shah instructed his government 
to introduce a bill in the Majlis (Iran's Parliament) declaring 
Bahrain to be the fourteenth Iranian province. 186 However, due to 
strong British opposition to the Iranian claims, all attempts by 
the latter were in vain. 
1 82 See for example the reaction of Mountstuart Elphinstone. Governor of 
Bombay at the time of the agreement, in Kelly's Britain and the Persian 
Gulf, p. 190. 
183 As a result to the agreement, Bruce was dismissed from his post. Ibid., 
p. 90; and Bidwell, The Affairs of Arabia. vol. I. p. xiv. 
'IN ' Philip Graves, The Life of Sir Percy (London: Hutchinson, n. a. ), p. 
96. Despite British official rejection of the Iranian interpretation of Lord 
Clarendon's Note, Aitchison comments on the Note were "really very painful 
to.. allows Persia to assume the position of suzerain which we have all along 
denied to her. " Kumar, op. cit.. p. 111. For a more detailed account of 
Clarendon's Note, see John Kelly "The Persian Claim to Bahrain. " 
International Affairs 33 (January 1957). 
18S Persian Foreign Office to HM's Minister, Teheran, 22 November 1927; 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Persian Minister, London. 18 
January 1928. Kumar. op. cit.. pp. 131-2. note: 51. 
's" Trevor Mosten, Major Political Events in Iran. Iraq and the Arabian 
Peninsula, 194 -1990 (Oxford: Facts On File. 1991). p. 57; and Edward 
Gordon, "Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute, " The American Journal of 
International Law 65 (1971). p. 560. note: 1. 
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In 1968, Britain announced that it would withdraw from the 
Gulf in three years time. The year following, the Shah announced, 
while on a state visit to India, that Iran would accept the 
Bahraini population's decision on their future. He declared that 
"If Bahrain does not want to join our country, we shall never 
resort to force to oblige them to do so. "187 On 30 March 1970, 
the United Nations Secretary-General's representative and 
Director-General of the United Nations office in Geneva, Dr. 
Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, arrived in Bahrain to investigate 
the wishes of its people; whether they wanted their island to be 
an independent state or to be part of Iran. In late April he 
submitted his report to the Secretary-General. His 
recommendation was clear: "My conclusions have convinced me 
that the overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain wish to 
gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent and 
sovereign state free to decide for itself its relations with other 
states. "188 Following the United Nations Security Council's 
endorsement of Guicciardi's report, the Iranian Majlis formally 
ratified the United Nations resolution by 186 votes to 4, and on 
18 May the Iranian Senate ratified it unanimously. 189 On 15 
1 Anthony Parsons, They Say the Lion. Britain's Legacy to the Arabs: A 
Personal Memoir (London: Jonathan Cape. 1986). p. 137, and Anthony 
Parsons, "Bahrain in Transition. " in Netton. op. cit.. p. 184. 
'8s, Moste n, op. cit.. p. 112. and Parsons. They Say the Lion. pp. 139-40. 
'8" Mosten. op. cit., p. 1 12. 
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August 1971, Bahrain became independent, and soon joined both 
the United Nations and the Arab League. '90 
The view that the British were behind the Shah's final 
policy towards Bahrain is shared by many. The French 
government, for example, believed that the arrangements between 
the British government and the Shah, not the United Nations' 
good offices, solved the Bahraini dispute in 1970.191 Some even 
affirmed that there was an understanding between the British 
government and the Shah that in return for abandoning Bahrain 
he would be allowed to take the three islands of Abu Musa and 
the two Tunbs. In practice, the Shah let the Iranian claim to 
Bahrain rest formally on 13 August 1970 and a year later annexed 
the three strategically important islands of the UAE. More 
explanation will be given to this point in chapter six. 
3.2.3 Qatar 
The Peninsula of Qatar became an independent state on 1 
September 1971, and soon joined the United Nations and the 
Arab League. The Peninsula, located halfway along the western 
coast of the Gulf, is about 115 miles long from north to south 
and 55 miles wide. It occupies a land area of 11,437 sq km/4,415 
190 Iran's claims over Bahrain did not stop forever. Immediately after the 
1979 Khomeini revolution in Iran, the Iranian claim was renewed by Sadeq 
Rouhani, one of the senior Iranian ayatollah (a title given to the most 
learned teachers and scholars in Shiite Iran). Mark Katz. Russia & Arabia: 
Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986). p. 176. Moreover. Iran's endorsement to 
the unsuccessful 1981 coup organised by the Islamic Front for the Liberation 
of Bahrain increased the fears of the suspicious Bahraini government. 
191 Gordon, op. cit., p. 567. 
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sq mi. Qatar lies between the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
The Gulf bounds the Peninsula from east, north and south . 
The 
UAE lies in the south and Saudi Arabia to the west and south- 
west. The capital city is Doha. In 1970, Qatar's population was 
estimated to be 110,000.192 
Qatar's history is closely intertwined with that of 
neighbouring Bahrain. The Bahrainis continued to dominate al- 
Zubarah, a town in the north-west of the Qatari Peninsula, until 
the late 1870s when the Al-Thani Shaikhs of Doha, who 
emigrated from the Arabian Peninsula and settled in the Peninsula 
of Qatar about the end of the seventeenth century, drove the Al- 
Khalifah out, and since then there has been an outstanding 
dispute between the two emirates, which we shall have cause to 
examine more fully in chapter six. 
In the years of 1867-8 attacks and counter-attacks took 
place between the Shaikhs of Bahrain and the inhabitants of 
Qatar, especially the Al-Thani Shaikhs of Doha . 
The British 
viewed these attacks as a rupture of the maritime peace in the 
Gulf waters. Prior to these clashes, Britain recognised Bahrain's 
authority over Qatar, or at least part of it, and therefore Qatar 
was considered bound by the treaties Bahrain signed earlier. The 
1867-68 events proved that this order was not effective. On 12 
September 1868, the British sent their Resident in the Gulf to 
conclude an agreement known as the 'Agreement of the Chief of 
E1-Kutr (Guttur) engaging not to commit any Breach of the 
Maritime Peace' with Shaikh Muhammad bin Thani . 
Two 
192 World Statistics in Brief, p. I l1. 
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important developments came with the 1868 agreement. It made 
Qatar for the first time an independent party to the maritime 
truce and addressed Muhammad bin Thani as the 'Chief' of Qatar. 
Therefore, the birth of modern Qatar as a separate independent 
emirate should be traced to the British acknowledgement of the 
1868 agreement. 193 
Before the British and the Ottoman governments settled 
their differences in the Gulf by the unratified agreement of 1913, 
Britain's fears of antagonising the Ottomans led her to reject 
extending her protection over Qatar. The British declined an 
1893 appeal by Shaikh Jasim bin Muhammad Al-Thani to sign a 
treaty like those concluded with the Trucial Shaikhdoms a year 
earlier. 194 The Ottomans, for their part, regarded Qatar, like the 
other Shaikhdoms, part of the Ottoman Khilafah. But due to its 
problems in other parts of its empire, the Ottoman government 
felt the importance of reaching an agreement with the British in 
their disputes over the Gulf question. On 29 July 1913, the two 
parties signed at London the Anglo-Ottoman Convention. By 
Article 11 of the 1913 convention, the Ottomans abandoned all 
their rights over the Qatari Peninsula. The Article stated that 
"The Ottoman Imperial Government... [has] renounced all its 
claims to the peninsula of al-Qatar. " 
Although it was only on 3 November 1916 that Qatar signed 
a 'Treaty of Protection' with Britain, the British government 
worked before that date for the emirate's survival. In the 1913 
'')3 Rosemarie Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar (London: Croom Helm. 1980). 
pp. 144-7, and Wilkinson. Arabia's Frontiers, p. 47. 
1`'4 Bidww ell. The Affairs of Arabia. vol. I. p. xV. 
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Anglo-Ottoman Convention and the 1915 Darin Treaty with Ibn 
Saud the British had successfully protected the Qatari emirate 
from being absorbed by its neighbours. In Article I1 of the 191-33 
convention, the signatory governments undertook that they would 
not permit the Shaikh of Bahrain to interfere "in the internal 
affairs of al-Qatar, his endangering the autonomy of that area or 
annexing it. " In the 1915 agreement with the British government 
the Najdi Ruler pledged that he would not attempt to attack the 
territory of Qatar. 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim pledged in the November 1916 
treaty not to cede, give, sell, lease or mortgage any of Qatar's 
territory to any power except Britain; not to have relations with 
any foreign governments without British authorisation; to accept 
the stationing in Doha of a British political agent and to desist 
from piracy, the slave trade and arms traffic. In exchange, the 
British government promised in Article 10 of the treaty to 
protect Qatar's "territory from all aggression by sea. " Probably 
because of Qatar's 1916 treaty with the British, Ibn Saud 
promised in Article 6 of the 1927 Treaty of Jeddah "to maintain 
friendly and peaceful relations" with the Al-Thani's emirate. The 
British protection extended, in 1935, to cover all the Shaikh's 
territory in return for giving Qatar's mainland concession to a 
British company. 
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3.2.4 Kuwait 195 
Kuwait is situated in the north-western corner of the Gulf. 
It is bounded on the east by the Gulf, on the south and south- 
west by Saudi Arabia, and on the north and north-west by Iraq. 
The distance between the extreme points of Kuwait's boundaries 
from south to north is about 200 km and from west to east about 
170 km. The total area of Kuwait is 17,818 sq km/6.878 sq mi. 
Kuwait's capital is Kuwait city. Kuwait's population was 740,000 
at the census of 1970 196 
The year 1896 was the turning point in Kuwait's history. In 
May of that year, the ruling Shaikh, Muhammad bin Sabah (r. 
1892-6) and his brother Jarah, were killed by their half brother, 
Mubarak. 197 Eager to maintain his throne and to avoid Ottoman 
rule, Mubarak (r. 1896-1915) approached twice, in March 1 897 
and again in 1898, the representatives of the British government 
in the Gulf to be awarded a status similar to that which the 
British gave in 1892 to the Trucial Shaikhs. 198 The belief of the 
British Indian government at that time was that Britain had no 
direct interests in Kuwait, and therefore her recommendations 
were to turn Mubarak's appeals down. The comments of Lord 
George Hamilton on Mubarak's demand of 1897, for example, 
195 "Kuwait is the diminutive of the Arabic word al-bout' which... means a 
house built in the form of a fortress adjacent to water. " Government of 
Kuwait: Ministry of Information, Kuwait Facts and Figures (Kuwait 1986), 
p. 19. 
196 World Statistics in Brief. p. 76. 
19' The murder is discussed by Abdul-Aziz Al-Rashid's. History of Kuwait 
(Beirut: Dar Maktabat Al-Havat. n. a. ). pp. 138-46. 
198 Telegram of Government of India to Foreign Office, in Bidwell. The 
Affairs of Kuwait. vol. I. part I. p. 9, and Government of India to Lord 
George Hamilton, 19 September 1897, in ibid., p. 14 
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were that the British government "do not propose to interfere in 
the affairs of that Chiefship more than may be necessary for the 
maintenance of the general peace of the Persian Gulf. "'9 
As already pointed out in chapter one, the efforts of the 
Russian and the German governments to extend their railways 
projects to the head of the Gulf (mainly to Kuwait) were the real 
reason for British reconsideration of Shaikh Mubarak's earlier 
requests. It was the railways projects which persuaded the British 
to come to Kuwait, not Kuwait itself. The two letters of Meade 
to Curzon and Sir Arthur Godley (Permanent Under Secretary at 
the India Office in Whitehall) to the Viceroy of India 
demonstrated this fact. In his private letter Meade said that 
"even if we are not immediately interested in getting hold of 
Koweit for ourselves, we can not afford to let it fall in the hands 
of any other power. " 200 Godley said "We don' t want Koweit, but 
we don't want anyone else to have it. "201 As a result, the period 
1896-9 saw Kuwait rise "from a backwater dependency of the 
Ottoman Empire into a key area of British influence in the 
Persian Gulf. "202 The British government, therefore, signed on 23 
January 1899 a treaty known typically as the 'Anglo-Kuwaiti 
Secret Bond' 
The Ottoman government's long refusal to recognise the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty, claiming that Kuwait was an Ottoman 
199 India Office to Foreign Office. 28 September 1897. Ibid.. p. 14. 
2) Lieutenant-Colonel M. Meade to Curzon, 28 March 1898. Ibid., p. 28. 
2"' Ibid., p. xii. 
22 Briton Busch. "Britain and the Status of Ku«avt. 1896-1899. " The 
Middle East Journal 21 (Spring 1967), p. 187. 
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qada (district), ended with their consent to the terms of the 1913 
Anglo-Ottoman Convention. Article 3 of the famous agreement 
acknowledged the 1899 agreement. Furthermore, at the outbreak 
of the Great War, the British Resident sent a letter to Shaikh 
Mubarak by which the British government's recognition of 
Kuwait's independency from other powers was confirmed. Sir 
Percy Cox promised the Shaikh to consider Kuwait as an 
"independent Government under British protection" in return for 
his support in World War One. 203 
Although the 1899 agreement did not clearly pledge Britain 
to guarantee Kuwait's safety, Britain's promises and actions in 
defending Kuwait are scattered in many documents. In the 
accompanying letter to the 1899 treaty, the Political Resident 
promised Shaikh Mubarak his government's 'good offices' towards 
him and his heirs and a sum of 15,000 rials. 204 Two years later, 
Lord Lansdowne, Britain's Foreign Secretary, emphasised 
Britain's protection to Mubarak. "We could scarcely allow the 
Shaikh to be crushed or deposed. X205 In his letter of November 
1914, Cox also confirmed British government protection of 
Kuwait. 
Throughout Kuwait's history, the guarantees of British 
protection proved to be very fundamental. In November 1900, the 
British warned Ibn Rashid, then the Ruler of Najd emirate, that 
, "j Letter of 3 November 1914 from Sir Percy Cox, the Political Resident, to 
Shaikh Mubarak, in Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XI, pp. 26-5-6. 
204 Copy of the British Political Resident's letter to Shaikh Mubarak is 
reproduced in Lorimer, op. cit.. vol. I. pp. 1048-50. 
201) Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor. Britain's Ambassador in Turkey, 26 April 
1901. Bidwell, The Affairs of Kuwait. vol. I. part III. p. 29. 
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"no attack upon Koweit will be allow", and that if Kuwait were 
overrun the invaders would be expelled "as soon as the means are 
provided. X206 In December 1901 and January 1902, extra British 
gunboats were sent to Kuwait and "two Nordenfeldts and two 
Maxims were placed in the Shaikh's fort at Jahra [a settlement at 
the western end of Kuwait Bay]. "207 In September 1902, British 
warships defeated a force commanded by Adhbi bin Muhammad 
Al-Sabah and Hamoud bin Jarrah Al-Sabah, who had intended to 
revenge their murdered fathers and to seize power from 
Mubarak. 208 Consequently, the government of India stated that it 
"will undertake to defend the Koweit district. "209 
Despite contradictory British policies in the 1913 Anglo- 
Ottoman treaty and the 1922 Uqair Treaty, which we will have 
opportunity to examine in chapter five, the British also forced 
the Ottoman and the Saudis to abandon their efforts to absorb 
Kuwait. In September 1899, the Ottomans tried to appoint a 
harbour master in Kuwait. Shaikh Mubarak, with British backing, 
refused to allow him to land. The British government warned the 
Ottoman not to send any official to Kuwait "without previous 
agreement" with them. 210 On 24 August 1901, it was reported 
that the Ottoman sloop-of-war Zuhaff sailed into Kuwait's 
206 Foreign Office to Admiralty. 14 November 1900. Bidwell. The Affairs of 
Kuwait, vol. I. part II, p. 50. 
2(r Lorimer, op. cit., vol. I. p. 1033. 
208 Alan Rush. Al-Sabah, History & Genealogy of Kuwait's Ruling Family. 
1752-1987 (London: Ithaca Press. 1987), p. 102. 
209 Government of India to Lord George Hamilton. 3 October 1902. Bidwell. 
The Affairs of Kuwait. vol. II, part. IV, p. 122. 
210 Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Salisbury, 8 September 1899; and the 
Marquess of Salisbury to Sir N. O'Conor, 8 September 1899. Bidwell, The 
Affairs of Kuwait. vol. I. part I. pp. 81-2. 
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harbour, only to be prevented by the British navy from landing 
Ottoman troops on Kuwait's land. 211 On 7 September 1901, 
Britain's Foreign Secretary sent a letter to Sir N. O'Conor, 
Britain's Ambassador in Constantinople (1898-1908), which 
concluded with the following paragraph, "Any attack upon the 
Sheikh [Mubarak of Kuwait], or any attempt to force him to 
accept conditions to which he is not now subject, would be 
regarded by us as an affront. " The British Ambassador was 
instructed to convey the message to the Ottoman government. 212 
As far as the Saudi threat was concerned, the best example 
was Britain's decisive intervention at the height of the al-Jahra 
war of 1920.213 On 10 October, the Saudis attacked al-Jahra, 
besieging the Kuwaiti forces in Oasr al-Ahmar (the Red Fort). 
The Kuwaitis were badly defeated and since more raids seemed 
likely, Shaikh Salim bin Mubarak (r. 1917-21) asked for Britain's 
assistance. Britain's readiness to defend Kuwait frightened the 
Saudis and forced their immediate withdrawal. 214 Moreover, after 
the end of the crisis the British government told Ibn Saud that 
they "recognized the territory within the inner boundary [the red 
zone] shown on the map attached to the Anglo-Turkish 
211 Busch. Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 205: and Kumar, op. cit., p. 198. 
212 Lansdowne to O'Conor. Bidwell. The Affairs of Kuwait. vol. I. Part III. 
p. 94. 
213 Ibn Saud also promised in the 1915 and 1927 Anglo-Najdi Agreements 
not to invade Kuwait and to keep friendly relations with the small emirate. 
Chapter five will consider the Kuwaiti-Najdi dispute in wider context. 
214 Al-Rashid. op. cit.. p. 262; and Rush. op. cit.. pp. 80-1. 
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Agreement as definitely appertaining to Koweit and that this was 
not open to dispute. " 215 
Even after Kuwait formally became an independent state, by 
signing the 'Ten Year Defence Treaty' on 19 June 1961, Britain 
continued the responsibility of defen ding Kuwait against any 
aggression if requested by the Kuwaiti government. Paragraph D 
of the 1961 treaty states that "Nothing in these con clusions shall 
affect the readiness of Her Majesty's government to assist the 
government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance. "216 
Immediately after its independence, British forces landed on 
Kuwait to defend it against the claim of General Qasim, Iraq's 
President (1958-63). 
On 20 July 1961, the Arab League recognised Kuwait as an 
independent state and accepted it as a member. Until 14 May 
1963, the Soviet Union vetoed Kuwait's applications for 
membership of the United Nations on the grounds that its identity 
was entirely linked to Britain. 217 On that date, Kuwait joined the 
international organisation as the 111 th member. In May 1968, at 
the wish of the Kuwaiti government, Britain and Kuwait stated 
21 Richard Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial 
Disputes, A Report Compiled for the Middle East Programme of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 1991). P. 16. 
2"' Exchange of Notes between Britain's Political Resident and the Ruler of 
Kuwait, 19 June 1961. 
217 Katz. op. cit., p. 158. 
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that their 1961 treaty would come to an end in three years, 
officially ending on 13 May 1971.218 
Finally, British acknowledgement of Kuwait's existence as 
an independent Shaikhdom in the 1899 agreement and the various 
treaties which followed it up to the death of Shaikh Mubarak in 
1915 and the British declaration of November 1914 provided the 
bases of Kuwait's independent identity. Furthermore, Britain's 
protection in words and deeds played a fundamental role in the 
survival of the emirate. However, the role of the British 
government's policies in Kuwait's border problems will be 
discussed in chapter five. 
Conclusion 
By sponsoring and signing the above-mentioned truces and 
treaties, the British acknowledged the seven emirates of UAE 
confederation, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait as free and independent 
of their big neighbours; Iran, Oman and the Saudis, and as not 
belonging to the Ottomans. 219 However, at the same time that 
Britain fastened and tightened her control over the Shaikhdoms 
after every new treaty she concluded with them, the Shaikhs' 
feeling of independence grew as well. In other words, these 
truces and treaties served to emphasise the separateness that 
218 Exchange of notes between the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister and the British 
Ambassador to Kuwait, 13 May 1968. Husain AlBaharna. "The Legal Status 
of Iraq's Sovereignty Claims over Kuwait, " Al Ta'awun Journal 21 (March 
1991). pp. 7 3-91 . 
219 M. Yapp. The Near East Since the First World War (London: Longman. 
1991), p. 205. 
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happened to exist at that time in that part of the Gulf and thus 
induced each ruling family to claim the independence or the 
autonomy of the emirate it ruled. This British acknowledgement 
policy was supported by its promises and actions of protection. It 
is easy to imagine how the awareness that the British government 
would defend the territories/Shaikhs of these emirates and 
retaliate was enough to deter others from invading them, or at 
least reduce the number of the attackers and their assaults. In 
short, British acknowledgement and protection policies paved the 
way for the independence of modern UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and 
Kuwait Shaikhdoms when the appropriate time came. 
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Chapter IV Britain's Attitude Towards a 'United Arab 
State' in the Gulf 
The earlier chapters illustrated the British dominating 
power and influence in the Gulf, which ended (formally) with 
their withdrawal from the region in November 1971. At the time 
of their departure, the Arabian side of the Gulf, excluding Iraq, 
was left torn and divided into six states --Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The 
British policy during their long stay was to weaken the region as 
much as possible by recognising the Shaikhs of the very small 
local entities, those small enough not to challenge or threaten 
Britain's interests, as independent from other powers. There 
could have been no clearer statement of Britain's wish (and 
indifference to Arab aspirations if they clashed with her own 
interests), to leave the region disunited than Lord Crewe's, 
Secretary of State for India (1910-15), statement of November 
1914. "What we want, " Lord Crewe said, "is not a united Arabia, 
but a weak and disunited Arabia, split into little principalities as 
far as possible under our suzerainty--but incapable of co- 
ordinated action against us. "22° 
The discovery of oil in the Persian side of the Gulf was to 
revolutionise the politics, economics and strategic importance of 
the whole Gulf region. On 26 May 1908, oil was discovered in 
commercial quantities at Masjidi Sulayman in Arabistan in south- 
west Persia, about 150 miles from the head of the Gulf. In 1909 
" Briton Busch. Britain, India, and the Arabs. 1914-1921 (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. 1971). p. 62; and Lacey. op. cit.. p. 
137. 
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the APOC was formed to take over the concession from d'Arcy. 
The strategic importance of oil became more clear when the 
Royal Navy decided, in 1910, to convert from coal to oil as the 
fuel for their ships. Production, the opening of the Abadan 
refinery and the export of oil began in the same year (1912). In 
1914 the British government acquired a majority share-holding in 
the company . 
221 After that date, British interest in the Gulf 
concerned not only the security of the sea routes to her Indian 
empire, but also its supremacy and monopoly of control of the 
region's oil over both regional and outside powers. 
The major event, however, which affected Britain's policies 
in the Gulf at the beginning of the twentieth century was the 
starting of the First World War. On 28 July 1914, the war broke 
out in Europe. The war was fought between the Allies (Britain, 
France, Russia, Japan together, later, with Italy, United States 
and others) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary 
empire, Ottoman empire and others). This meant that the Allies, 
and particularly the British, were now at war with Turkey 
throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf areas. Britain's 
interests in these regions therefore could be damaged by the 
Ottoman-German alliance. The possibility of an Ottoman or 
German occupation of either Iraq or Iran endangered the British 
interests in the Gulf in three ways: first, it threatened the 
security of the sea routes to Britain's eastern empire, second, 
it 
carried a potential strategic threat to Britain's oil 
interests in the 
Gulf; and thirdly, it endangered the British colonies and 
, 21 Anthony Sampson. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the 
World They Made (London: Coronet Books. 1993). pp. 79-80. 
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protectorates in the regions. Thus, the immediate reaction of 
Britain to the Ottoman government's entry into the war was to 
occupy the Persian oil fields and the Basrah Wilayet, which 
marked the first major British engagement in land operations in 
the Gulf. 
Britain was in a very delicate position between preserving 
her interests and not antagonising the Muslims under her control. 
In order to keep its interests in the East, the British government 
looked for the destruction of the Ottoman power but without 
arousing against the allied powers the enmity of Islam's 
followers. Before the beginning of the Great War, Britain was the 
actual dominant power in the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the 
sub-continental Indian regions. While the first two areas were 
totally Muslim, there was also a substantial number of Muslims in 
the Indian sub-continent. At the sametime, Turkey was the centre 
of the Islamic Khilafah and it was agreed that revolts and 
disorders within the Ottoman empire would hasten its collapse. 
But, to avoid the whole of Islam in the East being united against 
the Allies, the British government needed to win the support and 
alliance of the Muslims in these three regions, especially the 
Arabs, against the Ottoman. 
A descendant of Prophet Muhammad, Sharief Hussein of 
Makkah (1853-1931), was at that time entertaining hopes of 
becoming King or a Khalifah of the Arabs. Hussein was without 
doubt the best choice for the British task. He was a relative of 
the Prophet, the Sharief of Makkah (the Capital of Islam), and 
had the will to fight the Turks. British officials 
in Cairo, Egypt's 
capital, had been in negotiation with Sharief Hussein and 
his sons 
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to finance them for a revolt against the Ottoman government. 
With this end in view, the Secretary of War (1914-16), Horatio 
Kitchener, had approached the Sharief at the beginning of the 
War. On 31 October 1914, the same day on which the British 
announced war against the Ottomans, Kitchener sent a message to 
Abdullah, second son of Hussein, which promised that "If the 
Arab nation assist England in this war that has been forced upon 
us by Turkey, England will guarantee that no internal 
intervention takes place in Arabia, and will give Arabs every 
assistance against external foreign aggression. " Kitchener also 
added "It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the 
Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help 
of God out of all the evil that is now occurring. 11 222 
On 4 December 1914, moreover, the British Residency in 
Cairo issued a document under the title 'An official Proclamation 
from the government of Great Britain to the natives of Arabia 
and the Arab provinces'. The main significance of this 
proclamation lay in Britain's promises to the peoples of the 
Arabian Peninsula and the other Arab emirates and provinces of 
her help if they were to revolt against the Ottoman empire. "The 
Government of Great Britain informs you hereby that she has 
decided not to attack you nor initiate war against any of you - 
nor does she intend to possess any part of your country neither in 
the form of conquest and possession nor in the form of protection 
or occupation. She also guarantees to you that her allies in the 
I 11 
--- Telegram from Foreign Office to Mr Cheetham. British Embassy at 
Cairo. L/P&S/18/B222. Lord Kitchener's letter of 31st October 1914 was not 
the first one. It was preceded by his 24th of September letter of the same 
year. L/P&S/18/B222. 
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present war will follow the same policy. " If the Arabs were to get 
rid of the Turks "and take the reins of the Government of their 
country into their hands, we will", the proclamation undertook, 
"give up those places to them at once" after the end of the war. 
If the Arabs were to unite their forces, declare independence and 
drive out the Ottomans and their allies, "then Great Britain and 
her allies recognise their perfect independence and will moreover 
guarantee to defend you if the Turks or others wish to transgress 
against you and will help you to establish your independence with 
all her might and influence without any interference in your 
internal affairs. " The other main theme of the proclamation was 
223 that the Khilafah belonged to Arabs. 
Kitchener's message of 31 October 1914 was clearly 
reiterated in Sir Arthur Henry McMahon's letter, the British High 
Commissioner in Cairo (1910-16), to Sharief Hussein of 30 
August 1915- "Arab interests are English interests and English 
Arab 
... we confirm to you the terms of Lord Kitchener's 
message..., " McMahon said "in which was stated clearly our 
desire for the independence of Arabia, and its inhabitants, 
together with our approval of the Caliphate when it should be 
proclaimed. We declare once more that His Majesty's Government 
would welcome the resumption of the Caliphate by an Arab of 
true race. "224 
; Elie Kedourie. In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: the McMahon-Husavn 
Correspondence and its Interpretations. 1914-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ crsity Press, 1976). pp. 21-2. 
224 McMahon to Sharief Hussein. L/P&S/18/B222 
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These British documents (Kitchener's message to Abdullah, 
Cairo's British Residency official Proclamation, and McMahon's 
letter of 30 August 1915 to the Sharief himself) had emphasised 
three points. First, to persuade the Arabs that the war in that 
region has been "forced upon us [the British] by Turkey" 
(Kitchener's message), and therefore the British and their allies 
were at war with the Ottoman empire and not the Arabs. To 
prove this claim the British government announced that it "has 
decided not to attack you [the Arabs] nor initiate war against any 
of you" (Cairo's British Residency Proclamation). The British 
government added that the "Arab interests are English interests 
and English Arab" (McMahon's letter). Obviously, the message to 
the Arabs was. Britain is a friendly power and not at enmity with 
them. 
The second point was that the Allies desired the Arabs to 
fight with them against the Turkish empire. Their aim was very 
clear. McMahon himself later explained how his fundamental aim 
in trying to convince Sharief Hussein was to suborn the loyalties 
of the Arab soldiers in the Ottoman army. "At that moment a 
large portion of the Turkish force at Gallipoli and nearly the 
whole of the force in Mesopotamia were Arabs... could we give 
them some guarantee of assistance in the future to justify their 
splitting with the Turks? I was told to do that at once. X225 To 
-ý Lacey, op. cit.. p. 119. On 25 April 1915. British effort in the war faced 
a setback. In an attempt to wrest control of the Dardanelles from Ottoman 
empire in order to better supply Russia, the Allies' Gallipoli military 
campaign commenced. (Gallipoli is a Peninsula forming the southernmost 
European shore of the Dardanelles). Few months later, the operation proved 
to be a disaster for the Allied powers. mainly Britain and France. before the 
evacuation started in December 1915. 
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encourage the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman empire Britain 
declared her readiness to defend them against any threat. The 
British government also wished the Arabs to accomplish their 
freedom and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory 
and in practice. 
The third point stressed by the documents was that if it 
became unavoidable for the British government and the Allied 
Powers to land on Arab soil and to occupy it during the war, 
Britain and her allies promised to evacuate it directly after the 
end of hostilities. In the words of the Proclamation, Britain and 
her allies did not "intend to possess any part of your country 
neither in the form of conquest and possession nor in the form of 
protection or occupation"; even more important, the 
Proclamation promised that if the Arabs succeeded in getting 
their independence, the Allies were ready to "give up those 
places to them at once. "226 
During the period from August 1915 to March 1916 the 
British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, led the 
British government negotiating team with Sharief Hussein of 
Makkah. Their exchange of letters became known as the 'Hussein- 
McMahon Correspondence'. These documents demonstrated 
Britain's commitment to the independence of the Arabs and her 
approval of the Arabs' (i. e. Sharief Hussein) claims 
for the 
Khilafah after the end of the war. Moreover, in these 
documents 
the British government also promised to support a united 
Arab 
22 McMahon had also said in June 1915, that Britain intended to annex not 
"one foot of land in it, nor suffer any other Power to 
do so. " Busch. Britain. 
India. and the Arabs, p. 68. 
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Kingdom with a defined boundary. This new British position 
contradicted Britain's long established policy in the 
Gulf/Peninsula regions which was based on the principle: 'divide 
and rule'. The following pages will examine McMahon's promises 
in theory and in practice. 
On 14 July 1915, the Sharief's family sent an unsigned and 
undated letter to McMahon. In it, they asked for British approval 
of the proclamation of an Arab Khilafah and Britain's 
acknowledgement of "the independence of the Arab countries, 
bounded on the north by Mersina-Adana up to the 37 of latitude, 
on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia 
island, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of 
Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, 
with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on 
the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. "227 
The High Commissioner's reply on the 30th of August was: "With 
regard to the questions of limits, frontiers and boundaries, it 
would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing 
such details in the heat of war, and while, in many portions of 
them, the Turk is up to now in effective occupation. " 228 
The Sharief did not like McMahon's answer. In his letter of 
the 9th of September, the Sharief insisted that the boundary issue 
must be addressed. He wrote to McMahon "Your Excellency will 
pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coldness and 
hesitation which you have displayed in the question of the limits 
Letter from the Sharief's family to McMahon. L/P&S/18/B222. 
Ix McMahon to the Sharief of Makkah. L/P&S/18/B222. 
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and boundaries by saying that the discussion of these at present 
is of no use and is a loss of time and that they are still in the 
hands of the Government which is ruling them [i. e. Turkey].. . our 
peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at 
least by these limits and their word is united on this. Therefore 
they have found it necessary first to discuss this point with the 
Power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a 
final appeal, viz., the Illustrious British Empire. X229 
The British High Commissioner in Egypt agreed in the most 
important letter of the entire Hussein-McMahon Correspondence 
with the Sharief on the urgency of the boundary question. He 
outlined, on behalf of the British government, in his 24 October 
letter, the area in which Britain would give support for Arab 
independence. McMahon declared the following: "The districts of 
Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west 
of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Horns and Aleppo cannot be 
said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed 
limits and boundaries" in the Sharief's Family letter of the 14th 
July of 1915. He added in the same letter that: "With the above 
modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with 
Arab chiefs, we [Britain] accept these limits and boundaries 
and... I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great 
Britain to give the following assurances and make the following 
reply to your letter [of the 9th September 1915]: - Subject to the 
above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and 
support the independence of the Arabs within the territories 
') Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon. L/P&S/18/B222. 
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included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of 
Mecca. " In conclusion, McMahon said, "I am convinced that this 
declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the 
sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her 
traditional friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting 
alliance. "230 
According to the British High Commissioner's October 
promise to the Sharief of Makkah, the British government 
recognised today's Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen (except Aden), Jordan, Palestine, 
Iraq and most of Syria as provinces in a united Arab Kingdom, 
which was supposed to be established after the end of the Great 
War. In his speech to the Eastern Committee meeting of 5 
December 1918, of which he was the chairman, Lord Curzon, then 
Foreign Secretary (1918-24), declared that: "there was the letter 
to King Hussein from Sir Henry McMahon, of the 24th October 
1915, in which we gave him the assurance that the Hejaz, the red 
area which we commonly call Mesopotamia, the brown area or 
Palestine, the Acre-Haifa enclave, the big Arab area (A) and (B), 
and the whole of the Arab Peninsula down to Aden, should be 
Arab and independent. "2'1 
In their following correspondence of November and 
December of 1915, Hussein and McMahon emphasised the 
expression 'Arab Kingdom'. In his reply of 5 November to 
McMahon's letter of October, the Sharief used the phrase Arab 
Sir Henry McMahon to the Sharief of Makkah. L/P&S/18/B222. 
231 Kedourie. op. cit.. pp. 216-7. 
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Kingdom three times. "We renounce our insistence on the 
inclusion of the Vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab 
Kingdom. " He added "As the Provinces of Irak are parts of the 
pure Arab Kingdom.. . we might agree to 
leave under the British 
Administration for a short time those districts now occupied by 
the British troops,... against a suitable sum paid as compensation 
to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation. "232 In his 
reply of 17 December to the Sharief's November comments, 
McMahon had also used the expression Arab Kingdom twice. The 
High Commissioner said "In stating that the Arabs are ready to 
recognize and respect all our treaties with Arab Chiefs, it is of 
course understood that this will apply to all territories included 
in the Arab Kingdom. " The second time was when McMahon 
repeated the promise of the British government to support the 
Sharief and said that the government "are ready to give all 
guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the 
Arab Kingdom. "2'3 In this correspondence the expression Arab 
Kingdom meant an independent united Arab Kingdom of all the 
territories that had been accepted by McMahon's letter of 24 
October 1915. 
The use of words like 'province', 'district' or 'vilayet' in 
referring to Damascus, Hama, Horns, Aleppo, Baghdad and Basrah 
in more than one letter of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, 
gave a clear indication of the British approval of a united Arab 
Kingdom. Equally important, in his memoirs, Twenty-Five Years, 
1892-1916, Grey confirmed this understanding when he spoke of 
232 Hussein to McMahon. L/P&S/18/B222. 
11' McMahon to Hussein. L/P&S/18/B222. 
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a "promise to King Hussein that Arabia should be an entirely 
independent moslem state", and he called it a secret treaty. 2'4 
Harold Nicolson commented in his Peacemaking that "the 
impression left on the mind of King Hussein was that Great 
Britain had assured him support in the foundation of an united 
Arab Empire with its capital at Damascus. "235 
A few months later, in June 1916, the Sharief proclaimed 
the so-called 'Arab Revolt' against the Ottoman Khilafah. Many 
British officials believed that the Sharief's revolt was very 
important to the British and their allies and hastened the defeat 
of the Ottomans. General Gilbert Clayton, Director of Military 
Intelligence in the Egyptian Army, wrote on 11 October 1915 a 
memorandum in which he said "The Sharif's revolt has shattered 
the solidarity of Islam, in that Moslem is fighting against 
Moslem. It has emphasised the failure of the Jehad 236, and 
endangered the Khalifate of the Sultan... it has rendered pro- 
British a large body of anti-Turk sentiments in Turkish Arabia, 
Syria and Mesopotamia and it has impaired the loyalty of the 
Arab divisions of the Turkish army. "237 On 'The Value of the 
Sherifial Arab Movement for British policy' Arnold Toynbee, a 
member of the Turkish section of the British delegation at the 
Paris Conference of 1919, wrote on 19 December 1918 that "If 
we [the British] support the Arab movement we shall destroy 
;' Viscount Grey of Fallodon. Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1920, vol. II, p. 229. 
;' Harold Nicolson. Peacemaking, 1919 (London: 1933), pp. 140-1. 
13`' A holy wear in the cause of . -lllah (God) and 
His commands. 
,J Kedourie, op. cit.. p. 136. 
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Turkey with much less risk of arousing against us the permanent 
antagonism of Islam. " 238 
The British also succeeded in persuading the Shaikhs of 
Muhammarah and Kuwait, Sayyid Muhammad bin All bin 
Muhammad bin Ahmad Al-drisi of Asir and Ibn Saud of Najd to 
join the moves against the Ottoman Khilafah. 239 With the 
outbreak of World War One, Britain presented a particular 
guarantee to Muhammarah. 24° On 3 November 1914, Britain had 
given Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait a pledge of perpetual tax-free 
possession of his date groves "situate between Faw and Qurnah" 
and guaranteed Kuwait independence under British protection, in 
return for Mubarak's undertaken to attack "Safwan, Umm Qasr 
and Bubiyan and occupy them. "241 Also, by 30 April 1915 a treaty 
had been concluded between Britain and Al-Idrisi by which they 
agreed to co-operate against the Ottoman. To ensure the loyalty 
of Al-Idrisi, Britain would guarantee the safety of Asir from the 
sea, and her independence at the end of the war. 242 As chapter 
two pointed out by signing the 1915 treaty Ibn Saud promised, in 
238 Ibid., pp. 212-3. 
239 Before Abdul-Aziz bin Saud occupied it in 1930. Asir was the Red Sea 
coastal province on the north-west of Yemen. Al-Idrisi was the great- 
grandson of Ahmad bin Idris. a Moroccan religious leader, and he was not 
related to Sav}ad Muhammad Al-Idrisi. Grand Sanusi and late King Idris of 
Libya. Muhammad bin Ali Al-Idrisi had carved out a petty state for himself 
since 1906. Busch, Britain. India, and the Arabs, p. 218. note: 2. 
210 Yousof Al-Abdulla, A Study of Qatari-British Relations. 1914-1945 
(Qatar: Orient Publishing & Translation, 1981), p. 32, and F. A1-Khatrash. 
History of British-Kuwaiti Political Relations 1890-1921 (Al-Kuwait: That 
al-Salassel, 1984), p. 120. 
241 Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Shaikh of 
Kuwait, in L/P&S/10/606. 
242 Hurewvitz, op. cit., vol. II. pp. 12- 3. 
94 
Britain's Attitude Towards a 'United Arab State' 
Article 4, to follow the advice of the British government 
completely. 
There are two comprehensive British documents which show 
the position of the above mentioned leaders during the war. The 
first one was the De Bunsen Committee Report of June 1915. ```3 
Paragraph No. 91 of the report confirmed that, following the 
outbreak of the Great War, the British government "have entered 
into, and in some cases completed, negotiations with several of 
the Chiefs in what was to have been the Turkish area, including 
the Sheikh of Kuwait, the Amir of Nejd (Bin Saud), the Sheikh 
Mavia [in Yemen], Said Idriss, and the Grand Sherif of Mecca. 
These negotiations vary in detail, but they have this much in 
common that in every case they offer a guarantee of independence 
in some form or another as a return for effective or successful 
support in the war against Turkey". The second document was Sir 
Percy Cox's draft proclamation about the future of Baghdad on 8 
March 1917. He reported that in November 1916, Ibn Saud and 
the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Muhammarah met in Kuwait and 
"announce[d] to Islamic world.. . their 
firm intention to support 
Shereef Hussein and to co-operate to the utmost with British 
, -" On 8 April 1915, the British Prime Minister appointed a committee 'to 
consider the nature of British desiderata in Turkey in Asia' in the imminent 
fall of Constantinople. Its Chairman was Sir Maurice de Bunsen, G. R. Clerk 
represented the Foreign Office. Sir T. W. Holderness the India Office, 
Admiral H. B. Jackson the Admiralty, Major-General C. E. Callww ell the War 
Office, and Sir H. Llewellyn Smith the Board of Trade, and M. P. Sir Mark 
Sykes was Kitchener's representative on the committee. De Bunsen 
Committee Report. June 1915, p. iv. CAB 42/3. 
95 
Britain's Attitude Towards a 'United Arab State' 
Government for the expulsion of the Turks for ever from the soil 
of Arabia. " 244 
The British government's promises to Sharief Hussein of an 
independent and united Arab Kingdom and her promises of 
support to his claim to the Khilafah, however, outraged many 
British officials, whether in London, India or the Gulf. They 
believed that the creation of an Arab Khilafah or even a united 
Arab kingdom was definitely not in Britain's interest. Arthur 
Hirtzel, Secretary of the Political and Secret Department in the 
India Office, was sufficiently concerned about this when he 
stated in October 1914 that "a consolidated Arabia w[oul]d. be a 
far greater danger than the Jewish freemasons who now represent 
the caliphate, " the latter being a reference to the Young Turks. 245 
Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India (1915-7), put it 
to Grey on 27 October 1915 that: "the best comfort he 
[McMahon] could give me was that the whole thing was a castle 
in the air which would never materialize. "246 Charles Hardinge, 
the Viceroy of India (1910-6), also pointed out, on 15 November 
1915, that nothing but trouble would come from these "fatuous 
proceedings. " The Viceroy added that: "I devoutly hope that this 
proposed independent Arab State will fall to pieces, if it is ever 
created. Nobody could possibly have devised any scheme more 
detrimental to British interests in the Middle East than this. " 247 
Kedourie, op. cit., p. 167. Moreover. Cox reported that Ibn Saud, at that 
same meeting in Kuwait, praised unexpectedly the Sharief's action in 
fighting with the British against the Turks and asserted that it was the 
obligation of every true Arab to support him. Graves, op. cit., p. 214. 
, 15 Busch, Britain. India. and the Arabs. p. 220. 
246 Ibid., p. 77. 
,' Ibid.. p. 80. 
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Clayton in a private letter on 6 January 1916 to Sir Reginald 
Wingate, McMahon's successor in Egypt (1916-9), said that: "an 
Englishman would naturally avoid producing such a 
'Frankenstein'. 11 248 
The British government's official promises to Sharief 
Hussein, however, were contradicted by her practical policies. 
The British government was in line with those who opposed 
McMahon's promises. Britain clearly abandoned her guarantees to 
the Arabs by which she promised not to possess any part of 
Arabia neither in the form of conquest and possession nor in the 
form of protection or occupation. The British government also 
forgot her readiness to recognise the perfect independence of the 
Arabs after the end of the war. Two famous examples of Britain's 
practical policies will prove her contradiction of her earlier 
promises to Hussein. They are the Asia Minor Agreement, 
commonly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour 
249 Declaration of November 1917. 
On 16 May 1916, a few weeks before the announcement of 
the Arab Revolt, a secret agreement was concluded by British and 
French diplomats, Sir Mark Sykes and Georges PiCot. 250 In 1917, 
21 Ibid. p. 220. 
249 Majdy Al-Safouri. The Collapse of the Ottoman State and its Effect on 
Islamic Dawah (Al-Qahira: Dar A1-Sah«a. 1990), p. 167. Mark Sykes was a 
Conservative M. P., while Georges Picot, at the time of Sykes-Picot 
Agreement was the French Counsellor in London. Arthur Balfour was a 
former Prime Minister (1902-5) and was the Foreign Secretary at the time of 
the Declaration. 
") Few diplomatic documents have suffered the odium heaped upon the 
Sykes-Picot Treaty. from Arnold Wilson's "counter to every sound principle" 
or George Antonius's "shocking document... greed at its worst ... a startling 
piece of double-dealing" to Lloyd George's "a fatuous arrangement judged 
from any and every point of view. " Busch, Britain. India. and the Arabs. p. 
88. 
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the Sykes-Picot Agreement was made public to the world by the 
Bolshevik government after the 1917 revolution in Russia. Under 
its secret terms, the signatory powers agreed on the partition of 
the Ottoman empire between them into spheres of interest and 
influence which would be mutually respected if the allies won the 
war. While Palestine would be internationalized, control of the 
Gulf, the Wilayats of Basra and Baghdad, Egypt and of her 
communications with India would go to Britain. France had 
interests in the Wilayats of Mosul, Syria and Lebanon. The 
Russians were to have Constantinople and other Turkish 
territories. 25 1 As far as the Balfour Declaration was concerned, 
the British government declared on 2 November 1917 that they 
"view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object... "252 
It could not be denied, therefore, that the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement and the Balfour Declaration were incompatible with 
Kitchener's and McMahon's promises to the Sharief of Makkah 
and also to Cairo's Residency Proclamation of December 1914. 
Lawrence once said that, in case of an Allied victory, British 
promises to the Arabs were 'dead paper'. 253 In a book first 
published in 1933, Nicolson wrote: "Our pledges to the 
Arabs... [conflicted].. . with the promises we made 
to France in the 
Marlowe, op. cit.. p. 62; and Al-Safouri, op. cit.. pp. 196-7. 
2 Anis claimed that the Balfour Declaration was shown to the American 
President Woodrow Wilson before its announcement and the latter supported 
it. Anis, op. cit., p. 300. 
'3 Anthony Nutting, Lawrence of Arabia (London: Hollis & Carter, 1961). 
p. 87; and Lacey. op. cit.. pp. 134-5 
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subsequent Sykes-Picot agreement. " 254 Sir Lawrence Graffety- 
Smith, a former British diplomat in the Middle East, affirmed that 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration "made 
nonsense" of the McMahon promises. 255 Sir Hugh Foot, also a 
former British official in Palestine and the Middle East, said in 
his comments on the failure of British Administration in Palestine 
that "The Arabs who fought with Great Britain in the first world 
war to throw off the yoke of the Turkish Empire were led to 
believe that they were fighting for their freedom.. . the main 
responsibility was ours ... 
by prevarication and procrastination and 
basically by the fundamental dishonesty of our original double 
dealing we had made disaster certain.... In 1915 we supported 
King Feisal's [Sharief Hussein's son] desert rising. In 1917 we 
signed the Balfour Declaration. " 
256 
The defeat of the Central Powers (including Turkey) in the 
First World War allowed the victorious Allies to convene peace 
conferences in Versailles (Paris) in January 1919 and in San 
Remo (Italy) in April 1920 to decide what should be done with 
the territories they had obtained from their enemies. As a result 
of the Ottoman withdrawal from the Arab countries, the great 
powers took the chance to negotiate and bargain between 
themselves. 
The British government's problem was the conflicting 
promises and commitments which had been made at various stages 
24 -1. Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 140-1. 
Lawrence Graffety -Smith, Bright Levant (London. 
1970). p. 11. 
-N`' Hugh Foot. A Start in Freedom (London. 1964). pp. 35-6. 
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in the war to the Arabs, the French and the Zionists, in order to 
get their support in the fighting. It was at the peace conferences 
that the British proceeded to reconcile these rival promises. 
Ignoring her commitments to the Arabs, the British government 
agreed on the partition of the Arab world. Palestine and Iraq 
became British mandates and Lebanon and Syria French ones. The 
Arabian Peninsula region in its turn was divided up among 
several Shaikhs who were in treaty relations with Britain, by 
which the British controlled their foreign relations in return for 
protecting them. Certainly, the settlements of the Versailles and 
San Remo Peace Conferences complied with the interests defined 
in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration on the 
one hand, and, on the other, contradicted the British promises of 
an independent united Arab state. Thus the announcement of 
these outcomes raised severe disappointments and unrest in the 
Arab world. 
Conclusion 
To ensure Britain's upper hand in the area, the British 
governments kept shifting their policies from an inactive 
encouragement and support to resume the Khilafah and to 
establish a united Arab state, to using all possible means to 
guarantee the establishment of autonomous, weak, tiny states in 
the same territories they promised Hussein would be an 
independent and united state under his leadership. British old 
treaty relations and her efforts in the peace conferences tore up 
the supposed independent united Arab state into 18 states and 
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emirates as follows: Najd, Hejaz, Hail, Asir, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dhubi, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm 
al-Qawain, Oman, Yemen, Palastine, Syria and Iraq. The words of 
G. R. Clerk, head of the war department at the Foreign Office, 
and Clayton reflected the strategy of the British government at 
that time. Clerk agreed that: "The creation of a definite Arab 
state is, especially for foreign Christian powers, practically an 
impossibility. We cannot do more than spread and encourage the 
idea. But what we can perhaps work for is a system of 
autonomous Arab states, recognizing and paying tribute to a 
spiritual Khalif at Mecca, but politically independent of him. "257 
Clayton went further when he stated on 8 September 1918 that: 
"As regards future settlement in the Arabian Peninsula, the best 
that could then be hoped for is the formation of a number of 
small States under Arab rulers devoid even of the nominal 
controlling influence formerly exercised by the Turkish 
Government. X258 It is in this context that British policies before 
and after their promises to Sharief Hussein should be understood. 
2 Busch. Britain. India. and the Arabs. p. 53. 
'x Ibid., p. 200. 
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Border Disputes with Najd and Iraq 
From the time of its foundation in the early eighteenth 
century, Kuwait's security was in chronic jeopardy from its 
larger, more powerful neighbours --the Persians, the Najdis and 
the Iraqis, all of whom wanted to control it. 259 Shaikh Ahmad bin 
Jabir bin Mubarak (r. 1921-50) of Kuwait once compared 
Kuwait's relationship with its larger neighbours of Najd and Iraq 
as "a bone being fought over by two dogs, the Najdi one large, 
loud and aggressive and the Iraqi one smaller, inactive but 
nonetheless, stealthy. X260 
The aim of this chapter is to follow the British role in 
Kuwait's border problems with Najd and Iraq. The chapter begins 
with an introduction on the nature of the political borders and 
the reasons behind the boundary problems in the Arabian 
Gulf/Peninsula regions. Although the Anglo-Ottoman Draft 
Convention of 1913 was never ratified it played a great role in 
Gulf politics, therefore attention will be given to it in the second 
section. The role and responsibility of British governments in 
Kuwait's border disputes with Najd and Iraq will be examined in 
two separate sections. 
2 As far as the British role is concerned, the Irani-Kuwaiti dispute, 
compared with the Saudi and the Iraqi claims to Kuwait. is less important. 
,w From H. Dickson. Political Agent at Kuwait, to the British Resident, H. 
V. Biscoe. R/15/2/12. 
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5.1 The Boundary Problems 
The political borders between countries are nothing but 
lines drawn on a map specifying the territory which belongs to 
countries on either side of these lines, designating the piece of 
territory over which the governing body exercises its authority in 
a manner where it alone has the right to do so. These limiting 
boundaries do not define the land area of a country only, but in 
the situation of coastal countries, they extend into the sea, in 
order to delimit the coastal range of the countries as well. These 
limiting boundaries also define the territories of a country both 
above and below the earth's surface . 
261 Disputes arising from all 
these matters are sometimes resolved by force, and sometimes by 
a direct accord between the disputing parties or by forwarding 
the case to international organisations, like the International 
Court of Justice at the Hague, for mediation. 
When borders between countries are the result of natural 
geography such as rivers, mountains or valleys; or man-made 
features such as roads, railways and canals the countries involved 
are fortunate, for there can then be no, or at least less, 
disagreement about where to draw the boundary lines. These 
features would earn the borders involved a higher degree of 
stability. 262 Unfortunately, this is not the case in the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula regions. 
261 Tawfiq, op. cit.. p. 166, and Ahmad Mahabah. "The Borders' Problems in 
North Africa, " Al-Siassa Al-Dawlva 111 (January 1993). p. 2 39. 
2`', Mahabah, op. cit.. p. 239: and Salah A1-Aqqad. "The 
Historical 
Background of the Arabic Borders Problems. " Al-Siassa Al-Daýw, 
lya 111 
(Januare 1993), p. 172. 
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The border problems in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
regions proved to be more troublesome. Their territorial 
disagreements are one of the primary reasons of conflict in the 
modern history of these regions. All the states of these regions 
are involved in boundary disputes. Frank Brenchley declared in 
(The GCC Border Disputes Seminar, August 1992) that, "From 
1963-67 I was head of the Arabian department at the Foreign 
Office and from 1967-68 1 was Under-Secretary for Middle East 
affairs.... When I handed over the Arabian department in 1967 to 
my successor I gave him a list of boundary disputes still 
outstanding. I don't remember the exact number but there were 
certainly more than 50 and less than 100. "263 In the last two 
decades alone, the Gulf witnessed several acts of aggression. The 
Iranian occupation of the UAE's islands in 1971-, the Iraqi attack 
on Iran in 1980; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and 
the Saudi-Qatari clash of 1992 are the major ones to mention. 
Therefore, these disputes constitute a spectre of instability 
haunting the Gulf region today. 
The Gulf border problems resulted from a multiplicity of 
facts and reasons. They are as follows: the rarity of natural or 
man-made features, throughout much of the area, which could act 
as markers in the huge desert sands; the presence of many islands 
in the Gulf; the similarities and historical connection of the areas 
to be bisected by border lines; the similarity found between 
people living on either side of boundaries due to the widespread 
263 Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies. The GCC Border Disputes Seminar, 
with Special Reference to Iraq and Kuwait (London: 
Gulf Centre for 
Strategic Studies. August 1992). p. 59. 
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nature of the tribes and the intermixing of their families; the 
existence of poor relations for most of the time between the 
governments/ruling families of the modern Gulf states; and finally 
the policies of the British government during its long stay in the 
Arabian Gulf/Peninsula regions. Of all these, the last two 
continued to increase tensions and to be the greatest obstacle to 
any overall solutions to the border problems in the regions. The 
hypothesis of this study, however, leads us to concentrate on 
British involvement in the border settlements. In his book Seize 
the Moment Nixon considered the border lines between today's 
Muslims states, most of which he believed were drawn by the 
colonial powers, to be a main reason for conflict between these 
264 states. 
5.2 The Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention of 1913 
With the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
the interests of the British and the Ottoman governments 
persuaded them to negotiate their problems in the Arabian Gulf 
region. Due to their problems in other parts of the empire (such 
as the Balkan and the North Africa areas) and their weakness in 
face of the increasing British influence in the Gulf, the Ottoman 
government felt the importance of reaching an agreement with the 
British on their disputes in the Gulf. The British government, 
for 
its part, aiming to win the Ottomans and keep them away 
from 
the Germans arrived at the same outcome. Consequently, the two 
, `'a Richard Nixon, Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One- 
Superpower World (Al-Qahira: Dar Al-Hilal. 1977). Trans. by Ahmad Murad. 
p. 137. 
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parties signed at London the Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention of 
29 July 1913. 
As far as Kuwait was concerned, before Shaikh Mubarak 
killed his ruling brothers Muhammad and Jarrah and seized power 
in 1896, Britain had not disputed Ottoman sovereignty over the 
emirate. Indeed, between 1876 and 1896 alone there were many 
British documents which recognised the Ottomans' sovereignty or 
jurisdiction 265 over the Arabian coast from Basrah to Udeid or 
Qatif --both considerably south of Kuwait. 266 In 1876, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Prideaux, British Political Resident in 
the Gulf, named Kuwait, Qatif and Uqair as the main Ottoman 
harbours on the Arabian side of the Gulf. 267 Again, in May 1879, 
Sir Austin Layard, British Ambassador in Constantinople, 
admitted Ottoman sovereignty as far south as Udeid. 268 In 1893 
the British Ambassador in Constantinpole, Sir C. Ford, officially 
told the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs that the British 
government, "Whilst admitting the sovereignty of the sultan 
extended from Basra to a place called Al Qatif, considered that 
the coast running South of that place was looked upon as 
debatable land. "269 These documents convinced an expert on Gulf 
2611 Schofield pointed out that both the Home governin ent and the 
government of India appeared at that time to treat such terms as authority . 
jurisdiction, sovereignty and suzerainty as interchangeable. Schofield. 
Kuwait and Iraq, p 13. 
266 Even during the early years of Mubarak's rule many British documents 
indicated that the British regarded Kuwait as a part of Ottoman Arabia. To 
mention just one of therm: a Foreign Department minute at the end of 
1896 
declared that "The [British] Government has no concern with Kowcit which 
is under Turkish sovereignty. " Quoted in Busch. Britain and the 
Persian 
Gulf, p. 97, note: 2. 
2`' Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq. p13. 
Ibid. 
ý`'`' Bidww ell, The Affairs of Kuwait. vol. I. p. xi. 
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affairs to assert that, from the early 1870s up to the 1896 
accession of Shaikh Mubarak, Britain formally recognised the 
Ottoman title to Kuwait on a number of occasions and never at 
any time disputed it. 27° 
In 1899, as explained earlier in chapter three, the British 
concluded a secret treaty with Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait 
whereby they acknowledged the independence of the Shaikh. 
Accordingly, the British persistently rejected the Ottoman claims 
to Kuwait and defended her territory. The Ottoman government, 
for its part, refused to recognise the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty 
declaring that Kuwait was under the Ottoman Porte's sovereignty 
and must continue so. These arguments continued until the two 
parties began their negotiations for an overall settlement in the 
Gulf. 
To obtain Ottoman approval to other desiderata (including 
the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, Qatar and Bahrain questions), the 
British Home government was ready to make some sort of 
concession over Kuwait. On 29 July 1911, the British proposed 
to the Ottoman that they are "of opinion that any lasting 
settlement between the two Powers must provide for the definite 
renunciation by the Ottoman Government of Bahrain and adjacent 
islands and of the whole of the Peninsula of El Katr [Qatar]. X27 
In return the British agreed, on 10 May 1912, that Kuwait would 
"form a sort of enclave within, and forming part of the Ottoman 
Empire, but enjoying complete self-government under Turkish 
, l" Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, p1 
271 Gooch and Temperley. op. cit.. vol. X. part II. no. 34, p. 47. 
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suzerainty. X272 Two months later (18 July), the British 
government repeated the same concession. 273 Finally, the two 
governments signed the 1913 agreement. 
According to the terms of the 1913 convention, the 
Ottoman and the British governments were not only 
acknowledging the 1899 treaty (Article 3), but even more the 
Shaikhdom's frontiers were formally defined for the first time 
(Article 5 and 7). Kuwait's territory was divided into two 
circular zones (the red and the green zones), in which the Al- 
Sabah was acknowledged as having varying degrees of authority. 
Within a semi-circle of approximately 40 miles from the town of 
Kuwait the "complete administrative autonomy" of the Shaikh of 
Kuwait was recognised (Article 2). The islands of Bubiyan, 
Warbah, Mashjan, Failakah, Awhah, Kubr, Qaru, Maqtah, and 
Umm al-Maradim "together with the adjacent islets and waters" 
were also included within this red zone. 
Within an outer zone, which was occupied by tribes 
recognising the authority of the Shaikh of Kuwait, the Shaikh 
would continue to collect their tithes (ushur taxes) and to 
perform "the administrative rights belonging to him in his 
quality" as an Ottoman qaimmaqam (Article 6). The limitation of 
that outer zone had been based on Shakespear's 1912 
observations that "All Arab shaikhs base the territorial extent of 
their power upon their ability to enforce some order over the 
adjacent tribes, their power to enforce the payments of 'zikat' by 
Ibid., no. 50. p. 73 
2 Ibid., no. 55, p. 79. 
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Bedouin, and their capacity to prevent and to avenge outrages 
and raids within the territorial limits claimed. Judged by these 
standards there can be no question that Mubarak is the paramount 
chief within the limit described. "274 In this outer zone, the 
Ottoman government would not "exercise any administrative 
action independently of the shaykh of Kuwayt", and would not 
establish garrisons or undertake any military activity without the 
prior understanding of Britain (Article 6). 
Although the agreement recognised that both zones 
belonged to Kuwait and the tribes who lived in the outer zone 
acknowledged the Shaikh of Kuwait's authority and paid him their 
tithes, it failed to provide the reasons behind this division and on 
what grounds it was taken. The convention did not answer why 
the British and the Ottoman governments divided a territory they 
believed belonged to Kuwait. This division contributed to the 
confusion of Kuwait's boundary problems. 
The British government, in exchange, recognised Kuwait as 
an autonomous Ottoman qada (district)275; the Shaikh of Kuwait 
as an Ottoman gaimmaqam; accepted that the Ottoman 
government could appoint an agent in the Shaikhdom, agreed that 
the Shaikh raised the Ottoman flag, as in the past, though he 
could add the word "Kuwait" to it "if he wishes it" (Article 2), 
and promised not to announce Kuwait a British protectorate so 
long as the status quo was preserved (Article 4). 
a Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, p. 141. 
2 Dada or caza is an Ottoman word referring to an administrative unit. 
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Shaikh Mubarak's initial reaction to the Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention was to reject it, especially the question of appointing 
an Ottoman agent at Kuwait. The Shaikh insisted that appointing 
an Ottoman agent would destroy any good the convention might 
bring. 276 Mubarak argued that such a measure was against the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti treaties of 1899 and 1907, which he had faithfully 
observed for many years. 27 In a lengthy letter to a journalist 
friend, Cox wrote that "The admission of a Turkish Agent he 
[Mubarak] was most bitterly opposed to. It was what he had 
fought successfully all his life and had thought that such a thing 
had long ago vanished from the horizon of practical politics.... 
This is the thing they [i. e. the Ottomans] have many times tried 
and which I [Mubarak] have always.... defeated. X278 Captain 
Shakespear, the Political Agent at Kuwait, also reported that 
Shaikh Mubarak "was so surprised at the possibility that he asked 
me to repeat and explain the matter to him more than once, and 
when I had done so, he became most vehement in his opposition 
to the idea. X279 
On 6 July 1913, Mubarak received a written assurance from 
the British Political Resident in the Gulf. Cox told Mubarak that 
Britain had to negotiate the 1913 convention on a 'give and take 
basis'. The Political Resident assured Mubarak that "The points 
which you have conceded in the course of this agreement - which 
was on a give and take basis - you must regard as the price paid 
276 Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 338. 
277 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, pp. 45-6. 
Graves, op. cit., pp. 169-70. 
, l9 Busch. Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 338. 
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in exchange for the great advantages which you derive from it. 
Among them [are] the confirmation of your independence.... "280 
The Shaikh had no real choice but to accept the convention. He 
told Cox " what ca nI do but put my faith in you and your 
government and do as you ask; but it is with great trembling of 
heart that I do so. X2 81 
The 1913 convention signified a turning point for the 
British government's policy in Kuwait. The articles concerning 
Kuwait were totally opposed to Britain's former policy of 
defending Kuwait and recognising the independence of the 
emirate and its Shaikhs from the Ottoman empire. This probably 
explains why the British Indian government and its senior 
employees in the Gulf at that time, such as Cox and Shakespear, 
were not as enthusiastic about the convention as the Home 
government. After the two parties initialled the final Draft on 6 
May 1913, Cox pointed out rightly that "If Mubarak was to be an 
Ottoman qaimmaqam, that is, government official, he would be a 
Turkish agent. "282 In his letter to the journalist Cox even 
admitted that in the 1913 agreement "we came off worst in the 
Kuwait part. X283 Shakespear, in his turn, raised his reservations 
about the proposal of appointing a permanent Ottoman agent at 
, K" Ibid.. p. 339, and Maurice Mendelson & Susan Hulton, "Iraq's Claim to 
Sovereignty over Kuwait. " in Schofield. Territorial Foundations of the Gulf 
States, p. 144. note: 2>. 
, x' Graves, op. cit., p. 170. 
282 Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 338. 
283 Graves. op. cit.. p. 170. 
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Kuwait 
. 
284 "To me his attitude is no surprise" was also the 
reaction of Shakespear to Mubarak's initial rejection. 285 
The generally held view was that the British government, by 
signing the 1913 convention, sacrificed the territory and interests 
of Kuwait for her own interests. This view was shared by Shaikh 
Mubarak himself. Suspicious that the British have might gained 
some privileges from the Ottoman government in the Baghdad 
Railway's issue in exchange for their concessions in Kuwait, 
Mubarak asked to see the railway terms. 286 Shakespear's words 
also exemplified this belief. In May 1913, he wrote that, "No 
amount of explanation will ever remove the impression that we 
have used Kuwait as a pawn to secure other advantages to 
ourselves. "287 Mubarak's 'give' in the 1913 treaty was in return 
for the 'take' Britain achieved in the Qatari, Bahraini and the 
Baghdad Railway questions. 
Although the 1913 convention was never ratified, it had a 
great effect on the stability of the Gulf region. All parties 
involved in it, including the British, accepted the treaty when it 
ran in accordance with their interests and rejected it whenever it 
supported their opponents' argument. Though there are many 
examples to support this claim, three should suffice to illustrate 
the argument. 
2S1 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq, p. 45 
Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 138. 
Ibid. 
, ý^ Ibid. 
112 
Kuwait's Border Disputes with Najd and Iraq 
When clashes broke out in early 1920 between Salim's 
forces and Ibn Saud's over the green zone territory, Shaikh Salim 
appealed to the British to define Kuwait's frontiers according to 
the 1913 convention. The British reply was that the mentioned 
agreement had been substituted by the Anglo-Najdi Darin Treaty 
of 1915.288 According to Article 6 of the 1915 treaty, the limits 
of the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial 
emirates, which are under British government protection, "shall 
be hereafter determined. " The British also claimed that one of the 
aims of the convention was to protect Kuwait against the 
Ottomans, but since the Ottomans were no longer a political 
factor in the Gulf, the agreement had become obsolete. 289 Finally 
at the al-Uqair conference of December 1922, the British rejected 
Kuwait's claim and mollified Ibn Saud by giving him almost all 
the green zone area neighbouring his land disregarding the 1913 
convention. 
But when the Najdis extended their attack to al-Jahra town 
in October 1920, Ibn Saud was strongly warned by the British 
government that the red zone territory of the 1913 agreement was 
recognised as definitely belonging to Kuwait and that this 
question was "not open to dispute. " 290 Because of her interests in 
the survival of Kuwait, Britain could not allow Ibn Saud to take- 
over Kuwait or part of the boundary allocated to her by the red 
zone of the same agreement of 1913. 
288 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers. p. 141. and A1-Khatrash. op. cit.. p. 107. 
289 The Political Agent at Kuwait to Civil Commissioner at Baghdad. 
20/6/1920. Wilkinson. Arabia's Frontiers, p. 142. 
290 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq. p. 54. 
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The third example was on 19 April 1923, when the Kuwait- 
Iraq border was defined. In his letter to the British Political 
Agent in Kuwait, Cox, then British High Commissioner in Iraq, 
wrote "As you are aware it is in so far as it goes, identical with 
the frontier indicated by the Green line of the Anglo-Turkish 
agreement of July 29th, 1913, but there seems no necessity to 
make special allusion to that document in your communication to 
the Shaikh. X291 It appears that the High Commissioner wanted to 
avoid any question being raised by the Shaikh of Kuwait about 
Cox's rejection of the 1913 convention only four months earlier 
at the al-Uqair conference. 
It is not without irony therefore that this same convention 
which the British had told Kuwait had no validity in their dispute 
with Ibn Saud over the green zone area was invoked as a valid 
document when dealing with Ibn Saud himself over the red zone 
area and with the Iraqi government over the same green zone 
area. 
5.3 Britain and the Kuwait-Najd Border Dispute 
In 1891, Ibn Rashid, the Ruler of Hail, crushed the Al-Saud 
family and destroyed their rule in Najd. The latter moved to 
different places until finally seeking refuge in Kuwait. They 
stayed there until the young Ibn Saud recaptured Riyadh by 
defeating Ibn Rashid's forces in 1902. In 1913, the eastern part 
of the Arabian Peninsula fell to Ibn Saud's authority. After the 
Memorandum from Sir Percy Cox to the Political Agent at Kuwait. in 
L/P&S/20/C 158E. 
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failure of a number of attempts, Ibn Saud signed on 26 December 
1915, during the First World W ar, the Treaty of Darin with the 
British government, by which they pledged to protect his 
territories. The treaty addressed Ibn Saud as the 'Ruler of Najd, 
El Hassa, Qatif and Ju bail, and the towns and ports belonging to 
them'. Al-Hasa, Qatif and Jubail are situated on the eastern side 
of the Arabian Peninsula. Since then, the power of Ibn Saud 
gradually spread over the tribes of Najd and the eastern side of 
Arabia. 
Despite the close and strong relationship with Britain 
during Shaikh Mubarak's rulership which culminated in Kuwait 
fighting on the British side in World War I against the Ottoman 
Khailafh and Kuwait coming formally under British protection, 
Anglo-Kuwaiti relations were not always good. Shaikh Salim's 
weak response to the British request that Kuwait should 
participate in a blockade of exports to the Ottoman empire, led 
the British government to take some actions against him. The 
Kuwaitis' smuggling of supplies to the Ottomans in the last year 
of the war became so clear that it induced the British government 
to impose a naval blockade upon Kuwait, which was not lifted 
until the end of the war. 292 The British even warned the Shaikh, 
in July 1918, that their protection would be dependent on his full 
support of the blockade. 293 
292 John Kelly. Arabia, the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, 
1980), p. 170. In February 1919, the British lifted the blockade and agreed 
to compensate Kuwait with 487,000 Rupees. Rush, op. cit.. p. 80. and Al- 
Rashid. op. cit., pp. 239-40. 
21'3 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq , p. 
53. Al-Rashid claimed that at the 
beginning the British threatened Salim to bomb Kuwait if he refused to 
cooperate. Al-Rashid, op. cit., p. 239. 
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After the end of the First World War, the problems of the 
boundaries of today's northern Gulf states (Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait) broke out. These problems caused havoc to the 
British authorities in the area. In May 1922, the British decided 
to call Ibn Saud and the Iraqis for a meeting in Muhammarah to 
discuss the border problems between the two parties. Again, in 
December 1922, the British government asked Iraq, Najd and 
Kuwait to send their representatives to attend a conference at al- 
Uqair. As a result of these meetings, a new boundary between the 
three parties was drawn. However, the discussion in this section 
will be limited to the Kuwait-Najd border only. 
5.3.1 The Arguments of the Two Parties 
In the last months of Mubarak's rule, tension had grown 
between him and Ibn Saud. The situation went from bad to worse 
when Salim bin Mubarak succeeded his brother Jabir in 1917 and 
started to emphasise Kuwait's authority over the green zone 
territory allocated by the 1913 convention to Kuwait. Shaikh 
Salim insisted that Captain Daniel McCallum, the British Political 
Agent at Kuwait, confirmed to him during 1919 the British 
recognition of the whole area of the green zone as part of 
Kuwait. On 17 February 1920, Salim asked for Kuwait's border 
with Najd to be delimited according to the 1913 convention and 
294 McCallum's confirmation. 
294 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, p. 61. 
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The arguments of Ibn Saud were that Salim's power and 
influence over the tribes in the disputed areas was not like 
Mubarak's and that the convention of 1913 had not been ratified 
by its signatories. 295 Ibn Saud insisted that the disputed area 
come under his rule and the tribe there acknowledge his 
authority. He claimed that the Al-Sabah's boundary was far from 
what they claimed. On one occasion, Ibn Saud said that Salim's 
"boundaries are known to start from al-Subaihiyah or even 
further northwards", that was at the most 30 miles from Kuwait 
town. 296 On another, the Saudi Amir said that Al-Sabah's 
hegemony extended nowhere beyond Kuwait city walls. 297 As a 
result, armed clashes started in 1920 between the two parties. 
The Kuwaiti Shaikh appealed to the British for arbitration. 
5.3.2 The 1922 Borders Settlement of al-Uqair 
On 2nd December 1922, the British government called a 
conference at al-Uqair. The conference was held under the 
supervision of Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner in 
Iraq. Iraq was represented by Faisal's (King of Iraq 192 1-3 3) 
Minister of Communications and Works, Sabih Bey and Fahad 
Bey, chief of the Amaral tribe. The Saudi emirate of Najd was 
represented by Ibn Saud himself. Shaikh Ahmad Al-Jabir, the new 
Shaikh of Kuwait, was represented by Major J. C. More, the 
British political Agent in Kuwait (1920-9). Major H. R. Dickson, 
2qi 
Rush. op. cit., p. 80. 
296 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq. p. 54. 
,,,, Ibn Saud to the Political Agent. Bahrain. 5 September 1920. R/15/1/522. 
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then the Political Agent in Bahrain, was present as well. Amin 
Rihani, a close friend of Ibn Saud, was also at al-Uqair, although 
not in any official capacity. 298 
At the conference, to compensate Ibn Saud for the loss of 
the territory he was forced to cede to Iraq in the drawing of the 
Najd-Iraq frontier, the British compelled Shaikh Ahmad to 
abrogate Kuwait's right to the coastal hinterland south of the 
boundary designated to Kuwait in the convention of 1913, when 
Mubarak's influence in the desert was at its peak. Major Dickson, 
who joined the High Commissioner in the conference, reported 
how Cox took "a red pencil and very carefully drew in on the map 
of Arabia a boundary line from the Persian Gulf to Jabal Anaizan, 
close to the Transjordan frontier. This gave Iraq a large area of 
the territory claimed by Najd. Obviously to placate ibn Saud, he 
ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of her territory 
and gave it to Najd. "299 As a result of al-Uqair Agreement, the 
Kuwaiti territory was "pushed back a hundred and fifty miles, 
reducing the kingdom to an area of six thousand square miles" 
Dickson wrote . 
300 In size, the al-Ugair settlement reduced 
Kuwait's territory from nearly 45,000 sq km to 17,818 sq km. 301 
The al-Uqair conference also brought to existence, for the 
first time in Arabia, the strange feature of the 'Neutral Zone' 
298 Gary Troeller, The Birth of Sa'udi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the 
House of Sa'ud (London: Frank Cass. 1976), p. 179. 
H. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: George Allen and 
Unwvin, 1956). p. 274. 
3"" Ibid. 
, p. 276. 
3"' Some observers believed that Kuß; -ait-Najd settlement of al-Uqair was a 
high price Kuwait paid for Shaikh Salim's ill support to Britain during the 
Great War. Kelly, Arabia. p. 170. 
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Such features are usually agreed upon when the concerned 
governments agree to share equal rights of sovereignty in the 
territory disputed between them. 302 In the conference, Cox drew 
out, south and west of Kuwait proper, "two zones, which he 
declared should be neutral and known as the Kuwait Neutral Zone 
and the Iraq Neutral Zone.... Pressed by [the Saudi adviser]..., he 
snapped out: why, pray, are you so anxious that this area go to 
Najd? Quite candidly the pasha replied: because we think oil 
exists there. That", retorted Sir Percy, "is exactly why I have 
made it a neutral zone. Each side shall have a half share. X303 
Regarding the Kuwait-Najd Neutral Zone, "the government 
of Najd and Kuwait will share equal rights until through the good 
offices of the government of Great Britain a further agreement is 
made between Najd and Kuwait concerning it. "304 No such an 
agreement was ever made. Though Cox and the Najdis expected 
that the Kuwait-Najd Neutral Zone was to accommodate oil, no 
instructions were put for mutual co-operation between the two 
emirates in the administrative field or what to do in time of 
disputes. 305 
British official arguments were based on one point: that 
Salim's power was not like that of his father Mubarak at the time 
of concluding the agreement of 1913 and that Ibn Saud was the 
3"2 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq, p. 58. 
303 Dickson, op. cit., pp. 274-5. 
; "a E. Lauterpacht, et. al.. The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents (Cambridge: 
Grotius, 1991). p. 48. 
I`" Gerald Blake, "Shared Zones as a Solution to Problems of Territorial 
Sovereignty in the Gulf States. " in Schofield, Territorial Foundations of the 
Gulf States, p. 204. 
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new master of the desert. In February 1917 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Robert Hamilton, Political Agent at Kuwait, had "laid stress on 
the recent deplorable loss of [Kuwait Shaikh's] influence in the 
[Kuwait] hinterland. "306 In August 1918, Cox, then the Political 
Resident in the Gulf, acknowledged this diminishing of Al-Sabah 
territorial rule when he proposed that Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud could 
capture the Hafar wells, located in the south-west section of the 
area defined by the 1913 convention as part of Kuwait . 
30' Two 
years later, Captain John More's opinion was that "Shaikh Salim's 
influence can in no respect be compared with that of his 
father. "308 Though the Political Agent admitted that Ibn Saud 
based his claim on the unwritten law of the desert while Shaikh 
Salim had the 1913 convention document on his side, he judged 
that "Ibn Saud has a very valid claim to the southern portion of 
the territory" circumscribed by the green line of the 1913 
convention to Kuwait. 309 This weak influence of Salim and Ibn 
Saud's powerful position over the tribes were in Cox's mind when 
he drew the new boundary line between the two emirates in the 
al-Uqair conference. Dickson reported that Cox's argument was 
"that the power of Ibn Sabah was much less in the desert than it 
had been when the Anglo-Ottoman Agreement had been drawn 
Up 11310 
i"`' Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq, p. 53. 
3" Ibid. 
318 Ibid., p. 54: and Wilkinson. Arabia's Frontiers. p 
3wo 
Ibid. 
; 10 Dickson, op. Clt., p. 274. 
142. 
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As far as the Gulf's stability is concerned, the British policy 
in the 1922 Uqair conference laid the seeds for some future 
conflict between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This conclusion 
is emphasised by the following two revealing conversations 
between the British High Commissioner in Iraq and Ibn Saud on 
the one hand, and the High Commissioner and the Shaikh of 
Kuwait on the other after the end of the conference. Major 
Dickson wrote that after Cox drew the boundaries, Ibn Saud 
asked the High Commissioner to visit him. Ibn Saud proceeded to 
break into tears because of the loss of what he believed was his 
land to Iraq. In an answer to Ibn Saud's complaints, Cox replied: 
"My friend, I know exactly how you feel and for this reason I 
gave you two-thirds of Kuwait's territory. I don't know how Ibn 
Sabah will take the blow. "311 The second conversation happened 
when Cox stopped in Kuwait to inform Shaikh Ahmad about the 
results of the conference. Major More and Major Dickson were 
also present. Dickson reported the following remarkable scene, 
"If some day" said Shaikh Ahmad to Cox "Ibn Saud dies and I 
grow strong like my grandfather, Mubarak, will the British 
government object if I denounce the unjust frontier line and 
recover my lost territories? " "No" laughed Cox. "And may God 
bless your efforts. "312 
The last two conversations bring to light three points at 
least. The first is that Cox admitted that he was not fair to Najd 
311 Ibid.. p. 275. Rihani believes that Ibn Saud gave way to the British High 
Commissioner's decisions for fear of losing his annuit`'. Wilkinson, Arabia's 
Frontiers, p. 386, chp. 6, note: 1. 
312 Dickson, op. cit.. p. 279. Shaikh Ahmad. howwever. died in 1950 earlier 
than Ibn Saud who died on 19 3. 
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when he gave Najdi territory to Iraq. This was very clear when 
Cox expressed his sympathy with Ibn Saud by saying "My friend, 
I know exactly how you feel and for this reason I gave you two- 
thirds of Kuwait's territory. " The second point is that the British 
High Commissioner knew that his frontier line was unjust to 
Kuwait. This is supported by Cox himself when he said to Ibn 
Saud "I gave you two-thirds of Kuwait's territory" as a 
compensation for his lost territory to Iraq. Another proof can be 
found in the fact when Cox accepted Shaikh Ahmad's claims that 
he lost his territories because of "the unjust frontier line" 
imposed upon him by the High Commissioner himself. The third 
and final point is that the British High Commissioner realised 
from the beginning that his decision would be a reason for future 
conflict between the two emirates. Two pieces of evidence 
support this assumption. The first is that Cox described his 
decision to Ibn Saud as a 'blow' to Ibn Sabah. The second is 
Shaikh Ahmad's question to Cox: will the British government 
object "If some day... I denounce the unjust frontier line and 
recover my lost territories? " 
There can be no doubt that British interests were the 
decisive factor behind Cox's decisions at the al-Uqair conference. 
There was no consideration of the local, i. e. Kuwait or Najd, 
interests in Cox's mind. Since the concluding of the 1899 secret 
treaty with Kuwait, Shaikh Mubarak proved to be very important 
to British policy in the Gulf region. Therefore, during his reign, 
the British supported Kuwait's territorial claims. But with 
Mubarak's death at the end of 1915 and the raising up of Ibn 
Saud as the new lord of the tribes, Britain's policy was modified. 
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As a result of this change of power, the British refused to 
support the Sabah Shaikhs territorial claims, which were based on 
the 1913 convention. Conversely, they appeased Ibn Saud by 
accepting his claim to the same territories demanded by the 
Kuwaitis. Dickson put it plainly when he reported that Cox's 
action sprang from a desire to "mollify the powerful and 
troublesome Ibn Saud" at the expense of a small and weak 
neighbour. 313 However, no evidence could illustrate how Britain's 
interest was the major element behind the al-Uqair settlement 
better than her official's (the High Commissioner in Iraq and 
Political Agent in Kuwait at that time) favouring the desert law 
instead of the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention document. 
In conclusion, the results of Britain's policy at the al-Uqair 
conference was, and still is, a source of troubles and arguments 
between the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments. Many Kuwaitis 
continue to believe that the green zone area belongs to Kuwait 
and the British deprived them of it in 1922 when they gave it to 
Ibn Saud. And although the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian 
governments agreed, in 1976, to divide the Neutral Zone between 
the two countries, the Saudis still claim the two islands of Qaru 
and Umm al-Maradim arguing that they are off the Neutral Zone, 
despite the fact that the 1913 convention considered them as 
parts of Kuwait. 314 Thus, no one could guarantee that this 
chapter of history has closed for ever, and herein lies a great 
threat to Gulf stability. 
313 Dickson, op. cit., p. 276. 
314 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, p. 243. 
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5.4 Britain and the Kuwait-Iraq Border Dispute 
Iraq's long standing claims to Kuwait could be divided into 
two parts. The first is that Kuwai t should give some concession 
on the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, the control of which 
had been a key strategic objective of Iraq's policy for over half a 
century. The second is that the whole of Kuwait's territory 
belongs to Iraq. However, the chief characteristic of the 
territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait before the 1990 Iraqi 
invasion, with the exception of the 1963 treaty, has been Iraq's 
total refusal to accept the demarcation of the boundary as 
defined by the 1932 Kuwait-Iraq Agreement, which clearly 
specified Kuwaiti ownership of Warbah and Bubiyan islands, 
unless Kuwait first agreed to modify her boundary with Iraq to 
allow the latter greater access to the waters of the Gulf. 315 
Kuwait, for her part, implied that the alteration of the boundary, 
the cession of portions of its northern land and island territories, 
might be studied, but only if the boundary was first demarcated 
according to the 1932 agreement. ; 16 
Throughout their dispute, many attempts were made to free 
the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute from this dilemma. Proposals have 
been made that Iraq might get Warbah in exchange for other Iraqi 
territorial concessions to Kuwait. 317 Other proposals suggested 
1i It is worth noted that Bubivan represents one fifth of the total land area 
of Kuwait. 
316 Richard Schofield, "The Kuwaiti Islands of Warbah and Bubiv an, and 
Iraqi Access to the Gulf. " in Schofield, Territorial Foundations of the Gulf 
States, p. 153. 
31 ' Ibid.. p. 162. 
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that Iraq should be satisfied to lease rather than to control the 
islands. In 1956, for example , the 
British proposed that Iraq 
might lease Warbah in return for providing Kuwait with water 
from Shatt al-Arab . 
318 While others suggested that a territorial 
solution should be part and parcel of a much wider package of 
bilateral agreements between the two states. 319 Ultimately, all 
these efforts were unsuccessful and the territorial dispute 
between the two states remained in a deadlock. A leading 
authority on Arabian territorial affairs described the history of 
the Kuwait-Iraq border dispute up to the 1990 invasion "as being 
'more of the same'. "32° 
5.4.1 Britain and the Definition of the Kuwait-Iraq Border 
The British position on the Kuwait-Iraq border was clear 
evidence of a realpolitik policy. As was explained earlier, 
Britain's fears of her European competitor powers reaching 
through a railway to the head of the Gulf had prompted her to 
conclude the 1899 secret treaty with Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait. 
However, in the next few years the Germans increased their 
pressure on the Ottoman government. In January 1900, for 
example, a German technical commission visited Kuwait to 
explore the prospect of constituting a terminus there. The British 
government reached a conclusion that such progress would 
318 The National Union of Kuwait Students, United Kingdom & Republic of 
Ireland Branch, The Claims of the Iraqi Regime in the Territories of the 
State of Kuwait between History and Law 2, p. 6. 
119 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq. p. 132. 
Ibid., p. 128. 
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eventually result in the "Germanization of the Baghdad or Basra 
vilayets, the diminution of British prestige and commerce in these 
provinces, and the disturbance of our relations with the Arab 
Chiefs on the southern and western shores of the Persian Gulf. "'21 
And above all, the coming of the Germans to the Gulf region 
would affect the British position in the Indian sub-continent. 
Thus the Shaikh of Kuwait was directed to refuse the German 
proposal. "The Shaikh of Kowiet has been instructed to enter into 
no engagement with the German Commission without reference to 
the Government of India. " 322 Al-Rashid wrote that Mubarak even 
requested the German commission to leave his emirate. 32' 
To deny the Ottomans and their allies an access to the best 
natural outlet on the Gulf, the British Indian government 
supported Shaikh Mubarak's claims to Bubiyan and Warbah 
islands. The government of India admitted in 1906 that her 
support to Mubarak's claims to Bubiyan island had been made 
only "in anticipation of the day when the port of a trans- 
continental railway system should be located in the 
neighbourhood" i. e. the Ottoman-Iraq. 324 This self-interested 
policy resulted effectively in 'squeezing out' the Ottomans from 
321 Ibid., p. 33. The British Political Resident in the Gulf, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Malcolm Meade, also warned that the "establishment of German 
influence at Koweit will seriously affect our own position throughout the 
Persian Gulf. " Meade to Government of India, 5 February 1900. in Bidwell. 
The Affairs of Kuwait, vol. II, part II, p. 19. 
3 22 Government of India to Lord George Hamilton. 11 January 
1900, 
Hamilton to Government of India, 13 January 1900; and Government of India 
to Rear-Admiral Bosanquet. 18 January 1900. Bidwell. The Affairs of 
Kuwait, vol. I, Part II, p. 3,13. 
; 2j Al-Rashid. op. cit.. p. 99. 
324 Richard Schofield. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the 
Arabian Peninsula During the Twentieth Century. " in Schofield. Territorial 
Foundations of the Gulf States. p. 42. 
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the Gulf and denying the Porte (and its allies) any suitable site 
for a railway terminus along the Gulf coast. 325 This British 
success was formalised by the concluding of the 1913 Anglo- 
Ottoman Convention. 
The first definition of the Kuwait-Iraq border appeared in 
Article 7 of the 1913 convention. The contracting governments 
agreed that the limits of Kuwait's territory were to run as 
follows: "The demarcation line begins on the coast at the mouth 
of Khawr al-Zubayr in the northwest and crosses immediately 
south of Umm-Qasr, Safwan, and Jabal Sanam, in such a way as 
to leave to the Vilayet of Basrah these locations and their wells; 
arriving at the al-Batin.... This line is marked in green on the 
map annexed to the present convention. " Article 5 of the 
convention also named the islands belonging to Kuwait as 
follows: "al-Warbah, Bubyan, Mashjan, Faylakah, Awahh 
(Auhah), al-Kubr, Qaru, al-Maqta and Umm-al-Maradim. " 
In the early inter-war years, Turkey gave up all right of 
sovereignty over the territories detached from her after World 
War One. In the Sevres Treaty of 10 August 1920, reiterated 
three years later in the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey renounced in 
favour of the Principal Allied Powers "all rights and title" over 
all territories that had belonged to her outside the frontiers laid 
down in these treaties. 326 Turkey's possessions in the Arab world 
3, ) Ibid.. pp. 42-3, Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, pp. 132-3, and Khalid Al- 
Sarajani. "Delineating the Iraq-Kuwait Borders after the [Second] Gulf 
Crisis. " A1-Siassa Al-Dawlva 111 (January 1993). p. 231. 
Article 132 of the Sevres Treaty and Article 16 of Lausanne Treat- 
While the Sevres Treaty. owing to resistance by Turkey. was never ratified, 
the Treaty of Lausanne signed on 24 July 1923 and entered into force on 6 
August 1924. 
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were included. Modern Iraq was created in succession from the 
Baghdad, Basrah and Mosal wilayats. And as a result of the 
Anglo-French political manoeuvring during and after the First 
World War, Iraq became a British League of Nations mandate. 327 
A nationalistic opposition developed in 1920. Britain found 
it difficult to have direct rule over Iraq, and therefore planned to 
rule through a friendly and co-operative local government. In 
March 1921, the Cairo Conference under the leadership of W. 
Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, decided that the best course of 
action was to create a monarchy in Iraq. Amir Faisal, the third 
son of Sharief Hussein of Makkah, a minor ally of Britain in the 
Great War was the best choice. On 11 July 1921, convinced by 
Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner in Iraq under the 
mandate, the Iraq Council of State passed a resolution formally 
declaring Faisal to be King. In August 1921, Amir Faisal was 
elected as King. 328 Despite all this, control of Iraq's foreign, 
military and financial affairs remained firmly and directly with 
the British. 
In April 1923, only four months after the conclusion of the 
al-Uqair Treaty, following a request from the Shaikh of Kuwait, 
the second attempt to define the Kuwait-Iraq border took place. 
The Shaikh pointed out that Kuwait's border with Iraq would be 
;, For the Declaration which constituted the Mandate for Mesopotamia 
(Iraq) see FO 371/5245. Mandate is rights granted to certain powers after 
World War I by the League of Nations. to whom annual reports on conditions 
were supposed to be submitted. to administer the former German colonies 
and non-Turkish territories of the Ottoman Khilafah. which were 
deemed 
unable to govern themselves. 
328 Faisal was the first King of modern Iraq and the 
founder of the 
Hashemite dynasty in Iraq's modern history. 
128 
Kuwait's Border Disputes with Najd and Iraq 
as follows: "From the intersection of the Wadi El Audja with the 
Batin and thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south 
of the Latitude of Safwan; thence Eastwards passing south of the 
Safwan wells, Jabal Sanm and Um Qasr, leaving them to Iraq and 
so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor 
Abdullah. " He also named the islands he considered to belong to 
Kuwait as follows: "Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), 
Failakah, Auha, Kubba(r), Qaru and Um-el-Maradim. " Britain, as 
the mandate power in Iraq, agreed to the border and islands the 
Kuwaiti Shaikh had listed. "The Shaikh can be informed that his 
claim to the frontier and islands above indicated", Cox wrote to 
Kuwait's Political Agent, "is recognised in so far as His Majesty's 
Government are concerned. it 329 
The 1913 and 1923 definitions of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border 
were reaffirmed in the exchange of letters, dated 21st July and 
10th August 1932, between Nuri Al-Saed, Iraq's Prime Minister, 
and Shaikh Ahmad Al-Jabir, with the British representatives 
acting as the mediators. In his letter to Britain's High 
Commissioner in Iraq, Sir F. Humphrys, the Iraqi Prime Minister 
agreed to "reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and 
Koweit. " The Iraqi Prime Minister's letter described the frontier 
between the two countries in the same words cited above 
in the 
April 1923 definition. On 30 July 1932, Shaikh Ahmad received a 
letter from the Political Resident informing him that the British 
government approved the frontier proposed 
by the Iraqi Prime 
Minister. On 10 August 1932, Shaikh Ahmad told the British 
329 Memorandum from the High Commissioner for Iraq to the 
Political 
Agent in Kuwait, 19 April 192 3. L/P&S/20/C 1 58E. 
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Political Agent at Kuwait of his acceptance of the description of 
the frontier in the Iraqi Prime Minister letter. 33o 
Before the involvement of Britain in Kuwait's affairs in 
1899, Kuwait, like the other emirates in the Arabian side of the 
Gulf, had no clear border separating her territories from that of 
her neighbours. Lorimer commented that "The boundaries of 
Kuwait principality are for the most part fluctuating and 
undefined; they are, at any given time, the limits of the tribes 
which then, either voluntarily or under compulsion, owe 
allegiance to the Shaikh of Kuwait. "331 This problem continued 
even after the conclusion of the 1899 Treaty. The views of 
Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, were frankly expressed 
in a memorandum of 21 March 1902 that "no one knows where his 
[Mubarak] possessions begin and end, and our obligations 
towards him are as ill-defined as the boundaries of his 
Principality. "332 A few years later, in early 1908, a British 
memorandum stated that "the limits of Kuwait have never been 
accurately, or, indeed, even approximately, defined. to 333 The three 
documents indicate that the British knew the necessity of 
defining Kuwait's border precisely. Unfortunately, this was not 
the case in practice. 
As far as the Kuwait-Iraq border was concerned, the vague 
definition of Kuwait's border holds a great part of the 
33" Letters from the Prime Minister of Iraq and the Ruler of Kuwait Re- 
affirming the Kuwait-Iraq Boundary. 21 July and 10 August 1932 
respectively. R/15/1/738. 
331 Quoted in Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq. p. 35. 
332 Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 216, note: 105. 
;; Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq, p. 35. 
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responsibility for its long confusion throughout this century. The 
language of the 1913,1923 and the 1932 agreements was a clear 
example. This lack of clarity made it very difficult to understand 
what exactly was meant by words like "cross immediately south 
of Umm-Qasr, Safwan, and Jabal Sanam", "arriving at the al- 
Batin", "along the Batin", "just south... Safwan" and "Eastwards 
passing south of the Safwan wells, Jabal Sanm and Um Qasr", and 
where, precisely, to draw Kuwait's boundary in the sand. 
Therefore it increased the confusion of the border issue. "` 
Indeed, even the British themselves faced difficulties in deciding, 
and convincing the two parties, where the border line must run. "5 
Moreover, it took the United Nation Iraq-Kuwait Boundary 
Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC) almost one year to 
announce its final interpretation of where, exactly, the Kuwaiti- 
Iraqi land boundary should run. This explained, partially, why all 
the attempts to solve the Kuwait-Iraq border dispute based on the 
previous definition met with failure. 36 
In his reply to Shaikh Ahmad's letter of 1923, Cox's words 
to the Political Agent in Kuwait "The Shaikh can be informed 
that his claim to the frontier and islands above indicated is 
recognised in so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned" 
produced another example. Although both the context of the 
334 Ibid.. p. 72,100; and Al-Sarajani. op. cit., P. 232. 
33' In early December 1951 Sir John Troutbeck. British 
Ambassador in 
Baghdad, was instructed by the Foreign Office to present 
to the Iraqi 
government a note clarifying the boundary alignment specified 
by the 1932 
exchange of notes. This interpretation made reference to the point south 
of 
Safwan as lying 1,000 metres south of the old Iraqi customs 
hut. The new 
interpretation was delivered to the Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry in a note verbale 
of 18 December 1951. Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq, p. 95. 
; `' Ibid., p. 72. 
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words and the practical reality suggested that Cox recognised 
Shaikh Ahmad's claim on behalf of both the governments of 
Britain and Iraq, the phrase "in so far as His Majesty's 
Government are concerned" did not fully suggest that this was 
the case. 337 The British High Commissioner in Iraq had the power 
to make this pledge very clearly on behalf of the government of 
Iraq, but his vague language would be yet another reason for 
more troubles between the two states. 
5.4.2 Britain and Iraq's Major Attempts to Absorb Kuwait 
Before Saddam's brutal invasion of August 1990, Iraq's 
claim to the whole of Kuwait had been extended most notably on 
two occasions. 338 First, during 1938, King Ghazi and his Foreign 
Minister Taufiq Al-Suwaidi tried to utilise the internal opposition 
to Shaikh Ahmad's policies by provoking the Kuwaitis against 
their Ruler through a private broadcasting station in the King's 
Qasr al-Zuhur (Rose's Palace) and urged them to unite with 
Iraq. 139 On 28 September 1938, Al-Suwaidi formally informed the 
British government that "Just before the War of 1914-1918, 
i; ' The Iraqis themselves have treated the agreement as one that was made 
on their behalf, challenging it on the basis that it constituted a breach of the 
mandate. Mendelson & Hulton, op. cit., p. 145. note: 42 and p. 149, note: 
99. 
; 38 In 1958. Nuri Al-Said. Iraq's Prime Minister. also pressured Kuwait's 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Salim (r. 1950-65), to join the proposed Hashemite 
Union between the Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. Qasim's coup of the same 
year saved Kuwait from Nuri's plots. P. Mangold. "Britain and the Defence 
of Kuwait, 1956-7l. " Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 120 
(September 1975), p. 45. 
Kuwait's Foundation for Scientific Advancement, A1-Kuwait. Her 
Existence and Borders: the Objective Facts and the Iraqi 
Claims (Al-Qahira: 
Kuwait's Foundation for Scientific Advancement, 1991). pp. 933-4, and Rush. 
Op. cit., p. 52. 
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Kuwait was an autonomous qadah of the Wilayat of Basra. The 
Iraqi Government, as the successor to the Ottoman Government 
in the Wilayats of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, considers that 
Kuwait should properly be incorporated in Iraq. "340 
Britain's response to Al-Suwaidi's claim was that "The 
Shaikhdom of Koweit was for a considerable period in an 
anomalous state of semi-dependence on the Ottoman Empire; His 
Majesty's Government have nevertheless been in treaty relations 
with the Shaikhs of Koweit since 1 841 ; and Koweit finally 
became completely independent of Turkey and Koweit nationality 
finally came into existence on the same date as Iraq and Iraqi 
nationality. 341 The Iraqis then turned their claims to the 'slight 
rectification' principle of the boundary line. 
The second major attempt was made by Iraq's President 
General Abdul-Karim Qasim on the announcement of Kuwait's 
independence on 19 June 1961. On that day, the 1899 Anglo- 
Kuwaiti Agreement was abrogated by a new treaty between 
Britain and Kuwait, as being inconsistent with the sovereignty of 
Kuwait. Under the 1961 treaty terms, Britain would assist Kuwait 
if requested. One day after Kuwait declared her independence, 
Qasim showed his relief at the "abrogation of the illegal, forged 
and internationally unrecognized" agreement of 1899, which, he 
3-1' Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, p. 77. 
34' Ibid., p. 78. The British claim that they have been in treaty relations 
with Kuwait since 1841 is exaggerated. As explained in chapter two of this 
study, it is true that the Shaikh of Kuwait adhered on 24 April 184 1 to the 
Maritime Truce. but it was only for one year. Kuwait's next treaty with 
Britain was the well-known 1899 agreement with 
Shaikh Mubarak. In this 
sixty years period Kuwait Ni as far more close to the 
Ottomans than to the 
British. 
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claimed, had been "falsely concluded with Shaikh Mubarak al- 
Sabah, Qaymmaqam of Kuwait, who belonged to Basra province, 
without the Knowledge of his brothers in Kuwait and the then 
legal authorities in Iraq. "342 As far as the 19 June 1961 exchange 
of notes is concerned, Qasim warned Shaikh Abdullah against the 
"plots and intrigues of the British imperialists who divide the 
ranks inside the Arab homeland to ensure that they will remain 
behind the scenes. X343 On 25 June, Qasim seized the occasion of 
Britain's departure to announce in a press conference that 
"Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq" and should return as 
such. 344 
Shaikh Abdullah rejected Qasim's claims and swiftly turned 
to Britain to protect Kuwait from Iraq's threats. Britain 
immediately deployed its troops, ships, and aircraft to Kuwait, 
and blocked the Iraqi threat. The Arab League, despite Iraqi 
objections, admitted Kuwait into its ranks and decided to support 
it against Baghdad. An Arab League force consisting of units 
from the United Arab Republic (UAR)345, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
and Sudan arrived in September 1961 to replace the British, who 
completely withdrew the following month. No fighting occurred, 
but the Arab League force (except for the UAR units, which left 
; 4, Ibid., p. 106. 
; 43 Ibid 
3.1.1 Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the 
Revolution of 1958 (London: Oxford University Press. 1969). p. 
166. Two 
months before Kuwait's independence. Qasim declared that "there were no 
frontiers between us and the Kuwaiti people. " Khadduri. op. cit.. p. 
169. 
3-1' A federation of the contemporary states of Egypt and 
Syria lasted onl\ 
for three years. 1958-61. 
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in December 1961) remained until Qasim was finally overthrown 
and executed by the 1963 coup led by Colonel Abdul-Salam Arif. 
Consequently, relations between Iraq and Kuwait improved. 
In 1963, the new Iraqi government, headed by the Baathist 
Ahmad Al-Bakr, recognised Kuwait as an independent Arab 
country. The October 1963 memorandum stated that: "Iraq 
recognized the Independence and complete sovereignty of the 
state of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the letter of 
the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21st July 1932 and which was 
accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10th August 
1932. 346 
5.4.3 Iraq's Arguments and the Responses to them 
Though Iraq's political system had changed from a 
monarchy (1932-58), to a republic (since 1958), all Iraqi regimes 
shared a common allegation that. Iraq had a 'historical right' in 
Kuwait which Britain had deprived them of. The Iraqi argument 
laid stress on the notion of historical continuity of states. All 
Iraqi regimes argued, and continue to argue, that Kuwait formed 
an integral part of Basrah when both of them were a part of the 
346 For the "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic 
of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations. Recognition and 
Related Matter of 4 October 1963. " see United Nations Treaty Series 
(UNTS), vol. 485. p. 321,326. This Baghdad signed agreement was 
registered with the United Nations by the Kuwaiti government on 
10 January 
1964. 
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Ottoman Khilafah. Subsequently, as a successor to the Ottomans 
in governing Basrah, Iraq too had the right to govern Kuwait. 347 
To justify their claims, successive Iraqi governments 
insisted that all treaties and correspondence between Iraq and 
Kuwait (1913,1923,1932,1963) and between Britain and Kuwait 
(1899,1961) were null and void. For the 1913 convention, the 
Iraqis argued that the Ottomans did not ratify the agreement. 
They also claimed that Sir Percy Cox, the British High 
Commissioner in Iraq, breached his authority under the mandate 
when he accepted in 1923 the Kuwaiti Shaikh's suggestion for the 
border between Kuwait and Iraq. The Iraqis repeatedly rejected 
the 1932 agreement on the basis that it was forced upon Nuri Al- 
Saed, the Iraq Prime Minister, by the British government. 348 
Concerning the 1963 treaty, the Iraqis respond that it was not 
ratified by the National Council of Revolutionary Command, the 
highest Iraqi legislative authority according to the interim 
constitution of 1963.349 With regard to the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti 
Treaty, the Iraqis rejected it claiming that it had been signed 
without authorisation from the right authority, i. e. the 
3"1' Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, Introduction. and Kuwait's Foundation for 
Scientific Advancement. op. cit., p. 116. The "historical right" argument 
was discussed in detail in a seminar organised by Kuwait's Centre of 
Information: The Legend of Iraq's Historical Rights in the State of Kuwait. 
318 Kuwait's Centre of Information. op. cit.. p. 43, and The National Union 
of Kuwait Students, op. cit., p. 9. 
3.11' Tariq Aziz's, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq, letter 
to the Foreign Ministers of all Countries of 4 September 1990. Gulf Centre 
for Strategic Studies, The GCC Border Dis pules Seminar. Appendix C. p. -'7. 
and The National Union of Kuwait Students. op. cit.. p. 11. 
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Ottomans . 
350 As a consequence, the Iraqis also rejected the 1961 
treaty which declared Kuwait's independence. 351 
There are a number of irrefutable legal and historical facts 
which refute the Iraqi allegations. But before discussing these 
facts, it should be noted that in the event of all British-Kuwaiti 
and Kuwaiti-Iraqi agreements being invalid, Kuwait must be 
regarded in the same light as Iraq. Following the collapse of the 
Ottoman empire, Iraq became a British mandate country, likewise 
Kuwait was a British protectorate since 1899. Thus, as Iraq got 
its independence in 1932, Kuwait had its in 1961. Therefore, if 
all Iraqi regimes regard themselves as the natural heir to the 
Ottoman empire in Iraq, then the Kuwaitis had the right to 
consider themselves the legal inheritor to the Ottomans in 
Kuwait. The above-mentioned British response to Al-Suwaidi's 
claim supports this. It said that "Koweit finally became 
completely independent of Turkey and Koweit nationality finally 
came into existence on the same date as Iraq and Iraqi 
nationality. " 
As far as the notion of historical continuity of states is 
concerned, all Iraqi arguments omit the fact that Turkey gave up, 
in the 1920 treaty of Sevres and again in the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne, all right of sovereignty over the territories detached 
from her after World War One. Legally speaking, if Iraq regards 
herself as the inheritor of the Ottomans in today's Iraq, she must 
i") Kuwait's Foundation for Scientific Advancement. op. cit.. p. 100. For 
the Arabic text of Qasim's cable see Muhammad Al-Adhami. et. al.. 
Al- 
Kuwait and the Attempts of Getting Her Back to Iraq (n. a.. 
1991). pp. 116-7. 
3" Kuwait's Foundation for Scientific Advancement. op. cit., pp. 102-3). 
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respect and fulfil the Ottomans' obligations in those treaties. 
"While Iraq was on e of the successor states, she could not claim 
sovereign ri ghts", is Khadduri's viewpoint on Qasim's claim to 
Kuwait in 1961, "over a territory which Turkey had not 
surrendered to her . 
Thus in law Qasim could hardly justify his 
action, but he kept shifting the grounds of his claim from legal to 
historical to politic al considerations. "352 
There is no legal legitimacy to the Iraqi claims to ignore 
the historically accepted facts and documents. The most 
important of these were the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Agreement, 
which defined the boundaries between Kuwait and Ottoman Iraq 
and denied that Kuwait was part of Basrah, and the 1963 Iraq- 
Kuwait Treaty declaring independent Iraq's recognition of an 
independent Kuwait. In addition, there were many conventions, 
correspondence and events which indicated that since its 
foundation as a political entity in 1921, Iraq had openly agreed 
to the existence of Kuwait as an independent emirate. And up to 
1990, Iraq has had full and continuous diplomatic relations with 
Kuwait at the ambassadorial level. It is also worth stating here 
that all geography and history books, whether academic or 
otherwise, which were printed and circulated in Iraq have always 
referred to Kuwait as an independent Arab country. 353 
If these are the legal and historical facts, what were the 
real motives behind Iraq's claims to the whole or part of Kuwait? 
The Iraqis raised the strategic factor. According to this 
Il, 
Khadduri. op. cit.. p. 168. 
Kuwait's Foundation for Scientific Advancement, op. cit., p. 102,133 
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argument, Iraq's two principal points of access to the Gulf were 
from Basrah through the Shatt al-Arab waterway whose 
sovereignty was disputed with Iran; and at the port of Umm Qasr 
whose sea-lanes were controlled by Warbah and Bubiyan islands. 
Thus, it became fixed in official minds within Iraq that an 
effective Gulf role for Iraq was dependent either on Iran 
recognising Iraq's sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab --and 
this was impossible, or on Kuwait transferring control over 
Warba and Bubiyan islands to Iraq. 354 
The argument continued that Iraq's geographical disposition 
causes great difficulties and makes it easy for its historical 
enemy, Iran, to blockade its shipping lanes in the Gulf. "' In an 
interview with the editors of Kuwaiti newspapers, in April 1984, 
Saddam Hussein (Iraq's President since 1978) expressed this 
feeling. He stated that, "for Iraq, we are in an impossible 
position, worse than anywhere in the Gulf. If our navy sailed 
away two steps, it could be hit so easily. " 356 The Iraqis have 
always believed that Kuwait's ownership of the two islands 
squeeze their country out from the Gulf. 357 In April 1973, the 
354 Tim Niblock, "Iraqi Policies Towards the Arab States of the Gulf. 1958- 
1981, " in Tim Niblock, (ed. ), Iraq: The Contemporary State, (London: Croom 
Helm, 1982), p. 126. Kelly believed that it was this question of maritime 
access which was to be largely responsible for reopening the Iraq-Kuwait 
frontier question, from time to time. Kelly. Arabia, p. 278. 
;» Al-Mavyal, op. cit., p. 31. The Iranian-Iraqi historical dispute 
convinced the Iraqis that it is of vital importance to them to secure 
alternative ports on the Gulf to guarantee Iraq's oil exports, to secure the 
Iraqi navy's sailing and functioning in the Gulf. and to keep up with the 
superiority of the Iranian navy. 
356 The interview was published in all the Kuwaiti daily newspapers on 
3.5.1984. 
3'7 Schofield, "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf. " p. 4 and Schofield, 
"The Kuwaiti Islands of Warbah and Bubivan. " pp. 1-53-4. 
139 
Kuwait's Border Disputes with Najd and Iraq 
then Iraqi Foreign Minister, Al-Hadithi, for example, stated that 
Iraq would not be a Gulf st ate unless the islands of Warba and 
Bubiyan belonged to her. 358 Therefore, Iraq's officials have all 
the time expected Kuwait to compensate Iraq for her geographic 
and strategic difficulty. 359 
The reality, however, is that the incorporation of all 
Kuwaiti territory into Iraq would be insufficient to match Iran's 
marine geopolitical superiority. Iran enjoys naval control of all 
of the eastern seaboard of the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the 
coast on the Gulf of Oman to the Arabian Sea. Thus Iraq's quest 
for competition with Iran, would force her to be involved in 
further territorial disputes with all the Arab Gulf states, not just 
Kuwait. Therefore, a more comprehensive and effective method 
which would sufficiently protect Iraqi ports and shipping would 
have to be decided upon through common co-ordination with the 
weak Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states and not through 
the short-sighted and ineffective option of conducting military 
invasions on vulnerable small states. 
Finally, the truth is that, not only historical, legal or 
strategic causes lie behind Iraq's long standing claims over 
Kuwait; rather, personal ambitions, and domestic and financial 
problems were certainly involved, which none of the Iraqi 
regimes had the courage to make public. All the Iraqi leaders 
attempted to score a prestigious victory for their leadership and 
regimes. Moreover, all the revolutionary regimes 
in Iraq were 
Sx Kuwaiti Times (5 April 1973). 
S9 Schofield. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf. " p. >. 
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unpopular and facing deep difficulties. Under the fear of a coup, 
their usual policy was to shift the attention of their people from 
the internal troubles to foreign affairs. Also, the seizing of 
Kuwait's oil fortune was always an attractive objective. These 
general causes may explain why different Iraqi governments 
claimed Kuwait. 
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Chapter VI Britain's Role and Responsibility in the 
Bahrain-Qatar and the Iran-UAE Disputes 
The Bahrain-Qatar unsolved dispute over al-Zubarah and 
the Hawar islands jeopardised, and will continue to jeopardise, 
the stability of the whole Gulf region. Twice in the 1980s, in 
1982 and 1986, the dispute between the two emirates reached the 
brink of war. The successful mediation efforts of the British and 
the GCC (since its establishment in May 1981, in particular Saudi 
Arabia), were limited to preventing the dispute from exploding 
into a war rather than solving it. In 1986, for example, the 
Shaikhs of Bahrain and Qatar agreed not to escalate their 
360 dispute. 
The effect of the Iran-UAE dispute over the three islands of 
Abu Musa and the two Tunbs on the stability of the Gulf region 
was also, and still is, very serious. Quotation from two recent 
documents will be enough to prove that consequence. In April 
and August 1992, the Iran-UAE dispute over the islands exploded 
again. The GCC states held their annual meeting in the following 
December. In the closing statement, the GCC states emphasised 
that the Iranian occupation of the UAE's three islands conflicting 
with the principles of "good neighbourliness, respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the region's states and 
non-interference in others' internal affairs... and the declared 
desire to promote bilateral relations. " The GCC states also called 
on Iran "to cancel and abolish all [the new] measures taken on 
36" Muhammad Abu Al-Fadl. "The Dispute between Qatar and Al-Bahrain. " 
A1-Siassa A1-Dawlya 111 (January 19931). p. 229. 
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Abu Musa island and to terminate its occupation of the Greater 
and Lesser Tunb islands, which belong to the UAE. 061 Iran's 
reaction came a few days later, on 25 December, when its 
President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani warned the GCC states 
that "You yourself know that Iran is stronger than the likes of 
you.... To reach those islands one would have to cross a sea of 
blood. 362 
During their long stay in the Gulf region, successive British 
governments made several contradictory decisions in attempts to 
settle the local disputes. These decisions did not put an end to 
the disputes, but instead participated in the continuity of 
conflicts and wars between the disputant parties. The conflict of 
the governments of Bahrain and Qatar and the Iran-UAE dispute 
are good examples to contemplate. The next two sections will 
examine these disputes in more detail. 
6.1 Britain and the Bahrain-Qatar Disputes over al- 
Zubarah and the Hawar Islands 
Geographically, while the group of Hawar islands lies 
within the territorial waters of Qatar, only one mile distant from 
it, the location of al-Zubarah is on the north-west coast of the 
Qatari Peninsula. The Hawar islands are about 18 miles away 
36' "Closing Statement of the 13th GCC Summit: Criticism of Iraq and 
Iran, " BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: The Middle East, ME/1573/A7.29 
December 1992. 
ihr 
"Tehran Friday Prayers: Rafsanjani Criticises GCC for Raising Issue of 
Islands, " BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: The Middle East, 
ME/1 7 3/A 1 1.29 December 1992. 
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from Bahrain. The group of Hawar islands consists of one large 
island, approximately 11 miles long and at its widest point 2 
miles in width, with an area of about 17 sq mi, and a number of 
smaller islands and rocky islets. 363 
In the mid-1930s, the Bahrain-Qatar territorial dispute over 
the al-Zubarah and Hawar islands began. As far as al-Zubarah 
was concerned, the argument of the Ruler of Qatar was based on 
geography. He asserted that al-Zubarah town was an integral part 
of the Qatar Peninsula far away from Bahrain, while the 
argument of the Bahrainis was rooted in historical and tribal 
grounds. 364 The historical claim was that of continual occupation 
and administration of al-Zubarah by the Shaikhs of Bahrain, from 
the time of their settlement at al-Zubarah in 1766 until their 
relinquishment of it in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. 36' The tribal grounds of the Bahraini claim were that the 
Bahraini tribe of al-Nuaymi were the only inhabitants of al- 
Zubarah for many years, obeyed the Ruler of Bahrain and paid no 
taxes to the Shaikh of Qatar. 166 
The then British Political Resident in the Gulf, Trenchard 
Fowle, was in favour of Qatar's claim over al-Zubarah and 
363 Al-Abdulla, op. cit., pp. 62-3, note: 28. 
364 Nabil Adawy, "Resolving Boundary Disputes in the Gulf Region. " in Gulf 
Centre for Strategic Studies, The GCC Border Disputes Seminar, p. 13. 
(, s Kelly, "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction. " pp. 17-8. 
366 Political Resident to Secretary of State for India, 5 May 1937. 
R/15/2/202. A1-Zubarah also retained a symbolic importance for Al- 
Khalifah. To conceive its position as their ancestral home --the ruling 
family, of Bahrain point out that their first Ruler was buried there. 
Schofield. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf. " p. 50: and Anthony. op_ 
cwt., p. 91. 
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rejected the Bahraini argument. The main reasons behind Fowle's 
opinion were: the announcement of the British Indian government 
of 1873 that Bahrain had no obvious or significant rights in 
Qatar; the British government's aid to Bahrain in 1895 against 
the Qataris invasion from al-Zubarah, which indicated that the 
area was not under Bahrain's rule; and the acknowledgement of 
Bahrain that she did not collect taxes at al-Zubarah. 367 
In 1937, the Political Resident declared the British 
government verdict in the dispute. His finding was that al- 
Zubarah town belonged to Qatar. 368 However, this decision only 
lasted for a few years. On 24 June 1944, the Shaikhs of Bahrain 
and Qatar, under the supervision of Major T. Hickinbotham, the 
Political Agent at Bahrain, signed a new treaty. According to the 
1944 agreement the Shaikh of Qatar agreed that al-Zubarah "will 
remain without anything being done in it which did not exist in 
the past. X369 In other words, cancelling the 1937 decision of the 
Political Resident. 
The 1944 agreement raises two points. The first is that in 
her attempts to secure a settlement to the al-Zubarah dispute the 
British government used its influence upon the Shaikh of Qatar to 
reach the 1944 conclusion. The Political Resident's decision of 
1937 granted all al-Zubarah to the Shaikh of Qatar, therefore it 
36' Political Resident to Secretary of State for India, 5 May 1937. 
RI! 5/2/202. 
368 John Bulloch, "The Involvement of the United Nations in Border 
Disputes, " in Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies. The GCC Border Disputes 
Seminar, p. 34. 
369 Agreement between Bahrain and Qatar. 24 June 1944 R/15/2/371. 
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was not rational to abandon it for nothing. Bahrain Political 
Agent's covering letter to the 1944 agreement indicated that the 
Shaikh of Qatar raised some arguments before he finally accepted 
the agreement. The Political Agent said that "Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Qasim Al Thani... was eventually persuaded to accept" the new 
arrangements. 370 The second comment on the 1944 treaty is that 
the object of this agreement was not clear. It did not solve the 
problem at all. In the Political Agent's words it "restored the 
status quo ante 1936. "371 In other words, the ownership of al- 
Zubarah town would continue undecided which meant that the 
reason for the conflict continued to be ongoing. The British were 
well aware of the deep historical hostilities between the two 
houses of Al-Khalifah and Al-Thani, therefore, in this 
environment, it was strange to hear the Political Agent 
concluding his covering letter with the following sentence "What 
the future will hold it is difficult indeed to foretell but with care 
and goodwill on both sides it is possible that there will be no 
further rupture between the parties for many years. "372 The next 
few years proved the Political Agent's misjudgement. The 
skirmishes between the two emirates were revived until 1957 
when Sir Bernard Burrows, the then British Political Resident, 
ruled that al-Zubarah was part of Qatar. ''' Nevertheless, their 
Yo Major T. Hickinbotham. British Political Agent at Bahrain. to Political 
Resident, 24 June 1944. R/15/2/371. 
1 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
i Sir Bernard Burrows to Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifah. Ruler of 
Bahrain, 10 August 1957. FO 371/1269 315 
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dispute over al-Zubarah continued up to the present without a 
lasting solution 
The issue of the ownership of the Hawar islands, however, 
proved to be more complicated and more threatening to the 
relationship between the two emirates in particular, and to the 
stability of the Gulf in general. In discussing the British role in 
the Bahrain-Qatar dispute over the Hawar islands, it is very 
important to pay some more consideration to the effect of Qatar's 
mainland oil concession and of the attitude of Charles Belgrave, 
the British adviser to the Shaikh of Bahrain at that time. 
By the end of the 1920s, the big oil companies intensified 
their search for oil in the small Arab emirates. For the proper 
functioning of the oil companies, every Shaikh needed to know 
the exact limits of his territory. In other words, every oil 
company wanted to know where its concession ended. The 
"sovereignty over any sandbank or rock" could bring a fortune to 
the country concerned. 74 Those new developments awakened the 
border problems in the southern area of the Gulf. Claims and 
counter claims had been set by different parties to different 
places and islands. 
The Political Resident in the Gulf pressured the Shaikh of 
Qatar to agree to grant Qatar's mainland oil concession to the 
APOC. In his letter of 11 May 1935, the Resident wrote that 
"Protection will be afforded you on the condition... that you give 
the Oil Concession about which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
? 'a Bulloch, op. cit.. p. 34. 
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have been negotiating, to that Company. 11 375 A few days later, the 
Qatari Shaikh agreed to grant the oil concession to APOC. 376 In 
return, the British government secured the definition of the 
territory of Qatar. 377 The Bahrainis, as we shall see later, refused 
to accept this new definition. In early 1936, the Shaikh of 
Bahrain stationed a military force in the islands. 378 In April, 
Bahrain claimed officially the Hawar islands for the first time. 3'9 
This encouraged some authors to believe that the eruption of the 
Bahrain-Qatar dispute over the Hawar islands must be attributed 
to the British oil concession. 3so 
With regards to Belgrave's role in the Qatar-Bahrain 
dispute over the Hawar islands, the Shaikh of Bahrain did not 
include the Hawar islands in the area of the Bahrain Petroleum 
Company (Bapco) concession in 1925.38' A year later Belgrave 
was appointed an adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain. For many years 
after, Belgrave collected evidence of Bahrain administration over 
the Hawar islands with an object of claiming the islands for the 
Ruler of Bahrain. 182 
; '' Fowle to Shaikh Abdullah Al-Thani, 11 May 1935. R/15/1/632. 
3-6 On 5 February 1937, the Qatar oil concession of 1935 was transferred 
from APOC to Petroleum Development (Qatar) Limited (PDL). 
Schofield, "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf. " p. 17. 
3, X Charles Belgrave, Adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain, to Political Resident. 
28 April 1936. R/15/2/1858. 
Y L) Belgrave's letter to the Political Agent in Bahrain. Foreign Office, 
Historical Summary of Events. p. 26. 
zýu Al-Abdulla, op. cit.. p. 58. 
3XI 
Ibid.. p. 61. 
3r 
Ibid., pp. 64-65, note: 37. 
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In December 1938, Belgrave wrote a letter presenting the 
foundation of Bahrain's claim over the Hawar islands. The 
argument of the British advisor was based on history and law. 
Historically, the Hawar islands had been occupied by Bahrainfis 
who settled there with their families and established an Arab 
community living in permanent stone houses. As far as law is 
concerned, the islands had been controlled by the Ruler of 
Bahrain, in contrast to Shaikh Abdullah of Qatar who never 
exercised his alleged right of ownership over the islands and 
their inhabitants. As a result, the Ruler of Bahrain enforced his 
orders or courts over the inhabitants of Hawar and their 
properties. The inhabitants of the islands also travelled on 
Bahraini passports and their boats were registered in Bahrain and 
sailed under the Bahraini flag. Moreover, Belgrave presented a 
petition signed by the leading men of the islands claiming that 
they were subjects of Bahrain. In the end, Betgrave accused the 
Shaikh of Qatar of placing his claim when he realised the islands 
might have oil. 38' 
The Qataris rejected Belgrave's proofs. Their counter 
argument was based on emphasising the geographical point of 
view that the Hawar islands were considered as part of northern 
Qatar", an argument Belgrave had denied in his letter of 
December 1938. 'x4 
3"3 Belgrave to Political Agent at Bahrain. 22 December 1938. R/ 15/21547. 
3"4 Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim. Ruler of Qatar. to Political Agent at 
Bahrain, 30 March 1939. R115/2/547. 
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On 11 July of 1939, Fowle informed the rulers of Bahrain 
and Qatar that the British government had decided that Hawar 
islands "belong to the State of Bahrain and not to the State of 
Qatar. "385 The decision contradicted the prior British 
endorsement of the Petroleum Development (Qatar) Limited 
(PDL) incorporation of the Hawar islands to its area of 
concession. 386 The then Ruler of Qatar complained and sent a 
letter on 4 August 1939 to the Political Resident urging him to 
reverse his verdict. "I am unable to remain quiet over the case, 
which preferably is the result of abstruseness, ambiguity, and 
non-elucidation of the relevant facts. I therefore protest for a 
second time asking for the clarification of the question. "3g' 
Despite the objection of Shaikh Abdullah Al-Thani the Resident 
did not change his decision. 388 
In September 1939, Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Prior 
succeeded Fowle as the new Political Resident in the Gulf. With 
his appointment, came another viewpoint. The comments of Prior 
on Belgrave's role and Fowle's verdict illustrate their 
involvement. "Belgrave makes various claims", Prior said "which 
may carry weight to western minds but mean nothing to an Arab. " 
Prior added that during his three and half years in Bahrain he had 
never heard anything which suggested that the Hawar islands 
38ý L/P/&S/12/3895. 
36 Al-Abdulla, op. cit. , p. 59,61. 
38 Ibid., p. 60 . 
Some observers stated that Bahrain was given sovereignty 
over the Ha«var islands as an attempt by the British to compensate it for its 
rejected claims on al-Zubarah. Bulloch, op. cit.. p. 34 and Abu Al-Fadl, oQ. 
cit., p. 228. 
388 Al-Abdulla, op. cit. , p. 
60. 
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belonged to Bahrain. "He [Belgrave] has been collecting evidence 
of administration in Hawar for many years past", Prior said "with 
the object of making this claim, in which he has been very 
successful. Had Qatar had a British Adviser this claim could not 
have been made. "389 
In his review of Fowle's decision, the new British Resident 
said that the award of the islands had been decided according to 
Western jurisprudence and without paying any regard to the 
actual geographical arguments presented by the Shaikh of Qatar. 
The opinion of Prior was that the decision of his predecessor was 
unfair to Qatar. Despite all of that, Prior confessed that he could 
not change the verdict. 390 Two years later, in November 1941, 
Britain reversed Fowle's decision and affirmed that the Hawar 
islands belonged to Qatar. 391 
Chapters two and three of this study explained how the 
entity of Bahrain and Qatar, as independent emirates, was 
emphasised by the British treaty relations. The two emirates' 
identity was confirmed again and again during the years up to the 
First World War. In the 1913 unratified Anglo-Ottoman Draft 
Agreement the British insisted on authenticating this 
arrangement. Accordingly, Bahrain and Qatar were entitled to 
389 Prior's comments on Belgrave's role in ibid., pp. 60.64-65. note: 37. 
390 Ibid., p. 60. 
31'1 India Office to Political Resident in the Gulf. 19 November 1941. 
R/15/2/547. Even Fow'le, when the American Oil Company succeeded during 
the 1940s in preventing other companies being granted an oil concession 
in 
Bahrain including Haw ar islands. conceded his intrusion on Qatar rights and 
discredited the unjust reasons which he had previously approved to excuse 
his unfairness. A1-Abdulla, op. cit.. p. 60. 
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British protection and the foreign relations of the two emirates 
were a British responsibility. Settling the border problems of the 
two emirates were part of British responsibility. Therefore, the 
unresolved boundary between the two parties was, largely, a 
consequence of British policy. 
In her attempts to settle the Hawar islands and al-Zubarah 
disputes the British government hurried her decisions. It was the 
two emirates and their peoples who suffered from these hasty and 
contradictory judgements. The British government judged in 1937 
that al-Zubarah was part of Qatar, only to nullify it seven years 
later. Then after 13 years to again rule that al-Zubarah is Qatari 
land. The case was even worse in the Hawar islands. 392 In 1939 
the British decided that these islands belonged to Bahrain. Two 
years later, they reversed the decision and ruled that the islands 
i 
belonged to Qatar. The consequence of these contradictory 
decisions was that both the Bahraini and the Qatari authorities 
insisted on their ownership of al-Zubarah and the Hawar islands 
and had a British document or documents in their hands to 
support their claim. 
31'" The Hawar case was worse because in al-Zubarah's dispute the British 
decisions took longer time (20 years). Moreover. the British judged in one 
decision that Hawar belongs to Qatar while in the other it belongs to 
Bahrain. 
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6.2 The Iran- UAE Dispute over the Three Is lands393 
Iran has had a number of extensive claims over the 
territories of her Arabian neighbours. These Iranian claims have 
deep roots in history. For example, during the mid-1840s, the 
Iranian Prime Minister, Hajji Mirza Aghassi, claimed that all of 
the waters and the islands of the Gulf belonged to Iran. 94 The 
Iran-Iraq chronic dispute over Shatt al-Arab, the Iranian claims 
to Bahrain and to the three small islands of the UAE, Abu Musa, 
Tunb al-Kubra (Greater) and Tunb al-Sughra (Lesser), stand out 
as perennial causes of conflict in the Gulf. 
In 1992, the Iran-UAE historical dispute exploded again. 
Only a couple of months after a visit to Abu Musa island by the 
Iranian President Rafsanjani, the Iranian government refused, in 
April 1992, entry to a group of non-national employees of the 
emirate of Sharjah to the island. 395 Again, on 24 August 1992, 
the Iranian authority turned back 110 Arab school teachers 
(mainly Egyptians) and their families returning after their summer 
vacation to the island to prepare for the opening of the new 
school year requiring them to get Iranian entry visas. 396 A few 
weeks later, the Iranian government refused to accept the UAE 
government's demand to return the Greater and Lesser Tunbs 
393 In 1935, Shah Reza Pahlavi changed officially the name of the country 
from Persia to Iran (by which name the chapter will call it throughout). 
;, '' Schofield, "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf, " p. 35; and Al- 
Ghareeb, op. cit., p. 302. 
39S Schofield, "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf, " p. 71, note: 159. Ali 
Akbar Velavati, Iran's Foreign Minister. stated at that time. wrongly. that 
the 'Memorandum of Understanding' of 1971 gave the right only to 
Sharjah 
citizens to live in the island. Ibid. 
Ibid.. pp. 71-2, note: 159 
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islands or, at least, to agree to take the whole question of the 
three islands to the International Court of Justice at The Hague 
for arbitration. 397 This Iranian behaviour, however, was just a 
continuation of the Iranian settlement of 29th November 1971 
with Sharjah and Iran's invasion of 30th November 1971 of the 
two Tunbs. Both the settlement and the invasion will be 
considered in the subsequent pages. 
6.2.1 The Iranian Arguments and the UAE's Counter Arguments 
As far as geography is concerned, the island of Abu Musa is 
located 38 miles off the coast of the United Arab Emirates and 43 
miles off the Iranian mainland, while the Greater and Lesser Tunb 
islands are located at the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz. 
According to the British records, the three islands had been 
in the possession of the Arabian Qawasim tribe since 1750.398 The 
Iranians started their claim to the islands formally in 
1887 399 
The Iranian governments based their claims to the three islands 
mainly on historical and strategic reasons. As far as history is 
concerned, Iran has backed its aspirations by stressing that in a 
British War Office map, produced in 1887, the three disputed 
islands were shown clearly in Iranian colour. 400 This map was 
"Gulf States Condemn Iranian Action, " Reuters news service 1992. 
September 1992). 
398 Memorandum on the Persian Claim to Tunb and Abu Musa 
by D. 
Laselles. 4 September 1934. FO 371/17827. 
Ibid. 
41" Ibid.. and memorandum on the Status of Islands of Tunb, Little 
Tunb. 
Abu Musa and Sirri by J. Laithwaite. 24 August 1928. L/P&S/18/B39^ 
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given to the Shah of Iran at that time as a gift by the British 
Minister in Tehran under the direction of the then British Prime 
Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury. 40' 
When the British announced their intention to withdraw 
their forces from the Gulf region by the end of 1971, the Iranian 
officials placed more stress on the strategic factor. The argument 
was that control of the three strategically important islands was a 
great advantage to whichever power sought to command the 
Strait of Hormuz. The main shipping channel in the Gulf would be 
jeopardised if hostile forces, such as Iraq, were to seize these 
islands. 402 Accordingly, for the interests of the region and the 
whole world, Iran must have the three islands. Shortly before 
Britain withdrew from the Gulf, the Shah committed himself to 
the position that Iran would defend the interests of the Gulf 
states and the entire world. He stated that "the Persian Gulf must 
always be kept open for the benefit of not only my country but 
the other Gulf countries and the world. "403 
Contrary to the argument that the islands of Abu Musa and 
the Tunbs were occupied by Iran to safeguard the Gulf's main 
shipping channel, Kelly has persuasively argued that if the 
Iranian desire was to control shipping lanes then as an outpost 
Sirri, which they already possessed, was of equal suitability, and 
401 Richard Schofield, "Abu Musa and the Tunbs: the Historical 
Background, " in Arab Research Centre. Round Table Discussion on "The 
Dispute over the Gulf Islands, " (London: Arab Research Centre. 
Januar 
1993), p. 8. 
au, Kelly. Arabia, p. 87. 
a"; P. Harvs. "The Shah's Aim in the Gulf, " The Manchester Guardian. (9%'-' 
October, 1971), p. 7. 
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still more relevant, the strategic position of the islands of Qishm. 
Hanjam and Larak offered even better command of the Straits of 
Hormuz. 404 Another analyst of Gulf security problems has also 
explained that it is not essential to have control of the three 
islands to block shipping in the Gulf and neither is such control 
sufficient to prevent anyone else with adequate naval power from 
so doing . 
401 The strategic argument has been proved to be a 
pretext to justify the Iranian demands and occupation. It was 
reported that while the negotiations between Britain, Iran and the 
two Shaikhdoms continued throughout November 1971, Iran 
rejected suggestions by an Arab third party that the three islands 
could be leased to it when Britain withdrew its forces from the 
Gulf. 406 
The counter arguments of the UAE pointed out the long- 
standing British recognition of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs as 
Arab islands belonging to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah emirates, 
respectively. The government of the UAE also referred to the 
British long guarantee of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah's control 
over the three disputed islands and active defence support for 
this guarantee until Britain withdrew from the region. The 
following section will give several examples that confirm the 
British recognition and defence policies. 
404 Kelly, Arabia, p. 89. 
a"' Joseph Churba. Conflict and Tension among the States of the Persian 
Gulf, Oman and South Arabia (Alabama. Air University DocumentarN 
Research Studv, 1971). p. 68. Cited in Robert Litwak. SecuritN 
in the 
Persian Gulf (Aldershot: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
1981), vol. II, p. 57. 
406 
Litwak. op. cit., p. 57. 
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6.2.2 Britain and the Early Iranian Claims to the Three Islands 
The early policies of successive British governments gave a 
clear proof of Britain's firmness in upholding the Qawasim claims 
to the three islands. Although there are several examples and 
documents which prove this, recalling a few of them will be 
sufficient to make the argument clear. In 1904, the Iranians tried 
to assert their claims to the three islands. In that year, the 
Iranians occupied the islands for a short time and a Belgian 
employee of the Iranian customs authorities removed flags placed 
by the Qawasim Shaikhs on the islands and hoisted the Iranian 
flag in their place. But because of the firm British objections, 
which reached the threat of using force unless Iran retreated, the 
Iranian attempt was short-lived. 407 In June 1904, Sir Percy Cox, 
then Political Resident in the Gulf, arranged with the Qawasim 
aos Shaikhs for the rehoisting of their flags on the islands. 
In 1912, the British decided to build a lighthouse on the 
Greater Tunb island to use as a guide for ships. Cox's two letters 
of September and October 1912 are documents which show 
unequivocal British recognition of Qawasim ownership of the 
Tunb island. In his first letter, Cox addressed the Sharjahian 
Shaikh saying "your Island of Tumb. "409 He demanded, 
in the 
same letter, that the Shaikh ask his "representative on the Island 
40 Laithw aite's memorandum, 24 August 1928. 
auf Graves. op. cit.. p. 95. 
4n, ) Sir Percy Cox to Shaikh Saqr bin Khalid, 28 September 
1912 
R/15/1/736. At that time Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah ere united 
(until 
1921) under the leadership of Sharjah. 
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to show civility and give any help he can on your behalf. " On 13 
October, the Shaikh of Sharjah accepted the British Resident's 
request. 410 In a reply to the Shaikh, Cox stated clearly in his 
letter of 22 October that the British government recognised "your 
sovereignty over the Island. 11 411 
In the period from 1796 to 1925, Iran was ruled by Shahs 
from the Qajari dynasty. In 1921, a new era in Iran's modern 
history began, when Colonel Reza Khan (r. 1925-41) led a coup 
and later in 1923 became the Prime Minister. Two years later, 
Reza Khan took full power ending the Qajari rule and established 
his own dynasty, the Pahlavis. A few years later, the peaceful 
approach of the Iranians to the islands question underwent a 
volte-face. The Shah believed that Iran's supremacy over the 
three islands would help to strengthen her power in the region. 
But again, the British government stood firm against the Shah's 
new moves. He was told that these islands had since the 
nineteenth century been regarded by Britain as belonging to Ras 
al-Khaimah and Sharjah . 
412 
There was further obvious evidence of the stiff British 
opposition to the Iranian domination of the islands in 1934. In 
that year, the Iranian government succeeded secretly in 
persuading the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah to lower his flag and 
replace it with the Iranian flag in Greater Tunb. The British 
410 Shaikh Saqr bin Khalid to Sir Percy Cox. 13 October 1912. R/15/1/736. 
411 Sir Percy Cox to Shaikh Saqr bin Khalid. 22 October 1912. R/15/1/736. 
412 Kelly, Arabia. p. 88. 
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government stopped the process and ordered the Ruler to take 
down the Iranian flag and to replace it with his. 413 
In the early 1930s, the Iranians again raised the question of 
ownership of the three islands. But this time they tried to solve 
the dispute through negotiations with the British authorities in 
the Gulf. At that time, the British and Iranian governments were 
trying to reach a comprehensive treaty for all their differences in 
the region. To arrive at this objective, the firm British opposition 
to Iran's attempts to control the three islands started to ease. 414 
The British began to study the possibility of leasing the Tunb 
islands to Iran. In May 1930, the British Resident in the Gulf 
discussed the issue with the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah. The Shaikh 
of Sharjah was also present in the meeting. The two Shaikhs 
strongly rejected the British idea. 415 On 4 October 1930, the 
Persian Minister of Court, Monsieur Taimourlache, declared his 
country's readiness to acknowledge Sharjah's sovereignty to Abu 
Musa in return for British and Qawasim acknowledgement of 
Iran's ownership of the Tunb Islands. 416 
In July 1932, Taimourtache told R. H. Hoare, the British 
Minister in Tehran, that his government would give up its claims 
to Bahrain if the British government acknowledged Iranian 
413 Political Resident in the Gulf to Secretary of State for India. 10 April 
1935. FO 371/18901. 
414 Sir R. H. Clive, British Minister at Tehran, to Government of India. S 
December 1930. FO 371/14535. 
415 Political Resident to Secretary of State for India. 10 May 19 30. 
FO 
371/14478. 
416 Suggestion that the Island of Tunb might be Leased to 
Persia 
(Memorandum), 14 November 1930. FO 371/14478. 
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sovereignty over the three islands. 417 In 1934, the British 
responded with a scheme of leasing Abu Musa and/or the Tunbs 
to Iran. 418 In his telegram of April 1935 to the Foreign Office, 
the British Minister in Tehran, H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, 
mentioned that "Taimourtache was prepared to abandon the Abu 
Musa claim in return for Tamb and later even spoke of a long 
lease Tamb. "419 The Iranian claims more or less stopped until 
1948, when Iran's Counsel in London expressed to the Foreign 
Office the desire of his government to establish administrative 
offices on the three islands. 420 The answer of the Foreign Office 
was that never before had the British government acknowledged 
the Iranian claims to the three islands. 42' 
During 1955, the British officials tried to advocate an 
agreement whereby Iran would accept Sharjah's possession of 
Abu Musa island and the independence of Bahrain, the Shaikh of 
Sharjah would endorse Iranian sovereignty over Sirri island, and 
the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah would agree to sell the Tunb islands 
to Iran. 422 The British version of events attributed the failure of 
this scheme to the unwillingness of the Iranian government to 
sacrifice its claim to Abu Musa. 423 
417 R. H. Hoare to Foreign Office. 15 Jul), 1932. FO 371/16070. 
418 Hoare to Foreign Office, 7 April 1934. FO 371/17893. 
419 H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Foreign Office, 9 April 1935. FO 3371/18980- 
42o Desire of the Persian government to Establish Administrative office on 
the Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa. 1 December 1948. FO 37 1/68 3 29. 
421 From Foreign Office to Tehran. 7 July 1949. FO 371/74968. 
a" Foreign Office to the Secretary of the Admiralty. 31 January 1955. 
in FO 
371/114640; and Foreign Office to British Embassy at Tehran. 
19 August 
1955. in FO 371/114641. 
ý, Schofield. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf. " p- 38. 
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Since the failure of the 1955 negotiations, the Iranian 
claims to the three islands more or less rested until the British 
government announced in January 1968 her intention to withdraw 
from the Gulf in three years. Muhammad Reza Shah (r. 1941-79) 
and Iranian officials wasted no time in insisting on the 
transferring of the three islands to the Iranian control. 424 
6.2.3 The 1971 Iranian Occupation of the Three Islands 
Up to their withdrawal, the United States was happy with 
the dominant British presence in the Gulf. The American 
Administration predicted that Britain's withdrawal would bring a 
power vacuum to the region which the Russians would try to fill. 
As we shall explain in part two, handicapped by her experience in 
Vietnam the United States looked for a new power to police the 
strategic and important region on behalf of the West. 
The Iranians found in the British withdrawal the awaited 
opportunity to emphasise their historical claims to Bahrain and 
the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. Between the time of 
Britain's announcement and her actual withdrawal (1968-71), 
negotiations were conducted between the British government and 
the Shaikhs of the nine Gulf emirates on the one hand, and, on 
the other, between the British and the Iranians. During these 
negotiations, the position of the islands became linked both with 
Iran's recognition of the new UAE federation and, more tacitly, 
with the solution of the Bahraini question. 
424 
Kelle, Arabia, p. 88. 
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In August 1970, Iran renounced her claim to Bahrain and 
accepted the emirate's independence. The Shah, therefore, could 
not afford to make another concession over the islands question. 
In other words, he wanted a victory to save face in front of the 
Iranian people. He began to stress Iran's demands for the three 
islands. In October 1970, the Iranian government formally 
informed Britain that she would not acknowledge the existence of 
the proposed UAE federation unless her claim over the three 
islands were secured. Two months later, Ardeshir Zahedi, then 
Iran's Foreign Minister, restated straightforwardly the same 
warning. He said that: "Iran will never abandon her legal rights 
to sovereignty over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs and 
unless these rights are completely recognized there can be no 
peace and security in the Persian Gulf. "425 The Shah himself 
asserted, two months prior to the actual occupation, Iran's claims 
to the islands by saying that "Those islands are ours. We need 
them. We shall have them. No power on earth will stop us. "426 An 
argument that was backed by the American and the British 
governments as new regional security orders were being drawn up 
to fill the vacuum predicted by the British withdrawal from the 
region. The American role will be examined in the second section 
of this thesis. 
Some commentators believe that the Iranian-British 
negotiations during the 1968-71 period were based on 
acknowledging Iran's rights to the disputed three islands 
in 
a.; Ibid., p. 89. 
426 The Guardian (28 September 1971). 
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return for the relinquishment of her increasingly unacceptable 
claim to Bahrain. 427 It was reported that the late Shah stated that 
prior to the settlement of Iran's long-standing claims to Bahrain, 
Britain's envoys had told him that if he would agree to renounce 
his demand to the Bahraini island, Britain would not actively 
oppose Iran's claims to the three islands. 428 Recently, in a 
seminar organised by the 'Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies' in 
August 1992, the UAE's Ambassador in London indicated that 
Iran's occupation of his country's islands was part of a deal with 
the British government. He stated that "it was due to specific 
arrangements made with Great Britain to make the Shah withdraw 
his claim against Bahrain for which he was promised the two 
Tumbs. "429 
Fearing an imminent Iranian invasion, Sharjah accepted 
Britain's recommendation and signed, on 29 November 1971, the 
'Memorandum of Understanding' with the Iranian government, by 
which Iran officially received half of Abu Musa. The two parties 
were able to reach an agreement that provided for the 
establishment of an Iranian military station on Abu Musa in 
return for the payment to Sharjah of $1 .5 million as annual 
economic assistance until Sharjah's revenues from oil deposits 
reached the sum of $3 million annually. 430 
a, S. Amin. International and Legal Problems of the Gulf (London. Middle 
East and North African Studies Press. 1981). p. 163. 
428 Anthony. op. cit., p. 28. 
a2q Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies. The GCC Border Disputes Seminar p 
56, 
"11o Schofield. "Abu Musa and the Tunbs. " pp. 12-3. Text of 'Memorandum 
of 
Understanding' is in Ibid., p. 14. 
a 
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Only the question of Ras al-Khaimah and the Tunb islands 
remained unsolved. Saqr bin Muhammad A1-Qasimi, the Shaikh of 
Ras al-Khaimah, was determined to resist the Shah's claims. In 
other words, the dispute over the Tunb islands proved more 
difficult to settle in an amicable manner. Sir William Luce, 
Britain's special envoy in the Gulf, suggested that Ras al- 
Khaimah cede its sovereignty over the Tunbs in exchange for an 
annual payment of 11.6 million by Iran and a forty-nine percent 
share of the oil revenues, a suggestion rejected by the Ruler of 
Ras al-Khaimah . 
431 As a consequence of Shaikh Saqr's continual 
refusal to concede the Iranian demands, Iran occupied the two 
Tunbs on the last day of November 1971, a day before Britain 
terminated its treaties with the Gulf emirates and two days before 
the official declaration of the United Arab Emirates 
confederation. The Iranian troops met resistance from a police 
detachment from Ras al-Khaimah stationed on the Greater Tunb, 
with loss of life on both sides. 
There was a major outcry in the two concerned Shaikhdoms 
and in the Arab world in general over the Iranian occupation. The 
Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimah sent a cable on the same day of the 
invasion to the British Prime Minister (1970-74), Edward Heath, 
431 Heard-Bey, op. cit.. P. 366. However, in a recent study Schofield 
suggests that initially a different offer was made by Iran to the Shaikh of 
Ras al-Khaimah. Quoting a private and confidential source, Schofield 
asserted that "Iran was apparently prepared to supply the Shaikhdom with 
military and humanitarian support by way of compensation. " He continued 
that. "Though the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah initially seemed disposed to 
accept Iran's offer of Western-built guns and armoured vehicles plus the 
unspecified 'humanitarian' component, he apparently later changed his mind. 
demanding a significant sum of money instead" which Iran refused to accept. 
Schofield, "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf, " pp. 38-9. 
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accusing Britain of violating its protective agreement with the 
emirate by not expelling the Iranian forces. 432 Ras al-Khaimah 
also witnessed anti-Iranian and anti-British demonstrations 4, ', In 
Sharjah, following an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the 
Deputy Ruler, the Ruler, Khalid bin Muhammad bin Saqr, was 
murdered in February 1972 by his cousin the ex-Ruler of Sharjah 
Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr (r. 1951-65). 4; 4 
The Arab countries strongly condemned the Iranian 
occupation of the islands. Predictably, Iraq was the centre of 
opposition to Iran's move. The Iraqi government described the 
occupation as 'flagrant aggression'. 43 5 They believed that Britain 
had agreed to transfer her previous role in the region to Iran. 
According to that assumption, the occupation was carried out "in 
collusion with Britain. X436 The Baathi government of Iraq broke 
off diplomatic relations with Britain and Iran, and six months 
later, nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company's remaining 
possessions in Iraq. 437 On 7 December 1971, the two years old 
revolutionary Libyan government nationalised the British 
43 Petroleum Company's concession and assets in Libya. 
8 On 9 
December, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen asked the 
432 Hussien Sirriyeh. "Conflict over the Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the 
Tunbs, 1968-1971. " Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern 
Studies 8 
(Winter 1984). p. 82. 
433 Anthony, op. cit., p. 27, and Heard-Bey, on. cit.. p. 366. 
434 Ibid. 
Mosten, Q p. cit., p. 120. 
a3o 
Ibid. 
4; Kelly, Arabia. p. 96; and Heard-Bey. op. cit.. p. 366. 
3 h, 
Ibid. 
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United Nations Security Council to hold a special meeting to 
discuss the occupation. The Security Council adjourned its 
"consideration of the matter sine die" as friendly states 'ere 
attempting a discussion to resolve the conflict. '-` 
6.2.4 Britain's Stand over the Iranian Occupation 
The British role and responsibility in the Iranian-UAE 
historical dispute over the three islands can be assessed in the 
light of three considerations: the sudden British withdrawal from 
the region; the British failure to defend the territories of the 
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah Shaikhdoms, and the effect of 
contradictory British policies and practices in the dispute. 
The effect of the unexpected British withdrawal from the 
Gulf on the Iranian-UAE dispute over the three islands, is clear. 
The announcement of the withdrawal, and the following British 
pressure, on the one hand weakened the capability of the two 
emirates to negotiate or resist and, on the other, strengthened 
the power of the Shah to force the kind of settlement he desired 
The withdrawal exposed the small Arab emirates to the powerful 
ambitions of the Shah, to the extent that he forgot Iran's 
readiness in 1935 to acknowledge the Qawasims of Sharjah and 
Ras al-Khaimah's rule over the three islands in exchange 
for only 
leasing the Tunb island . 
4ao In November 1971, the Shah, with no 
matching power on the other side of the Gulf and a knowledge of 
UN Monthly Chronicle, IX: 1. January 1972. p. 50. 
-14o ,i Knatchbull-Hugessen telegram of 9 April 19 to Foreign 
Office. FO 
371/18980. 
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the west's dependence on Iran, insisted on full control of the 
three islands. From the Western perspective, safeguardinýL, the 
interests of the West was certainly more important than 
maintaining the sovereignty of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah over 
the three small islands. It was judged that sacrificing the three 
islands was a cheap price for the co-operation of the Shah. 
The second consideration under which the British role and 
responsibility can be examined is their protection obligation. As 
was explained in chapter two, according to her historical treaty 
relations with Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah Britain had been the 
protecting power for both emirates at the time of the Iranian 
occupation. On the very day of the Iranian occupation, the 
aircraft carrier HMS Eagle and the cruiser HMS Albion were 
standing by in the Gulf. Kelly, rightly, asked whether they were 
at hand to cope with any complications that might arise over the 
termination of the treaties and the ending of Britain's naval 
protectorate of the Gulf. If this were the case why did Britain 
not carry out its protection responsibility right up to the last 
moment of its existence? 441 
Britain's stand on the three disputed islands was a classic 
case of realpolitik. Aiming to preserve her commercial interests 
in the Indian sub-continent and the Arabian side of the 
Gulf, 
successive British governments continuously rejected the 
Iranian 
claims over the three islands. When she decided to leave the 
region, Britain reached the conclusion that her 
interest, and that 
441 Kelly. Arabia. p. 96. 
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of the west in general, lay in mollifying the powerful Shah of 
Iran. 
There were good reasons, for Britain and the west, to 
conciliate the Shah. Some of these reasons were: British financial 
interests, especially in the Iranian oil industry442, the free floxý of 
oil through the Straits of Hormuz to the West, and the 
importance of Iran in the new regional security arrangements to 
fill the vacuum anticipated after the British withdrawal from the 
Gulf. The Sunday Times wrote on 11 July 1971 that it was far 
better for Britain to act as a scapegoat in the Gulf and to bear 
"the probably short-lived Arab odium that would result" from 
leaving the islands to the Shah. The Iranian military power and 
the "very considerable British financial interest in the Iranian oil 
industry" convinced The Guardian to suggest on 3 November to 
follow "the path of realism-to accept the inevitable and 
recognize" the Iranian occupation. 
In her (1968-71) negotiations with her allies in the two 
Arab emirates, Britain made it clear that she had no intention of 
standing in the Shah's way in the event of an Iranian invasion of 
the islands, and recommended them to seek an agreement with 
Iran in an attempt to solve their disputes. In practice, the British 
government even went further. She pressured the Ruler of 
Sharjah emirate to come to terms acceptable to Iran, and allow 
442 Kelly reported that in May 1971 the Shah signed a contract of 
Arms a nd 
communications equipment from Britain to a value of over 
£ 100 million. 
1h., p. 91 
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the Iranian occupation of the Tunb islands. Several statements by 
British, Iranian and Arab politicians support this. 
The British special envoy Sir William Luce, and Sir Denis 
Wright Britain's Ambassador in Tehran (1963-71), had told the 
rulers of the two emirates, during their visit to the Gulf in April 
1971, that if no agreement was reached with Iran "the Shah is 
going to occupy the islands" by force . 
44' During a debate in the 
House of Commons on 13 December 1971, Joseph Godber, 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, stated 
that the British government had made it clear to the Ruler of Ras 
al-Khaimah that she would not be able to intervene militarily on 
the last day before Britain's protective treaty with the emirate 
444 was terminated. 
In his confidential diary, the then Minister of Imperial 
Court, Amir Assadoullah Alam, also wrote several comments on 
the British-Iranian negotiations of 1968-71. In his diary of 
Monday 18 February 1969, Alam wrote that the British 
Ambassador in Tehran told him very confidentially that "the case 
of Tunb Islands is practically settled and will definitely be given 
to Iran, for we [the British] have told the Sheikh of Ras al- 
Khaimah that if you don't come to some sort of arrangement with 
Iran... Iran will lawfully, and if that was not possible, will 
forcefully take these islands. 11445 
443 
Sirriyeh, op. cit., p. 80. 
444 Ibid., p. 84. 
Pirouz Zadeh. "The Issue of Abu Musa Island from an 
Iranian Pont o 
VI "` It '^ 'drab Research Centre. Round Table Discussion on 
"Ttie Dispute 
If Islands. " p. 24. 
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On 29 November 1971, the Ruler of Sharjah declared that 
the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding agreement 
with Iran was due to an obvious threat that Abu Musa island 
would be occupied should Sharjah not comply with Iran's 
wishes . 
446 In a press conference held in Ras al-Khaimah, three 
days after the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs, the Ruler of Ras 
al-Khaimah said that Luce had exerted pressure on him to come 
to a peaceful arrangement with Iran over the Tunb islands. He 
added that during his visit, the British envoy warned that Iran 
would occupy the islands and that "it would be better for you 
[the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah] to take part of your rights. "447 
It is, therefore, not the case that Britain failed to counter 
the Iranian invasion because she was unable to do so. Rather, the 
failure arose because a decision had been agreed between the 
British and Iranian authorities. This perception was confirmed by 
Alain in his book The Shah and I when he said that the United 
States and British governments were aware of the Shah's 
arrangements to occupy the three islands. 448 This understanding 
is also reinforced by the statements of Luce and Abbas Hoveida, 
the Iran Prime Minister. Luce declared upon leaving Tehran, only 
two weeks before Iran's invasion of the Tunb islands, that Britain 
and Iran had "sorted out their differences over the islands" and 
aa(, Schofield. "Abu Musa and the Tunbs. " p. 12. 
44- The Government of Ras al-Khaimah. Information Office. an-. 
Vashra a- 
Wharjv va (Neww s Bulletin. No. 26.6 December 1971), p. 
Quoted in 
Sirri) eh, op. cit.. p. 79. 
44 Arah Research Centre. Round Table Discussion on "The Dispute overt the 
of pp. 42-3. 
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that, "the Shaikhdoms can now form their federation. "" On the 
same day of the Iranian occupation, Hoveida informed the Iranian 
Parliament that the sovereignty of Iran over the islands "had been 
restored following long negotiations with the British 
government.  
450 More to the point, there are the earlier warnings 
of Luce to the rulers that the Shah would occupy the islands if 
they did not reach an agreement with Iran, and Godber's 
statement that the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah had been warned that 
Britain could not defend the Tunb islands if an Iranian invasion 
happened on the last day of their treaty relations. These 
statements raise the suspicion that the British government knew 
about the Iranian occupation before it took place and surely 
showed the desire of Britain to allow the Shah to fill the 
expected power vacuum and to be the new stabilising power in 
the Gulf. 
The third consideration of British responsibility is the 
contradiction in her actions and decisions . 
It was the British 
Residency in the Gulf who published many d ocuments recognising 
that Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands were owned by the 
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah emirates. It was also the British 
authorities who had rejected, since the nineteenth century. 
renewed Iranian claims to the three islands. At the same time, 
it 
was the British government who produced, in 1887, a map in 
Which the three disputed islands were shown clearly 
in Iranian 
colour. It was the British government who in 1971 pressured 
the 
aa1> 
The Times (London, 18 November 1971). 
Arabia, p. 96. 
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rulers of Sharjah and 
Ras al-Khaimah emirates to come to an 
arrangement with the 
Shah and warned them of an Iranian 
invasion. And finally it was the British government who agreed to 
the Shah's control of the long recognised Arab islands. These 
self-contradictory British documents and practices had been, and 
still remain, one of the primary reasons behind the continuity of 
the dispute which, in its turn, carries a great threat to the 
stability of the Gulf region. 
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Part II: Instability in the Gulf Region: the Role and 
Responsibility of the United States 
In 1968, the British government announced its intention to 
withdraw its military forces from the Gulf region in 1971 The 
decision shocked many, including the American Administration 
The Americans believed that the British withdrawal would result 
in a power vacuum in the region, which the Russians would surely 
try to fill. Consequently, the interests of the West would be 
damaged. The United States government reached the conclusion 
that she needed to do something to prevent this scenario. 
However, the very strong opposition of the American people to 
their country's heavy involvement in the Vietnamese War (1960- 
75) hindered the Nixon government from playing a direct role in 
the Gulf and taking over the British position. 
The best available response for the United States 
Administration was to advocate the Nixon Doctrine, with its 
characteristics of 'twin pillars' and a high degree of military 
sales. In other words, to back and support her strongest allies 
in 
the Gulf, i. e. Iran and Saudi Arabia, to face any direct or 
indirect 
Russian intervention in that region. The American choice of 
Iran 
and Saudi Arabia as a senior and junior ally was based mainly on 
their strategic location, their economic power, and their strong 
relations with the United States. In practice, however, the policy 
of the United States government was, in addition to 
her support 
of Iran and Saudi Arabia, to begin the gradual 
increase of her 
naval attendancy in and around the Gulf waters 
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This second part examines in four chapters the role and 
responsibility of the United States' Gulf arms policy of the 190s 
for instability of the region. With more than half of the \ti orld's 
known proved oil reserves in the Gulf it is very difficult to 
investigate the policies of successive American governments in 
the region and ignore the oil factor. Thus, this part will begin 
with a chapter that looks at Western European, Japanese, and 
United States interests in the Gulf's oil. A historical overview on 
United States-Gulf region relations will also be covered in 
chapter seven. The British withdrawal from the region and the 
Soviet Union's threat to the area as seen from the United States 
perspective will be the central point of chapter eight. The same 
chapter discusses the causes that led the British government to 
take the decision, the domestic Gulf reaction to it, and the 
attitudes of United States and the former Soviet Union. The 
following chapter will study the United States response (the 
Nixon Doctrine) to the anticipated Russian threat. The tenth and 
last chapter puts the American response to the supposed Russian 
threat under close examination. 
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Chapter VII Oil and the United States-Gulf Region 
Relationship: Historical Overview 
7.1 Introduction 
The United States-Gulf region relationship developed long 
before the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908. Indeed, commerce and 
missionary activity were the two main elements of her early 
relationship with the region. While the United States commercial 
and missionary ambitions were most important in the nineteenth 
century, oil was at the centre of their relations during the 
twentieth. The body of this chapter deals with the great interest 
of the United States in the Gulf's oil wealth whilst the remainder 
of this introduction briefly covers the other two principal 
elements. 
The commercial relations between the United States and the 
Gulf extend back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
when the little American trading vessels reached the Gulf. The 
arrival of these vessels was enough for British officials to 
wonder if another challenge to the British hegemony in the Gulf 
waters was in the offing. The British Resident at Basrah noted 
the appearance of the Two Sons in 1802 "the first vessel of that 
nation which ever visited the port of Bussora. It was out of 
New 
York... 11 451 
In 1832, the Ruler of Muscat invited the President of the 
United States to conclude a commercial treaty betel een their 
4i j Joseph Malone. "America and the Arabian Peninsula: the 
First To 
Hundred Years. " The Middle East Journal 30 (1977). pP 408-9 
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states . 
452 At that time, the Omani navy was larger than that of 
453 
the United States. In the following year, on 21 September, a 
Muscati-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed 4 ý4 
The United States Senate ratified the treaty on 30 June 1834 The 
1833 agreement remained in force for a century and a quarter 
when it was replaced by the 1958 Treaty of Amity, Economic 
Relations and Consular Rights. 
On the other shore of the Gulf, Iran approached the United 
States government with a bid for a commercial treaty. To face 
British influence and Omani expansionism, the Iranian charge 
d'affairs at Constantinople proposed in 1855 to the United States 
Minister to the Ottoman government that the two countries 
should conclude a treaty. Article XV of the treaty would require 
the United States to escort Iranian merchant shipping. Article 
XVI, which Kelly believes was the actual purpose of the treaty, 
called upon the Americans to defend the Iranian coast and islands 
in the Gulf "against the attacks of strong and weak enemies, 
whether they be Christians or otherwise", and to provide naval 
assistance "to enable the Persian Government to take possession 
of and to subjugate such of its islands and ports (for instance 
Kishm, Ormuz, and Bahrein) as show insubordination and refuse 
to pay the revenue... "455 America's imperial era was 
decades 
away. The United States rejected the Iranian proposal and the 
W HureN%itz, op. cit.. vol. I. p. 255. 
4`; David Long. "The United States and the Persian Gulf. 
" Current Histor- 
(January 1979), p. 27. 
454 For the 1831 treaty document see ibid.. vol. I. pp. 255-6. 
a;; Kelle, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 458. 
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two governments signed at Constantinople on 13 December 1856 
the Friendship and Commercial Treaty. 
456 
The next significant element of American involvement in the 
region was missionary activity. In 1829, the first missionaries 
began their work in north-west Iran (Tabriz Province). Later on, 
an Arabian Mission, founded in 1889 at New Brunswick (Ne%ý 
Jersey) by the Reverend Samuel Zwemer of the Reformed Church, 
established in 1892 its first mission at Basrah on the Arabian side 
of the Gulf. The mission in Muscat was opened a year later, and 
in 1895 another was opened in Manamah, the capital of Bahrain. 
By 1910, plans were made to open a mission in Kuwait and later 
a mission was opened in Amara, Iraq. "' 
By the end of World War One, the missionaries maintained 
five stations, three substations, six Sunday schools, seven day- 
schools, one boys' boarding school, and five hospitals and 
dispensaries at the locations mentioned above on the Arabian side 
of the Gulf. The missionaries also built Baghdad College (later 
al-Hikma University) in 1932 as well as the American Tehran 
College in Iran. By the Second World War, the number of 
working missionaries differed from one Gulf state to another 
While there were less than two dozen in Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, 
and the Trucial Shaik hdoms, there were about 42 in Iran and one 
hundred and thirteen missionaries in Iraq. Thus, the missionaries 
a, % it ý ol. I. pp For the text of the agreement see Hure«'itz. oý c 
a' Long. op. cit " p. 
27, and Malone. op. cit. " p. 
4I 
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took a leading role in bringing Western thought, ideas, and 
education into the region. ' 
There is no doubt that the missionary remained as America's 
best link with the region, until the arrival of the age of Gulf 
petroleum. They developed into 'goodwill' ambassadors for the 
United States, and some even worked as part-time consuls, thus 
becoming an accepted tool of foreign policy. In future, the 
performance of these missionaries would benefit both the 
American oil companies and the United States government. They 
helped the oil companies during their oil negotiations in the 
region. It also assisted the United States government in gradually 
diminishing the predominant position of the British in the Gulf. 4 
British missionaries had never officially been present in the 
region. 
7.2 The Role of Oil in the United States-Gulf Region 
Relationship 
Since oil was discovered at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the international demand for it has been increasing. The 
world production of oil rose from approximately 20 million tons 
in 1900 to 1791 million tons in 1968 
460 This level made oil a 
major element in the world market. From analysis of sales, sip of 
the world's top thirteen businesses in 197? were oil companies 
A. Assiri, The Impact of Arms and Oil Politics on 
United States 
Relations with the Arabian Gulf States 1968-78 (Unis ersitz of 
C 3lifornia-- 
F'erside: Unpublished Ph. D., 1981), pp. 16-7. 
459 
Ibid. 
*" Fiona Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century (London 
Macmillan, 1986). Appendix, pp. 17 1 -6. 
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In the United States, there were five oil concerns among the 
leading twelve companies. Shell and BP were the largest two 
companies in Britain. 
46' 
During the First World War the vital importance of oil to 
the industrial world was realised. The war led the Western 
powers to the understanding that petroleum products were crucial 
to victory, and no nation could win a mechanised war without a 
sufficient supply of this strategic resource. Lord Curzon's 
statement that "The Allies floated to victory [in the Great War] 
on a wave of oil" is one of many famous remarks delivered by 
Western politicians that recognised oil's future role in world 
462 politics in the aftermath of World War One. 
By the end of the Second World War, the necessity of oil to 
the industrial world increased very dramatically. Oil was 
considered as the golden key to industrial production. Loy 
Henderson, Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs in the 
American State Department, wrote in 1948 that "at this state of 
industrial development, oil, like food, is essential to the 
operation of our very economic life and to the maintenance of 
what we Americans consider as civilization. " 463 
The Gulf states' oil was discovered and exported at 
different times. Oil began to flow from Iran in 1912, Iraq in 
461 Fred Halliday Arabia Without Sultans (England: Penguin Books, 1974). 
p. 395" 
ah. 
The Times (London. 22 November 1918). 
463 
Loy Henderson, "American Political and Strategic Interests in 
the 
Middle East and Southeastern Europe. " Proceedings of the 
Academe of 
Political Science (January 1948), p. -1 3. 
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1927, Bahrain in 1933, Saudi Arabia in 1937, Kuwait in 1946, 
Qatar in 1949, Abu Dhabi in 1962, Oman in 1967, Dubai in 1969, 
and from Sharjah in 1974. Henceforth these states began a new 
era of prosperity. This tremendous oil wealth made the Gulf at 
the time of British withdrawal, and for a long time to come, the 
leading region in meeting the demands of the industrial xý orld. . -A 
1972 Congressional report expressed this fact clearly by asserting 
that "Never before in the history of mankind, have so many 
wealthy, industrialised, militarily powerful, and large states been 
at the potential mercy of small, independent and potentially 
unstable states which will provide, for the foreseeable future, the 
fuel of advanced societies. " 464 
For this reason, it has been estimated in American official 
circles that the effect of losing the Gulf's oil would have a 
devastating impact on the economy of the Western industrialised 
societies. James Akins, the Director of the Office of Energy and 
Fuel in the State Department during the Nixon Administration, 
predicted in a 1973 Foreign Affairs' article, six months before the 
Ramadan War, that: "the loss of the production of any of these 
countries [the Gulf states] could cause a temporary 
but 
significant world oil shortage, the loss of any two could cause a 
crisis and quite possibly a panic among the 
40i In the 
""ords of Carter's Defence Secretary, Harold Brown "The loss of 
this [Gulf] oil to the economies of the 
West and the 
464 Ein ile Nakhlah. Arab-American Relations in the 
Persian Gulf 
(\\ashington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Polic' 
Research, 1975), p. 56. 
-IM James Akins, "The Oi1 Crisis: This Time the Wolf is 
Here. " Foreien 
Affýs 51 (April 1971). p. 469. Ramadan is the ninth month 
of the Muslim 
)ear, when Muslims must fast from dawn to dusk. 
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industrialized Far East would be a blow of catastrophic 
proportions... the loss of Persian Gulf supplies would do 
irreparable damage to our allies and friends... X466 
Thus oil became the most important element in United 
States-Gulf region relations. The following pages, however, will 
concentrate on the story of the American oil concessions in the 
region and the deep interest of the industrial world in the Gulf's 
oil at the time of the British withdrawal. To prove the Gulf's oil 
importance, the 1973 oil crisis will be discussed. 
7.2.1 The American Oil Concessions 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States and 
the Soviet Union were the world's main oil producers. Therefore, 
prior to the end of the First World War, American governments 
had shown little interest in foreign oil exploration. However, the 
First World War and the depleting of her own oil reserves 
persuaded the government of the United States to extend its 
search for oil in the outside world, including the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula regions. 467 
In the few years preceding World War One, the 
British 
government increased its involvement in the oil industry to a far 
greater degree than had been the case. This new policy «as 
continued in the aftermath of war. The British government sought 
to exclude foreign oil companies from the Gulf areas 
that had 
466 Harold Brown. "Protecting U. U. S. Interests in the 
Persian Gulf. " 
P& artment of State Bulletin 80 (May 1980). p. 63 
Venn, op. cit., p. 48. 
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been under its influence. The United States was disinclined to 
accept this. To her, the struggle for control of the Gulf oil 
resources seemed just another part of Britain's old imperialist 
diplomacy. As a consequence, in the inter-war years, great power 
rivalry between the two countries was to have profound 
implications for British strength and prestige in the Gulf. 68 
Before the involvement of the United States with the Gulf's 
oil, the dominant oil companies were the APOC --later British 
Petroleum (BP), Shell (an Anglo-Dutch combine with 40% British 
interest and 60% Dutch) and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 
(CFP). The United States government announced, after the end of 
the Great War, her own open door policy, as a basis for 
negotiating new oil concessions in the Gulf. 469 The State 
department had encouraged American oil companies to go out and 
obtain foreign oil concessions. The United States Secretary of 
State, Charles Hughes, wrote to President Calvin Coolidge 
(1923-9) on 8 November 1928, that "our position is that we are 
always ready to give appropriate support to our nationals in 
seeking opportunities for business enterprise abroad. "470 As a 
result, in the late 1920s and 1930s, the American oil companies 
had obtained concessions in most of today's Gulf states. 
""' For oil's role in the First World War and its aftermath see 
Venn. op 
PP. 
469 Originally the United States government objected at the 
be;,, inning of 
twentieth century against tearing China into area of concessions 
bet"\ 
o 
the 
European 
colonial powers. Instead, the Americans asked 
for same econ 
chance for all states. Ibid., p. 12. 
4'o Assiri. op. cit.. p. 21. 
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In Iraq, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) discovered oil 
in the northern part of the country in late 1927. The British 
government tried to secure for the APOC and Shell the 
controlling share in the IPC but were frustrated by the 
Americans. In July 1928, the American companies --Standard Oil 
of New Jersey (Exxon) and Mobil-- secured 23.75 per cent of the 
assets of the IPC. In 1927, the American Company Standard Oil 
of California (Socal) also succeeded in purchasing Bahrain's 
concession for $50,000.471 In 1932, Socal's subsidiary, Bapco, 
discovered oil. 
In Saudi Arabia, IPC and Socal were competing for the 
highest bid to win the Saudi Eastern province (al-Hasa) oil 
concession. IPC's inability to make down payment in gold as 
desired by Ibn Saud was responsible for the concession being 
granted to the American Company. On 29 May 1933 Socal signed 
an agreement for a sixty-year concession for the whole of eastern 
Saudi Arabia by beating the IPC's offer of $45,000 with its bid of 
about $250,000 in gold sovereigns. 472 The loss of the al-Hasa 
concession proved to be the greatest blow in the history of 
British concern in the Gulf's oil . 
When the Americans received 
the concession the British Minister in Saudi Arabia at Jeddah 
was shocked 473 
In 1933, Socal obtained another concession from Ibn 
Saud 
and created a wholly owned subsidiary, California 
Standard Oil 
Sampson, op. cit., p. 125. 
Assiri, op. cit., pp. 25-6, and Troeller. op. c1t " PP 
Malone, op. cit., p. 418. 
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Company (Casco) to explore for oil. Two years later, Socal and 
Texaco joined forces overseas with a jointly owned subsidiary, 
Caltex, which became the new owner of Casco. On 5 '. larch 19')8, 
oil was discovered in commercial quantities. World War T\ý o 
intervened, and it was not until the late 1940s that Saudi Arabia 
started to be one of the world's greatest oil exporters. In the 
meantime, in 1948, Casco's name was changed to the Arabian 
American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Two other American 
companies, Mobil and Exxon, bought into Aramco with Texaco 
and Socal upon payment of 500 million dollars. 474 According to 
this new arrangement: each of Socal, Exxon and Texaco got 30 
475 per cent and Mobil got the remaining 10 per cent. 
In the face of this American activity, the British moved 
very quickly. Briefly, Shaikh Ahmad of Kuwait granted, in 
December 1934, Kuwait's oil concession to the new Kuwait Oil 
Company (KOC), owned jointly (50/50) by the American Gulf and 
the British BP companies. 476 Exclusive rights were also obtained 
by IPC in the Trucial Shaikhdoms and in Oman, but these became 
commercially important only in the 1960s. 
As far as Iran's oil was concerned, the United States move 
came after the Second World War. After Mossadiq's ousting 
from 
office in August 1953 and the Shah's return to Iran, a consortium 
of international oil companies was formed to operate 
Iran's oil 
production. On 5 August 1954, Iran concluded an agreement ýt 
ith 
Long, op. cit., p. 28. 
Halliday op. cit., p. 400. Since 1/1/1976. Aramco company 
has bccn 
completely owned by the Saudi government. 
4_ Katz, cit., p. 159 
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Western oil companies that resulted in the founding of the 
Iranian Consortium, a union of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC) and other, mostly American, companies. Under the new 
terms, AIOC owned only 40 per cent of the assets of the new 
company. The American companies of Gulf, Exxon, Texaco, 
Mobil and Socal each received a seven per cent interest, and a 
group of smaller United States companies collectively called the 
Iricon Group received an additional five per cent. The other ?0 
per cent was divided as follows: Shell 14 and CFP 6 per cent. "' 
The last few pages have shown that British companies, 
despite the pledges their government received at the beginning of 
the current century from most of the local forces not to award oil 
concessions to anyone but British subjects, were unable to gain 
the upper hand in the scramble for concessions in the Gulf. 
Therefore, why, despite Britain's predominant political position 
in the region for more than a century, were American oil 
companies so successful there? 
At the beginning, the British government tried to prevent 
the coming of the United States' oil companies to the region, but 
ultimately it gave way. The strength of the United States during 
the Great War was the main reason for the giving way of British 
imperial policy in the Gulf to that of the Anglo-American 
alliance. In other words, British petroleum policy v. as 
subordinated to the more fundamental issue of Anglo-American 
relations as a whole. Fiona Venn writes in her 
Oil Diplomacy in 
the Twentieth Century that "If the British government w as 
Long. op. cit., p. 28. 
185 
Oil and the United States-Gulf Region Relationship 
prepared to compromise on such vital issues as naval superiority 
and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it would not hesitate to 
surrender partial control of the as yet unproved oil reserves of 
the Middle East. X478 As a result, the governments of Britain and 
the United States became in the Gulf, in the period between the 
two world wars, rivals and allies, each hoping to stress co- 
operation, on one hand, and, on the other, eager to advance their 
own particular interests. 
479 
7.2.2 The Western Oil Interests in the Gulf 
Before the 1970s, world oil production, the greater part of 
which was in the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC), was controlled by a small group of foreign 
companies, generally referred to as the 'Seven Sisters'. Five of 
them were from North America: Exxon, Socal, Texaco, Gulf and 
Mobil; the two others are British BP and Anglo-Dutch Shell. (The 
French CFP, with less economic strength, came next to them). As 
a consequence, production levels, refining and marketing were 
determined by these seven companies. As late as 1968, they 
controlled 77.9 per cent of world production, 60.9 per cent of 
refining and 55,6 per cent of world marketing facilities . 
48' Table 
1. shows the major oil companies' production share in the leading 
Gulf states producers. 
Venn, op. cit., p. 67. 
a'v 
Ibid., pp. 67-8. 
aKu Halliday, op. cit.. pp. 395-6. 
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Table 1: Major oil companies in the Gulf, 1971 (Million Metric Tons)a 
Gulf States Esso Shell BP Gulf Texaco Socal Mobil CEP Others Total 
Abu Dhabi 3.25 6. 5 17.8 
-- -- -- 
3.25 12. 2 14 44 5 
Iran 14.5 29 .1 
83.8 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 12. 5 26. ; 227 
.0 
Iraq 9.8 19. 7 19.7 
-- -- -- 
9.8 19 
.7 43 83 .0 
Kuwait 
- 
72.5 72.5 
- 
145 
.0 
Qatar 1.1 12. 5 2.4 
-- -- -- 
1.1 2 
.4 0.5 20 .0 
N. Zone 
- 
26.4 26 4 
Saudi Ar. 66.6 
- - -- -- 
66.6 66.6 22.2 222 
.0 
Total 95.2 67 .8 
196.2 87.0 81.1 81.1 50.8 46 
.8 58.9 767. 9 
a. Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p. 404. 
During the 1960s oil had surpassed the coal industry as the 
world's first energy source. At the end of that time, the leading 
industrialised countries obtained more than half of their energy 
supplies from oil. Tables no. 2 and 3 show the growth of 
dependency on oil and its consumption in the prominent industrial 
countries. 
Table 2: Growth in West's dependence on oil, (1960-1970)a 
Area 
Volume 
(m h/h 
1960 
% of total 
) energy 
1970 
Volume 
(m b/b) 
% of total 
ever gy 
North America 10.2 44 .9 
15.3 4 3.31 
OECD Europe 0.4 32 .6 
12.4 59.6 
Japan 0.6 36 .4 
3.8 71.7 
Rest of World 5.5 22 .4 
10.7 31.8 
Total world 20.1 33 .2 
42.2 13.9 
a. Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil: the Biggest 
Business (London: Eyre Methuen. 1975), p. 252. 
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Table 3: Crude oil consumption in the major industrial countries in million barrels daily for the years 
1968-71a 
Country Canada France W. Germany Japan Italy UK us 
1968 1.375 1.470 2.1 35 2. 850 1.385 1.840 13.09 
1969 1.440 1.705 2.420 3. 390 1.530 1.980 1 x. 81 
1970 1.525 1.920 2.655 4. 000 1.740 2.095 14. X50 
1971 1.585 2.090 2.745 4. 435 1.875 2.105 14.843 
a. BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1978 (London: The 
British Petroleum Co. Ltd., 1978), p. 21. 
The quantity of crude oil reserves and their consumption 
level are the most crucial factors in determining the availability 
of oil. And while oil was depleting in the Western countries its 
quantities were increasing in tremendous amounts in the Middle 
East, particularly in the Arab Gulf states. Therefore it was 
expected that by the end of the 1960s, many oil-producing 
countries, especially those with high level oil consumption, were 
likely to run out of crude oil (see table no. 4). The United 
States, for example, was depleting her crude oil reserves of 39.3 
billion barrels at a high rate due to her large level of oil 
consumption which equalled 3.320 billion barrels per year as of 
1968.48' According to their levels of production of oil in 1973, 
the life-span of crude oil reserves in the leading Arabian Gulf 
states' oil producers was estimated as follows: Kuwait 63.6 
ax' Another study conducted by the American Enterprise institute stated that 
proved oil reserves in the United States had been reduced from a 
12. i-year 
supply in 1958 to a ten-year supply in 1968. "Economic Interests, 
" in George 
LenczoNN ski, (ed).. United States Interests in the Middle East. p. 40. 
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years; Saudi Arabia 49.2 years; Abu Dhabi 46 years; and Iraq 
42.7 years. 482 
Table 4: The Life-Span of crude oil reserves in some of the Non-OPEC major producers in 1968a 
Product Crude Oil Reserveb Crude Oil Productionc Life-Span (Years) 
Canada 10.0 1.1 65 2; 
Caribbean 17.8 3.985 12.2 
US 39.3 9.095 11.7 
USSR, E. Europe 
& China 55.9 6.785 22.6 
a. Compiled from Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry. 1968, 
(London: The British Petroleum Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 5,7. 
b. in billion barrels. 
c. in million barrels a day. 
It was clear at the time of British withdrawal, that the 
industrialised world's increasing consumption level of crude oil 
would make the future demand for OPEC countries' oil in 
general, and the Gulf's oil in particular, very urgent. The Gulf 
was, in 1971, the world's greatest oil producing area. The oil 
production of the region was just over 16,000.000 barrels per day 
(b. p. d. ) compared with some 11,050.000 in North America, 
425.000 in Western Europe, and 7,835.000 in Eastern Europe and 
the former USSR. In figures, the percentage of the 1971 oil 
' production of the Gulf was 27.6% of total world production. 48 
aK: Compiled from BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry. 1978. p. 
19: and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Oil and 
Sec E (Stockholm: Almgvist & Wiksell International. 1974). p. 66 
4s " BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry. 19-8. p. 19. 
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Table 5: Oil production in the Gulf area in thousand barrels daily for selected years (1968-71)a 
Country 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Bahrainb 0.075 0.076 0. 076 0.07 
Iran 2.840 3.375 3. 845 4 565 
Iraq 1.505 1.525 1. 565 1.700 
Kuwait 2.420 2.575 2. 7 35 2.925 
Oman 0.240 0.330 0. 330 0.285 
Qatar 0.340 0.355 0. 370 0.4 10 
Neutral Zone 0.405 0.420 0 . 
505 0.545 
Saudi Arabia 2.830 2.995 3 . 
550 4.500 
UAE 0.495 0.610 0 . 
780 1.060 
Total Gulf 11.150 12.261 13. 756 16.085 
a. BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1978, p. 19. 
b. United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs. World 
Energy Supplies, 1950-74. Statistical Papers, Series J. No. 19 (Neww 
York: United Nations. 1976), p. 210,213. 
Exports of crude oil and refined products were dispatched 
from the Gulf to most consuming areas of the world. For many 
years, the whole world was heavily reliant upon the millions of 
barrels of crude oil leaving the region every day, passing through 
the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf. At the end of 
1971, for example, the world obtained about 56.6 per cent of 
its 
oil from the Gulf: about 22.1% of North America's (21% of the 
United States'), 58.9% of Western Europe's, 83.7% of the Far 
East's (84.5% of Japan's), and 76.8% of Africa's oil supplies 
came from the Gulf (see table no. 6). Such a position gave the 
region a unique importance in both energy and economic 
terms in 
relation to the economies of the United States, 
`Western Europe, 
Japan, and much of the African and Asian continents. 
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Table 6: Distribution of Gulf oil exports (Thousand Metric Tons) in 1971a 
From To Africa North America Far East Western Europe Others 
Gulf 20.170 26.210 225.770 369.800 39.550 
a. United Nations, World Energy Supplies, pp. 228-37. 
The oil-producing and exporting states of the Gulf were, 
and still are, the owners of the world's largest oil reserves. The 
Gulf states possessed, in 1968, more than half of the world's 
proven oil reserves. Indeed, the next largest holder of oil 
reserves, the former Soviet bloc, had only 12.0% of the world's 
proven reserves. Table 7. shows the oil reserves at the end of 
1968 in the world's major producing regions. 
Table 7: World published proved oil reserves at end 1968a 
Country/Area Billion Barrels World Share % 
Africab 44.6 9.6 
Canada 10.0 2.2 
Caribbean 17.8 3.8 
Middle Eastc 270.1 58.1 
USA 39.3 8.4 
USSR, E. Europe & China 55.9 12.0 
Western Europe 2.6 0.6 
Others 24.7 5.3 
Total World 465.0 100.0 
a. Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry. 1968, p. 5. 
b. The oil production of North Africa's countries is included. 
c. Almost all of it in the Gulf region states. 
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7.2.3 The 1973 Oil Crisis 
On 6 October 1973, the Ramadan War broke out between 
the Arab countries, principally Egypt and Syria, and Israel. The 
United States and some other countries supported Israel. This 
American stance prompted OAPEC to use all its efforts, 
especially its oil wealth, to maintain Arab interests against Israel 
and her supporters. In practice, the OAPEC members followed 
three lines. They started immediately with the reduction of oil 
production. A few days later they raised the prices of their oil. 
The third direction they followed was a full embargo on oil 
exports against specific countries. 
The gradual cutback in oil production was chosen by 
OAPEC as a more effective option to persuade Israel's 
supporters, especially the United States, to modify their 
alignment with the Israelis against the Arab countries. In 
November 1973, the reduction in crude oil reached 26.7 per cent 
484 of the September 1973 production levels. 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, many OAPEC members 
have controlled their own oil production and prices. In 
September 1973, oil prices were very low, averaging only 
$1.77 a 
barrel. OAPEC's decision to reduce their oil production resulted 
in a decrease in their oil revenues. Consequently, Arab oil- 
producing countries held a meeting in Kuwait on 16 
October, and 
decided to increase the oil prices by 70 per cent to 
$3.05 per 
barrel. This was the first action taken by oil producing countries 
484 A. Al-Sows avegh. Arab Petro-Politics (London: 
Croom Helm. 1984). pp. 
130-1. 
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to determine their oil prices. A dramatic increase in spot oil 
prices raised the posted price to $5.17 per barrel in November, 
and to $11.65 in January 1974, this latter a 558 per cent increase 
from the price only four months earlier. 
But since the earlier policies did not produce an immediate 
response from the government of the United States to change her 
pro-Israel policy, the Arab oil producing countries decided to 
halt all oil exports to the United States. This took effect on 19 
October 1973. The oil-consuming countries were divided, with 
respect to the oil embargo, into three groups: friendly, unfriendly 
and neutral. The friendly states which included Britain, France 
and Spain, were to continue to receive oil at the pre-embargo 
level. The unfriendly countries were to receive no oil at all. In 
addition to the United States, this group included those countries 
that provided military support to Israel, namely, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. The neutral countries, 
which constituted the rest of the world's consuming states, were 
485 to receive whatever oil was left. 
The consequence of these actions taken by OAPEC was the 
1973 energy crisis. This crisis had major effects on the economy 
of the industrial countries, particularly the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan. As a result, the United States and 
other major industrial countries followed an energy conservation 
policy to reduce their dependency on OAPEC oil, which 
led to a 
substantial decrease in oil consumption. For example, bet« een 
1973 and 1986, oil consumption among the major 
OECD 
d., pp. 130-2. 
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industrial countries declined by over 15 per cent. This was 
accompanied by a significant improvement in energy efficiency. 
This was especially clear in the automobile industry. In other 
words, the Arab oil embargo encouraged the major industrial 
countries to increase their dependence on non-oil energy sources, 
such as coal, natural gas and nuclear power, and to develop 
renewable energy resources such as solar energy, wind energy 
and hydropower. 486 
But despite the search for alternative energy sources, the 
West realised that for the near future only oil would be available 
at hand in sufficient quantities and at reasonable cost to meet the 
expanding thrust of its industrial machine. More to the point, to 
the West the Gulf represented the only supplier that would be 
capable of satisfying future oil import demands. Business Week 
magazine stated during the Ramadan War that, "The world will 
buy more Arab oil, whatever the outcome of the fighting, because 
there are no alternative energy sources at present to meet soaring 
demand. X487 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo, therefore, proved that the use 
of oil as a political weapon could lead to an energy crisis. The 
embargo also confirmed that the political factors could play a 
crucial r ole in the availability of crude oil. The Palestinian 
question, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran conflict of 
1980-88 and lastly the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, 
, 
'"' K. McCann, "OPEC Policy and the Future of Oil, " OPEC Bulletin 
19 
(October 1988). P. 11. 
"The New Economics in the Middle East. " Business Week (20 October 
78. 
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all these examples resulted in a severe 
supplies from the Arab supplier states. 
shortage in crude oil 
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Chapter VIII The British Withdrawal and the Soviet 
Threat to the United States' Interests in 
the Gulf 
The last chapter showed that the great interest of the 
United States in the Gulf region's oil was the most important 
issue that governed her relationship with the Gulf throughout the 
twentieth century. Nevertheless, the need of the United States for 
British co-operation and her rivalry with the Soviet Union were 
the other main pillars of her Gulf policy since the end of the 
Second World War. It is worth noting that these three pillars 
were for most of time overlapping. 
Britain's presence in the Gulf eased the fears of the West in 
general and of the United States in particular about their 
interests in the region. Therefore when the British Labour 
government announced in 1968 its intention to withdraw its 
forces from the region, the American officials viewed it as a 
unique opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase her power in 
the region and to control its oil wealth. The following two 
sections will attempt to show the link between the British 
withdrawal and the Russian threat to the West's interests in the 
Gulf region, from the United States' perspective. An examination 
of the Soviet's options for control of the region will be also. 
8.1 The British Withdrawal 
In a dramatic signal of Britain's retreat from 'Bieg Power' 
status, the British Prime Minister of the Labour government, 
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Harold Wilson (1964-70,1974-6) announced, on 15 January 
1968, to the House of Commons his government's decision to 
withdraw forces from 'East of Suez', including the Gulf, by the 
end of 1971. In other words, despite her 'will to empire' the 
British government, according to Wilson's announcement, was 
unable to continue her protectorate position in these regions. 
Wilson attributed his government's decision to the growing 
financial pressures and high expenditure of maintaining British 
troops there. 
The Labour government's decision to withdraw was 
unexpected. The world had witnessed as late as 1964, Wilson 
himself asserting that one British soldier East of Suez was more 
valuable than one thousand British soldiers on the Rhine. 488 As 
regards the Gulf specifically, the Wilson government had sent in 
November 1967, just two months before its announcement of 
withdrawal, the Foreign Office Minister of State, Goronwy 
Roberts, to assure the rulers of the Gulf emirates that Britain had 
no intention to withdraw, but had positively decided to stay in 
489 the region for the foreseeable future. 
The British government's decision, therefore, produced 
mixed or diverse reactions in Britain, in the Gulf countries, and 
in the two superpowers of the United States and the 
Soviet 
Union. While to some the decision was a 'blow', others 
favoured 
it. However, before discussing the different powers' reactions, it 
4X8 Alvin Cottrell. "British Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, " Military 
ReyieNN' 50 (June 1970), p. 14. 
489 Balfour-Paul, op. cit.. p. 262. and Parsons, They 
Say the Lion. p. 132 
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is necessary to explain briefly the circumstances that led the 
Labour government to make the important decision to withdraw 
from a region that was regarded as economically vital for all 
Western powers. 
The Labour government admitted publicly that its decision 
was rooted in the deteriorating British economic situation. Its 
purpose was to disengage Britain from military spending overseas 
which, according to their judgement, had become economically 
beyond Britain's ability to tolerate. In his book A Personal 
Record: the Labour Government 1964- 70, Wilson states that his 
government asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to reduce 
public expenditure. As far as defence expenditure was concerned, 
the Chancellor proposed, among other things, the immediate 
withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf. 490 
In Britain, those who argued for the decision agreed that 
Britain, since the 1960s, faced major economic difficulties. Her 
share in the total export of manufactures in the industrial world, 
for example, fell from two-ninths in 1952 to less than one-eighth 
in 1967. Thus, the decision was acceptable to them as a means of 
seeking a way out of these problems by cutting public 
expenditure. The Conservative party (then the opposition party) 
condemned the Labour government's decision and promised to 
reverse it if they succeeded in the next general election, which 
was due to be held before the withdrawal would take place. 
The 
49" Harold Wilson. The Labour Government. 1964-1970: A Personal 
Record 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1971). 479. 
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Conservative Party pamphlet, 'East of Suez, ' argued that the cost 
of Britain staying in the Gulf was very low compared with what 
was gained from its investments there. At the time of the decision 
Britain spent 25 million dollars while gaining 450 million dollars 
annually. 49' The Conservatives believed that a continued British 
presence in the region was essential to protect Britain's trade and 
commercial interests that might be threatened by the withdrawal. 
It is noticeable, however, that the main motive for the Labour 
government in taking the decision and the Conservative 
opposition in trying to reverse it was Britain's interests. 
With the exception of Oman, where the British forces were 
not affected by the 1968 announcement, the rulers of the Gulf 
states were divided in their responses toward the British 
government's decision. While the big three --namely Iran, Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia-- and Kuwait felt their interests were served by 
Britain's withdrawal, the nine small protectorate emirates 
opposed it. 
Those who supported the British decision rejected the 
argument that the British withdrawal would create a power 
vacuum and that the Soviets would jump in to fill 
it. They 
considered the withdrawal to be a potential stabilising 
factor and 
asserted that the states of the region had the capacity and the 
will to fill the anticipated vacuum and to defend themselves. 
491 The Conservative Party pamphlet. "East of Suez". 
Quoted in Cottrell.. p. 
16, and Balfour-Paul, op. cit.. p. 224. note: 733. 
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Some detail about the reaction of the four states will clarify their 
position more. 
Iran, under Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's leadership, 
welcomed the British decision. The decision gave the Shah the 
opportunity he had long been waiting for to revive the great 
ancient Persian empire. The British withdrawal provided Iran 
with 'a propitious opportunity' to accomplish her ancient dream 
of spreading her control over both sides of the Gulf. 492 The Shah, 
therefore, expressed his belief that there would be no power 
vacuum and as a result no need for a foreign power to fill it. The 
Iranian government confirmed that the Gulf states would defend 
their interests as well as the world's. Iran suggested some type of 
regional co-operation in the form of a defence pact among Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In addition to Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia denounced the proposal, refusing to join in military and 
political alliances. 493 
In Iraq, the Baath party came to power for the second time 
on 14 July 1968. Although not communist, the Baath was pro- 
Soviet. In other words, six months after the British government's 
announcement of withdrawing, Iraq was under a pro-Soviet 
regime. Therefore, Iraq's stance concerning the British 
withdrawal was a predictable one. Ahmad Al-Bakr, 
Iraq's 
President (1968-79), in a speech delivered on 22 June 1970, made 
492 R. Ramazani, "Iran's Changing Foreign Policy: A Preliminary 
Discussion, " The Middle East Journal 24 (Autumn 1970), pp. 435-7 
4k)l 
Ali Khalifa. The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation 
(London: Westview Press, 1975), p. 162 
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his country's position very clear, "There must be complete 
[British] withdrawal from the Gulf. 11494 Four months before the 
time of British withdrawal, Al-Bakr, in a step designed to face 
the so-called power vacuum, called for the creation of an Arabian 
defence alliance in the region. No doubt Iraq's intention was to 
exclude Iran --Iraq's main rival-- and to lead the Arabian side of 
the Gulf. 495 
Saudi Arabia, with her difficult relations with Britain over 
the Buraimi Oasis, also welcomed the British decision and 
rejected the region's power vacuum argument. The Saudis 
opposed the proposal of the Conservative opposition that Britain 
should stay in the Gulf. They threatened to refer the case to the 
International Court of Justice if a new Conservative government 
496 decided to reverse the Labour decision. Kuwait also favoured 
the Labour government decision to withdraw and urged that a 
future Conservative government should respect it. Though Kuwait 
rejected the Iraqi proposal for an Arabian defence alliance in the 
Gulf, they requested the small emirates of the region to work 
together to safeguard their independence. 497 
On the other hand, the nine small protectorate emirates 
involved regarded the British decision as against their interests. 
494 
The Times (London. 23 June 1970), p. 7 a. 
49' Muhammad Sadik and William Snavelti,, Bahrain, Qatar. and the United 
Arab Emirates Colonial Past. Present Problems and Future Prospects 
(Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company. 1972). p. 198. 
496 
Ibid. 
49Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih. The Foreign 
Relations of Iran. a 
Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict (Los 
Angeles. Unix ersit\ 
of California Press, 1974). p. 237. 
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The rulers of these emirates believed that the British withdrawal 
would cause dramatic changes that would be detrimental to the 
survival of their emirates. They felt that after being protected 
from external aggression for a long time, they were suddenly 
abandoned by the British to survive in turmoil. Therefore, they 
demanded that Britain should reverse her decision and stay in the 
region. 
To understand the argument of Bahrain, Qatar and the seven 
Trucial emirates, it is important to view it in the local political 
context. At the time of Britain's announcement, the small 
protectorate emirates were involved in several border disputes 
with their powerful neighbours. The most threatening were Iran's 
historical claims to Bahrain, the Abu Musa island of Sharjah and 
the two Tunb islands of Ras al-Khaimah, and the Saudi Arabia- 
Abu Dhabi-Oman dispute over the Buraimi Oasis. Under such 
circumstances, Britain's 1968 announcement came as a great 
shock to the emirates. Fearing the possibility that, after the 
British withdrawal, the regional big powers would be likely to 
attack them, their rulers called on the British to cancel their 
decision. The late Shaikh Rashid Al-Maktom of Dubai, one of the 
most influential rulers, said that he tried to express his objection 
to British officials, but was told that the decision had been theirs 
and that he would not be allowed an opportunity to express 
his 
opinion. 498 
498 The Times (London. 3 March 1971). p. 6 c. The Times described on 
9 
December 1971 the effect of the Conservative government's 
final decision to 
adhere to the Labour government's timing of withdrawal on 
the emirates 
rulers. as "the bitter pill" which they had to accept. 
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In the superpower circle, the attitudes of the United States 
and the Soviet Union towards the British announcement stood in 
sharp contrast. The United States criticised the British decision 
strongly under the pretext that it would expose the region to an 
imminent Soviet threat. American Presidents Lyndon Johnson 
(1963-8) and Richard Nixon (1969-74) warned of the danger of 
British withdrawal from the Gulf. The United States Secretary of 
State William Rogers went even further by accusing the Labour 
government of being less than honest with the South East Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) allies. 499 
In the case of the Soviets, they were pleased with the 
British decision and demanded that Britain should fulfil the plan 
as quickly as possible. The Soviet officials rejected the argument 
of the United States that Britain's presence would keep the 
region in order and her withdrawal would expose the Gulf states 
to a potential threat, emanating particularly from the Soviets and 
from domestic and regional radicals. The Soviets denounced this 
argument and labelled it as propaganda against them. They 
proclaimed that they were not looking to seize the region but 
wanted mutually friendly relations with its states. 
Finally, despite the growing dependency of the industrial 
world on imported oil from the Gulf; despite the rejection of the 
United States Administration; despite the offers of burden 
sharing or financial contribution from some of the rulers of 
the 
Gulf states; and despite the claims of the Conservative party 
that 
499 
The Times (London, 26 June 1970), p. 7 a. 
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for every dollar Britain spent in the region it was gaining 18, the 
British Labour government insisted on the decision to withdraw 
from the Gulf, and it was the Conservatives themselves, who, by 
the end of November of 1971, carried it out. This involved the 
recall of Britain's ground troops stationed at the British bases in 
Bahrain and Sharjah and the abolition of the nineteenth century 
Exclusive Agreements of protection over the nine small Arab 
emirates. 50° The British withdrawal marked the end of one era 
and the beginning of another characterised by intensive struggle 
between the two superpowers. 
8.2 The Soviet Threat 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the Russians, even before 
their 1917 revolution, had intensified their efforts to create a 
presence in the Gulf waters. In 1893 a Russian warship first 
visited the Gulf, and in 1895 and 1897 they made an attempt to 
gain Bandar Abbas on the Persian side of the Gulf. The Russians 
had asked in 1898 for the Ottoman government's approval to 
build a railroad through Tripoli with a terminus at 
Kuwait. In 
1901, the Russians sent naval vessels to the Gulf, and subsidised 
a steamship line from Odessa to Muscat and Kuwait. 
Russian 
ships came to the Gulf again in 1902, and 
in 1903, they were 
accompanied this time by French vessels. 
50' But as with the 
5"" Cottrell. op. cit.. p. 15. Kuwait had already received 
her independence 
in June 1961. 
501 ;, 199, note: 3. Katz, op. cit., p. 
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German plans, the British stopped the Russians. In August 1907, 
the two governments concluded the Anglo-Russian Treaty by 
which the Russian government controlled the northern part of 
Iran, viz. they were pushed away from the Gulf waters. 
In 1914 the Russians fought the Great War in the Western 
camp. During the war, in 1917, the Czarist regime was 
overthrown, and in November the Bolsheviks gained power. With 
Marxism in the driving seat, the first Communist state arrived 
and was interested in extending 'world revolution' by 
overthrowing the existing world order. As a result enmity had 
been inherent in Western-Soviet relationships. 502 Therefore, many 
governments withheld recognition of the new Soviet regime for a 
long time. For example, it was only acknowledged by Britain in 
January 1924 and by the United States in November 1933. 
Hitler's invasion in June 1941 of the Soviet Union, 
however, revived again the old Western-Russian alliance. The 
Russians entered the Second World War against the Nazis and 
their partners. But despite the fact that both the United States 
and the Soviet Union fought as allies in the war, the new world 
order that succeeded it was characterised by its bipolarity. In 
this bipolar system, power was divided between two camps- the 
Eastern bloc under Russian leadership and the Western axis under 
1(1, 
Michael Dockrill. The Cold War, 1945-1963 (London- Macmillan. 1988). 
P. 8. 
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the Americans. This produced what has come to be called the 
'Cold War'. s°3 
At the time of Britain's decision, the Cold War between the 
western and eastern camps reached its climax. Due to its physical 
weakness, strategic location and economic wealth, the Gulf was 
one of the main regions for superpower competition and 
confrontation. The competition in the Gulf waters was regarded 
as a part of the wo rld's balance of power. To be a world, rather 
than a regional power, the Soviet Union decided to make its sea 
power felt right around the globe. In 1968 a small Soviet 'flag- 
showing' force entered the Gulf and visited the Iraqi port of Umm 
Qasr just two months after the British announcement. 504 
These Soviet ambitions were in conflict with the American 
interests in what Robert Tucker has called "the indispensable key 
[i. e. the Gulf] to the defense of the American global position. SO' 
In accordance with such an appraisal, the struggle between the 
two superpowers in the region was to be carried out by all means, 
direct or indirect. They both continued to fight to expand their 
503 The Cold War, which may be said to have started with unrest in Iran 
(the Azerbaijan Issue), is a protracted state of political and diplomatic 
tension between countries, falling short of actual war. The Cold War is a 
name usually used for the international rivalry that developed between the 
Western powers and the Eastern European bloc after World War II. which 
divided the world into Western and Communist spheres of influence. 
The 
term, however, originated in a speech of Bernard Baruch, United 
States 
financier and special adviser to successive Presidents, in Columbia, 
South 
Carolina, on 16 April 1947 at a time when the United States Congress was 
discussing the 'Truman Doctrine'. 
qua A. Yadfat and M. Abir, In the Direction of the Persian Gulf: the Soviet 
Union and the Persian Gulf (London: Frank Cass. 1977), p. 65 
iu> Robert Tucker, The purposes of American Power: An Essay on National 
. Security (New York: Pareger Publishers. 1981), p. 93 
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own influence while working to diminish the influence of the 
other. The mutual suspicion between the United States and the 
Soviet Union meant that neither superpower wanted to ignore 
developments in the area for fear that her competitor would take 
advantage of the circumstances. 
The American argued that the aim of the Soviet Union was 
to reduce the Western influence wherever it existed, hoping to 
eliminate it; and if possible, to replace it by a Soviet one. A 
panel convened by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) affirmed in 1969 that, "It must 
be assumed that the Soviet Union will attempt to fill the power 
vacuum resulting from British withdrawal [from the Gulf], " since 
Moscow always moved into an "area where the West shows its 
inability to safeguard its interests. " 506 
The American argument continued that the vulnerable Gulf 
region was bordered by the Soviet Union, a superpower with a 
historical dream to reach the warm waters of the Gulf. The 
statement of William Crawford, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State during the Carter Administration, revealed this fact. He 
said "The Russian objective was clearly stated more than 100 
years ago at the Constantinople Convention, that the Red Sea and 
"06 The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Gulf: 
Implications of British Withdrawal (Washington. D. C.: 
Georgetown 
University, Special Report Series: No. 8. February. 1969). p. 91. In 1946. the 
British Chiefs of Staff held the same assumption. "If we move out 
in peace 
time, Russia will move in, pursuing her policy of extending 
her 
influence... to further strategic areas. " Louis. op. cit.. p. 28 
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the Southern entrance thereto were a legitimate area of Russian 
military hegemony. "507 
The Gulf's oil wealth added another dimension to the 
American argument. Some studies expected that the Soviets 
would face oil shortages in the near future. In 1966, for example, 
a journalist predicted that, by 1980, the Soviets would be forced 
to import oil to meet their need. 508 A 1977 Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) report also estimated that in a few years Soviet 
domestic demand for oil would ove rtake and surpass domestic 
supply. The report predicted that, in 1985, the Soviet Union 
would have to import 3.5-4.5 milli on barrels of oil per day. 
Under the pressure of such circums tances, the theory emerged 
that to obtain the oil they needed the Soviets would try to extend 
their control and establish a strong foot-hold somewhere in the 
Gulf. sog 
The United States feared that if the Russians managed to 
extend their control to the vulnerable Gulf region, this would 
lead to the increase of oil prices, the reduction of the flow of oil, 
or even the termination of exported oil to the Western camp. The 
report of the CSIS concluded that "the strategic interests of the 
noncommunist world would be in grave jeopardy if freedom of 
movement in and out of the Gulf were curtailed or denied. "5'0 
Katz, op. cit., p. 199. note: 3. 
'"x John Berry, "Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East. " The Middle East 
Journal 26 (Spring 1972). p. 150. 
509 Katz, op. cit., p. 5 and John Campbell. "The Soviet Union in the 
Middle 
East. " The Middle East Journal 32 (Winter 1978). p. 10. 
510 The Gulf: Implications of the British Withdrawal. p. 9. 
208 
The British Withdrawal and the Soviet Threat 
Therefore, to safeguard Western interests in the Gulf the United 
States tried to fill the so-called power vacuum that would be 
created after the British withdrew their forces. However, the 
response of the United States to the expected Soviet threat will 
be given more attention in the next chapter. 
The American analysis that the Gulf's oil would be an 
overriding impetus for the Soviets to rush to control one or more 
states of the region after British withdrawal can not be accepted. 
If the Soviet's future oil production was to be insufficient for 
their needs, they had other easier options before deciding to 
occupy one or more states of the Gulf with the strong Western 
reaction this would provoke. To cut down on their exports of oil 
rather than importing additional supplies was the obvious option 
s available to them. ll The second option was that the Soviets 
could satisfy their needs from their oil rich allies such as Iraq. 
The third was that they could obtain oil from the Gulf states 
without the necessity of occupying any of them. The Gulf states 
would be ready to avoid such a scenario by buying Moscow's 
contentment. They would be happy to follow the 'better safe than 
sorry' attitude by reaching an agreements with the Soviets, 
guaranteeing them the oil they needed. 512 
Finally, even if the Gulf countries were to be controlled by 
the Soviet Union or a native radical movement, the United States 
should not be worried about her own and the West's oil supply 
"' David Wilson. Soviet Oil and Gas to 1990 (Massachustts: Abt Books. 
1982), pp. 2-4. 
112 Assiri, op. cit.. PP249-50. 
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because whoever controlled these states would have, at the end, 
an interest in selling oil and importing goods and technology 
from the West as strong, or probably more than, the West's need 
for Gulf oil. This interdependence between the two parties was 
the best guarantee for the West; not who governed the Gulf 
states. Therefore, the West would be able to get along with 
whoever was the controlling power in the region. This evaluation 
was supported by several facts. Looking for hard currency, the 
Soviet Union itself was interested in selling her oil to the West. 
Iraq, presumably an anti-Western regime after the 1968 Baath 
party coup, sold her oil to Western countries. Likewise, Iran 
after the 1979 revolution has also been governed by a supposedly 
anti-Western government, but nevertheless she has continued to 
export oil to the West. 
8.2.1 Soviet Options for Control of the GUIf513 
According to the Western appraisal, there were several 
options available to the Soviet Union to gain control of the Gulf. 
A direct Soviet invasion of one or more countries of the region, 
supporting an invasion by one of Moscow's allies, and 
helping a 
revolution in one of the Gulf states were the most likely choices 
for the Soviets at the time of British withdrawal. 
Despite the truth that the forces of the Gulf states would 
not have been sufficient to defend a direct military 
invasion by 
X13 
Katz, op. Cit.. pp. 8-12 
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the former USSR, there were two main reasons that made this 
option an extremely difficult scheme for the Soviets. First, since 
the Gulf area was so indispensable to Western interests, the 
Russians knew that the United States and her allies would not 
allow them to take control of such a vital region and, therefore, 
might well decide to contest the attack. In other words, the 
Soviet invasion of one or more of the Gulf states could possibly 
lead to a direct confrontation with the West. Second, attacking 
any of the Gulf states would not be consistent with the Soviet 
policy of supporting the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli dispute, which 
the Russians were very anxious to benefit from in their long term 
policy in the region. 
As far as supporting an invasion of one of the Gulf 
countries by one of Moscow's allies was concerned, again there 
were two reasons for ruling out this option. The possibility of 
risking Western intervention and a wider conflict with the West 
was the first. The second was that Moscow's allies in the region, 
such as Iraq or South Yemen, were not necessarily prepared or 
willing to carry out an invasion of a Gulf state for the sake of the 
Soviets. 
Although helping a revolution in one of the Gulf states was 
the kind of policy favoured by the Soviet Union in certain other 
periods and circumstances, it does not seem to have 
been on the 
Soviet foreign policy agenda in the region at the time of the 
British withdrawal. The final years of the Dhofari rebellion 
in 
Oman demonstrated this change in Soviet Gulf policy. In 
September 1969 the rebellious leaders stated that their arms came 
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from China and complained about the Soviets, "We do not say 
that the Soviet has totally discarded us. We are still hopefully 
trying in this direction. " 514 There were many reasons behind this 
new Soviet Gulf policy. The Soviets decided not to provide the 
West with any opportunity to come into the region. They feared 
that any support to national radicals might provoke the regime 
against which they were struggling to seek Western military 
assistance. The Soviets also realised that supporting rebellions 
did not always succeed, especially if the West showed its 
willingness to help to suppress them. Another reason was that the 
communist parties in the Gulf states were very weak, unreliable 
for an active Soviet policy and not worth antagonising the 
installed government for. Lastly, most of the Gulf states were 
generally enjoying such rapid economic growth that their 
monarchies appeared to have a cushion against revolution. 515 
Pursuing a revolutionary policy in the Gulf, therefore, 
either independently or through their allies, was not the sort of 
policy that the Soviets preferred at the time of the British 
withdrawal. Consequently, they realised that the best policy 
available to them was befriending governments already in 
power. 516 There were certain important foreign policy issues on 
which the viewpoints of the Russians and the Gulf states, 
"a Al-Hurri. yah (22 September 1969). Cited in ibid., p. 
113. 
515 John Campbell, "The Superpowers in the Persian Gulf Region. " in Abbas 
Amirie. (ed. ). The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics 
(Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies. 1975), 
p. 55. 
516 Katz, op. cit.. pp. 11-12. 
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particularly the Arabian, seemed to be identical. The most 
important of these was the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the 
Russians opposed Israel and supported the Arabian side. By 
advocating the Arab cause, the Soviet Union attempted to 
persuade the Arab countries to distance themselves from the West 
which supported Israel and to draw closer to them. 5' 
But despite the advantages presented by befriending the 
existing governments in the Gulf, the success of the Soviets was 
very limited. They failed to establish good relations with the 
modern Gulf states. Up to the 1979 Iranian revolution, apart 
from Iran and Iraq, Kuwait was the only GCC state which had 
diplomatic relations with the Soviets. The failure of the Soviets 
was due to different political, economic and religious reasons. 
The political factors could be summarised in the Gulf states' fears 
of the Soviet's intention in the region. The Gulf regimes viewed 
Moscow's support for the radical groups as a real danger against 
their own thrones. The economic reasons were that the Soviet 
Union had less in technology and goods to provide the region 
with than did the West and her need for oil was limited. 
Religiously, Islam, the religion of all Gulf states, is based on 
worshipping the one God, strongly contradicted by Communists 
atheism. Consequently, these inconsistencies played a major role 
517 Yadfat and Abir, op. cit., p. 15. 
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in delaying relations between the Arab Gulf states and the Soviet 
Union. 
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Chapter IX The Response of the United States: the 
'Nixon Doctrine' 
The strategic interests of the industrial world would be in 
grave jeopardy if the freedom of oil supply were to be denied. It 
had been estimated in official American circles that any 
disruption in the supplies, especially during periods of crisis, 
could bring about serious consequences to the oil-consuming 
states. They believed that the British military withdrawal from 
the Gulf would constitute an open invitation to the Soviet Union 
to extend her control to the Gulf waters. Admiral Arleigh Burke, 
for example, noted in 1969 that, "If the announcement in 1968 
that Britain would withdraw from the Gulf by 1971 had no other 
consequences, it certainly focused attention on this vitally 
important political, military and economic part of the world. "518 
It was under this assumption that the United States received the 
1968 British decision. Therefore, the Americans officials felt that 
they must do something to counter the supposed Soviet threat in 
the region. 
After the end of the Second World War the United States 
became the undisputed leading power of the Western world. With 
global responsibilities for the security of their allies and their 
interests, the Americans had come to see themselves as ready to 
confront any Soviet threat. President Jimmy Carter, the 
39th 
President of the United States (1976-80), expressed this 
proposition in his 1980 State of the Union address following the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan of December 1979. 
He said that, 
Sig The Gulf: Implications of British withdrawal. p. iii. 
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"Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other 
nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. "519 
The policy of containing communism replaced co-operation 
with the USSR. In the Gulf, Iran was the site of the first 
confrontation between the two camps. Britain, the United States 
and the Soviet Union agreed in the Tehran Conference of 1943 to 
withdraw their forces from Iran after the war, and at its 
conclusion, the forces of Britain and United States began their 
withdrawal but the Soviets attempted to establish client states in 
the Northern regions. After being pressured by the United States, 
the Soviets evacuated Iran in March 1946. Combined with 
difficulties in Turkey and Greece, the situation according to 
United States President Harry Truman (1945- 52) "began to look 
like a giant pincer movement against the oil-rich areas of the 
Near East and the warm-water ports of the Mediterranean. 520 
Moving towards taking over British responsibilities in Turkey and 
Greece, the United States announced on 12 March 1947 American 
support for "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation 
by armed minorities or by outside pressures. "521 This new 
departure in United States' foreign policy was called the Truman 
Doctrine. By this doctrine, the United States government 
affirmed her global responsibility in containing what was 
perceived in Washington as world-wide Soviet expansionism. 
519 U. S. Congress. House. State of the Union Address, H. Doc. 96-257,96th 
Congress. 2nd Session, 1980. p. 1. 
Harry Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1: Years of Decisions (New York: 
Doubleday, 1955), pp. 522-3. 
s'' "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey. The Truman 
Doctrine, " in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry 
Truman--1947, (Washington. D. C. - Office of the Federal Register, National 
Archives and Records Service. 1963). pp. 178-9. 
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On 31 October 1956, British and French forces, jointly with 
the Israelis, attacked Egypt during the 'Suez Crisis'. At this time 
the Soviets supported Egypt, and as a result, while the influence 
of Britain and France in the Middle East was reduced, that of the 
Russians increased. In an attempt to face the growing Soviet 
influence in the Middle East, Foster Dulles, the United States 
Secretary of state (1953-9), declared on 31 December 1956 that 
Washington "has a major responsibility to help prevent the spread 
to the Middle East of Soviet imperialism. " 522 The 'Eisenhower 
Doctrine' of 5 January 1957 came amid such circumstances. The 
Doctrine (named after President Dwight Eisenhower) was 
perceived as an attempt to fill the vacuum left by Britain and 
France in the Middle East and to act as a stop sign to the 
Russians. The thirty-fourth President of the United States 
recommended the use of American forces "to secure and protect 
the territorial integrity and political independence" of the Middle 
Eastern states against open aggression from international 
Communism. 52' The Soviet government denounced the Eisenhower 
Doctrine as a plot to turn the Middle East "into a permanent 
hotbed of military conflict. " 524 In an attempt to justify the 
Eisenhower Doctrine to the governments of the Middle East 
states Dulles warned, on 14 January, that possible Communist 
aggression in the Middle East was "the most serious threat we 
51, Mostyn, op. cit., p. 49. 
',; "Special Message t o the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, " 
in Public Pa pers of the Presidents of the United States. Dwight 
Eisenhower-- 
1957, (Washington, D. C.: Federal Register Division. National Archives and 
Records Serv ice. 1958) . p. 
I',. 
j"I Mosten, op. cit., p. 49. On 10 January the 
former U. S. Secretary of 
State, Dean Acheson, also opposed the Eisenhower Doctrine as 
"perilously 
like another approach t o the brink" of a Third World 
War. Ibid .. p. 
50. 
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have faced over the last 10 years. "525 Nevertheless Dulles' 
attempt did not succeed. On 19 January, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan issued a joint statement rejecting the 
Eisenhower Doctrine's 'vacuum theory' of Middle East politics. 526 
When Britain announced in January 1968 her decision to 
withdraw her forces from the Gulf by 1971, the immediate 
American response to fill the so-called power vacuum came on 19 
January 1968 from Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow. The 
Under-Secretary suggested the creation of the Gulf Defence Pact, 
which included Turkey and Pakistan in addition to Iran, Kuwait, 
and Saudi Arabia. 527 Moscow rejected Rostow's proposal on the 
grounds that such a defence system would be directed ultimately 
against the security of her southern frontier. 528 
In the years between Britain's decision and her actual 
withdrawal (1968-71), the Nixon Administration found itself in a 
dilemma. With the insistence of Britain that she would complete 
her withdrawal at the announced time, the Nixon Administration 
realised that the United States was the only power capable of 
replacing her. However, the unsuccessful experience of United 
States troops in Vietnam made such overseas involvement 
unacceptable to American public opinion. 
The Vietnamese experience exercised a great influence on 
the Nixon government's reaction to the British withdrawal. 
12 1 
Ibid. 
526 
Ibid. 
5, Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih. op. cit., p. 23,7. and Khallfa. 9-p. 
cit.. p. 171. 
ý'x Ibid. 
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Briefly speaking, in March 1965, seeking to build up barriers 
against the spread of communism in south-east Asia, the United 
States' military involvement in Vietnam began. By 1966 over 
400,000 American troops were already involved. Two years later 
the war aroused great resentment within the United States and 
President Nixon began to withdraw combat troops in June 1969, 
to abolish conscription, and to order massive cuts in military 
strength. 529 The Nixon Administration sought a cease-fire with 
North Vietnam. On 27 January 1973, a peace treaty was signed in 
Paris and the last United States combat troops were withdrawn. "O 
It is beyond any argument that the major premise in United 
States decision-makers' minds at the time of British withdrawal 
was to keep the flow of Gulf oil to herself and her allies secure 
and adequate at reasonable prices. Theoretically, there were 
three options available to the Nixon Administration to achieve 
this objective. 531 
To do nothing or to make no change in its commitments was 
the first. Although pursuing this option would prevent another 
catastrophe like Vietnam, it would obviously increase the 
influence of the Soviets and their allies, could lead to the 
', ' Michael Klare, Arms, Oil and Intervention: U. S. Military Strategy in the 
Persian Gulf During the Nixon Era (The Union Graduate School. 
Unpublished Ph. D.. 1976), p. 56. 
53 " In his 1973 foreign policy report to the Congress Nixon described the 
Paris Agreement as the "most satisfying development in the past year. 
" U. S. 
Foreign Policy for the 1970s: An Analysis of the President's 1 97 3 Foreign 
Police Report and Congressional Action. Prepared 
for the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional 
Research Service, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 19731). 
p. 2,17. 
iij 
Klare, op. cit., pp. 100-8. 
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overthrow of the Gulf's monarchies, and probably the stoppage, 
or at least the decrease, of the oil flowing to the West. On these 
grounds the National Security Council concluded that it was a 
dangerous choice which would be very costly for the United 
States, as a superpower with a great interest in the Gulf, to 
choose. 
To intervene militarily and assume the British role as the 
protecting power or the big-power policeman in the Gulf region 
was the second option. Though following this course would 
obviously guarantee the interests of the West in the Gulf and 
would have increased America's power to influence future events 
there, it would also arouse major dissatisfaction both at home 
and in the region itself. It was believed that a direct American 
military presence would cast the United States in the role of 
colonial power in the eyes of the Gulf states' people. More 
important, the American people would view a large scale military 
involvement in the Gulf as 'another Vietnam'. As a consequence, 
the American Administration could not have an obvious military 
involvement in the region after the British withdrawal. Senate 
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield declared, on the day following 
Britain's announcement, that "I am certain we will be asked to fill 
the vacuum east of Suez. I don't think we have the men or 
resources for it. "5 2 
The third choice available to the United States government 
was to apply the Nixon Doctrine to the region. The idea of the 
Nixon Doctrine was to distribute the burden of collective defence 
13' 
Long, op. cit., p. 28. 
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more equitably between the United States and her allies in the 
region concerned. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James 
Noyes later explained the Nixon Doctrine in his testimony in 
1973 that "primary responsibility for peace and stability would 
henceforth fall on the [powerful pro-western] states of the 
[concerned] region. X533 Accordingly, the United States policy in 
the Gulf would be to help and encourage Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
as the big pro-western states in the region, to fill the impending 
vacuum after the British withdrawal, but without the military 
presence of the United States. 
The factors outlined above which caused the dilemma for 
the Nixon Administration in the Gulf, namely, Britain's insistence 
on withdrawing her forces at the announced time, the danger of 
not doing anything against the supposed Soviet threat, and 
adverse public opinion to sending troops overseas, were the main 
influences on the Administration in adopting the Nixon Doctrine 
in the region. In practice, however, United States' decision- 
makers did not restrict their country's Gulf policy to the Nixon 
Doctrine only. The United States followed a mixed policy 
combining the application of the Nixon Doctrine and the presence 
of 'moderate' United States military forces in and around the 
Gulf. 
As far as the Nixon Doctrine was concerned, Under 
Secretary of State Joseph Sisco recounts, in 1973, the United 
533 U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on 
the Near East and South Asia, New Perspectives on the 
Persian Gulf. 
Hearings, 93rd Congress. Ist Session. 1971. (Washington. D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1973). p. 39. 
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States adoption of her policy after the British withdrawal, "We 
asked ourselves: What is the United States to do, consistent with 
the 'Nixon Doctrine', to make a major contribution toward 
stability in the area without ourselves getting directly involved, 
because this is an area obviously in which we have very, very 
significant political-economic strategic interests. What we 
decided was that we would try to stimulate and be helpful to the 
two key countries --namely, Iran and Saudi Arabia-- that, to the 
degree to which we could stimulate cooperation between these 
two countries, they could become the major elements of stability 
as the British were getting out. "534 
Therefore, according to the Nixon Doctrine, the new 
mission of the United States, was to arm Iran and Saudi Arabia 
and turn them into regional superpowers that could sustain 
stability and Western influence in the Gulf. To ensure that the 
two regimes could successfully carry out their wider obligations 
would need a sharp increase in the United States military sales to 
both of them. Having unlimited access to American armaments, 
Iran's and Saudi Arabia's purchases speedily rose in the few years 
following the British announcement of 1968. The United States 
military sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia tripled between 1968 and 
1969 (from $75 million to $244 million), then doubled over the 
next two years (to $494 million in 1971), doubled again 
in the 
following year (to $861 million), tripled the next 
(to $2.7 
billion), and peaked in 1974 at $6.5 billion. 
535 In short, Iran 
replaced Israel as America's leading arms customer 
in the mid- 
534 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
Klare. op. Cit.. p. 109. 
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1970s, and Saudi Arabia surpassed Iran as the largest importer of 
United States weapons in 1978.536 This fact was strong evidence 
of the application of the Nixon Doctrine. 
But why precisely Iran and Saudi Arabia? They were the 
most suitable to the Nixon Doctrine because Iraq, at the time of 
British withdrawal, was under a new pro-Soviet regime and the 
other Gulf states were less important than these two countries. 
Moreover, by guaranteeing the co-operation of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia the government of the United States would be able in the 
end to bring the small Arabian Gulf states under her influence. 
However, the characteristics of Iran and Saudi Arabia require a 
special assessment. 
Iran's strategic location was the most important factor in 
the American consideration. Iran, flanking the Soviets' southern 
border with her 1,600-mile long frontier, stood as "a shield 
against the spread of Communist influence into the Persian Gulf 
region. 11 537 Iran's geographical position also placed her alone on 
the Persian side of the Gulf with a close eye on the Strait of 
Hormuz, through which most of the region's oil flows. In the case 
of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom enjoys a vast expanse of land 
(more than two million km2) bordering all the Gulf states, except 
Iran. The Kingdom's position as guardian of Makkah and Madinah 
(the Holiest cities in the Muslim world) also gave her a dominant 
536 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World Armaments and 
Disarmament: Yearbook 1979 (London: Taylor & Francis. 1979). p. 177.182. 
53 James Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of 78. " Foreign Affairs '7 ("'inter 
1978-79), p. 336 
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political position on the Arabian Peninsula and the Arabian side 
of the Gulf in particular and on Muslim world affairs in general. 
Equally important was the formidable economic power of 
both countries, which was very necessary to the fulfilment of the 
Nixon Doctrine. Another factor was the 'special relationship' of 
the United States with the two countries. While United States' 
support to the Shah in Mossadiq's crisis (1951-3) was the real 
beginning of her special relationship with Iran, the oil concession 
of 1933 was the key to her close relations with the Saudis. 
Finally, the anti-Communism and anti-radicalism attitudes of the 
two regimes were other factors in United States officials' minds 
when they chose them. 
The second arm of policy exercised by the United States to 
fill the so-called power vacuum in the region was the presence of 
moderate American military forces in and around the Gulf waters. 
United States officials came to the conclusion that, after all, 
whatever state Iran's and Saudi Arabia's armament reached, it 
would not alone be enough to match any Soviet threat either as a 
deterrent or a true defensive ability. In other words, the United 
States officials realised that the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine 
in a remote valuable area such as the Gulf was not enough. 
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Therefore, they pursued a mixed policy; a combination the Nixon 
Doctrine and the readiness to intervene. 538 
Melvin Laird, Nixon's Secretary of Defense, explained this 
mixed policy in 1970 when he said that, "The basic policy of 
decreasing direct U. S. military involv ement [the Nixon Doctrine] 
cannot be successful unless we provide o ur friends and 
allies.. . with the materi al assistance n ecessary to assure the most 
effective possible cont ribution by the manpower they are willing 
and able to commit to their own and the common defence. " Then 
Laird described what he believed was a better policy for the 
United States in the Gulf region. He said that "The most 
challenging aspects of our new policy can, therefore, best be 
achieved when each partner does its share and contributes what it 
best can to the common effort. In the majority of cases, this 
means indigenous manpower organized into properly equipped 
and well-trained armed forces with the help of material, training, 
technology and specialized skills furnished by the United States 
through the Military Assistance Program or as Foreign Military 
Sales. X539 These 'specialized skills', Laird later explained, 
538 Assiri. op. cit., p. 1. This mixed policy was not ne«. Kennedy's 
Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, once described America's 
strategic options as follows: "Either we can station numbers of men and 
quantities of equipment and supplies overseas near all potential trouble 
spots, or we can maintain a much smaller force in a central reserve 
in the 
United States and deploy it rapidly when needed. U. S. Congress. 
Senate, 
Committee on Armed Services. Military Procurement Authorization, 
Fiscal 
Year 1966, Hearings, 89th Congress. Ist Session, 1965. p. 120. Cited in 
Klare, op. cit.. pp. 60-1. 
539 U. S. Congress. House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee. 
Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1971. Hearings. 91st Congress. 2nd 
Session. 1970, p. 307. Cited in Klare, op. cit-. p. 18 
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consisted principally of air and naval support for the ground 
forces of the selected countries. 540 
Military figures understood the implications of this policy 
for the American armed forces. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., Chief 
of Naval Operations, for example, wrote in 1972, "So, as I 
understand the 'Nixon Doctrine', the Navy's future contribution 
will be even greater than in the past. X541 In a 1972 article, 
Colonel Zeb. B. Bradford also wrote in Military Review that as a 
result of the Vietnamese War, "we have learned that, in strategic 
terms, ground power can be quite inflexible once committed, 
however, much flexibility it may provide on a tactical 
level.... While aircraft and ships can often reverse course and 
make a clean break, ground forces rarely can do so once 
engaged. " The use of ground forces thus "burns the bridges of 
easy political or logistical withdrawal. "542 
Consequently, the United States government launched a 
major naval build-up in the Indian Ocean-Mediterranean-Gulf 
regions. Two examples will be sufficient to illustrate this. In 
December 1971, the United States government signed an 
agreement with the Ruler of Bahrain allowing the American navy 
to replace Britain in using a naval base in his emirate . 
543 On 24 
November 1974, a United States aircraft carrier entered the Gulf 
waters for the first time in 26 years. The visit by the 60,000-ton 
sau The Washington Post (21 January 1970). Cited in Klare. op. cit., p. 35. 
`a' Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., "The Navy Tomorrow. " Ordnance (January-February 
1972), p. 285. 
'a, Zeb. B. Bradford. "American Ground Power After Vietnam. " Military 
Review 52 (April 1972), p. 4. 
543 Katz. op. cit.. p. 176. 
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Constellation was viewed as a signal by United States of her 
willingness to use force if necessary to protect her interests. The 
Christian Science Monitor noted, on 26 November 1974, that 
Washington "will not accept any threat to, or interruption of, the 
supply of oil from Persian Gulf states. " This interpretation was 
confirmed a few weeks later when Henry Kissinger, Secretary of 
State (1973-7) under both Nixon and Ford, stated in a Business 
Week interview that the United States government would not rule 
out military action in the Middle East if the Arab countries 
threatened some actual strangulation of the industrialized 
world. "544 
The advantages of applying this mixed policy in the Gulf 
were varied: preventing a major commitment of the United States 
in another Vietnam, not appearing as a colonial power, shifting 
the burden of protecting the region on local states; giving the 
United States a considerable political influence onto local events; 
and, by the shipment of arms, recycling the oil revenue of the 
Gulf states and strengthening their local allies repressive 
capabilities to stay in power. The choice was the least expensive 
at that violent time. 
iaa For complete text of interview see Business 
Week (13) January 1975), pp. 
67-76. 
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the Stability of the Region 
The successful Iranian revolution of 1978-9 confirmed that 
the United States arms policy exercised in the Gulf, which did 
not take into consideration the local states' circumstances and 
interests, failed to provide political stability for the region after 
the British withdrawal of 1971, as had been predicted for it. 
Indeed, on the contrary, it contributed to the instability of the 
region. By supplying the Gulf states, especially the late Shah of 
Iran, with modern military arms products the United States 
increased, rather than lessened, the risk of violence and 
destruction. The Centre for Defense Information warned in 1975 
that, "the countries of the region are acquiring the capacity to 
make war at ever-increasing levels of potential 
destructiveness. it 545 
It was explained in the last three chapters that the major 
concern of the United States, as the defender of the West's 
interests, was to guarantee the continuous flow of Gulf oil to 
herself and her allies at reasonable prices. Therefore, the serious 
threat to these interests if the Soviets were allowed to dominate 
the Gulf after British departure persuaded the United States 
government of the necessity of facing the predicted Russian 
move. But due to her unhappy Vietnamese experience, the 
government of the United States decided not to 
be involved 
directly in the region. Instead, they preferred to apply the 
Nixon 
Doctrine, which was based mainly on arming 
Iran and Saudi 
54 ' "U. S. Arms to the Persian Gulf, " The Defense Monitor (May 1975), p. 
2. 
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Arabia to be in the words of one American source, the "American 
proxy in the region" . 
546 
In their efforts to protect the interests of the United States 
and her allies in the Gulf, successive American Administrations 
pursued a self-interested policy. There were many local sources 
of conflict and enmity that threatened the stability of the region 
but the United States governments did not pay them the 
appropriate attention. The problematic relationship between 
individual Gulf states and the late Shah's dictatorial method of 
rule are the obvious examples. 
Though all the Gulf countries share the same religion (i. e. 
Islam), their deep suspicion of each other was a major internal 
reason for instability in the region. These suspicions were fuelled 
by their historical conflicts and wars and their border problems. 
There was, at the time of the British announcement, a border 
dispute between almost all neighbouring states in the region, the 
most important of which were Iran's disputes with both Iraq and 
the two emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah of the UAE and 
the Buraimi dispute between Saudi Arabia on one side and Oman 
and Abu Dhabi of UAE on the other. And, since much of the Gulf 
states' oil was discovered in border regions and in the Gulf 
waters, there was always a threat that the big states of the Gulf 
would attack their smaller neighbours to increase their oil stocks. 
This situation was further complicated by the fulfilment in 
November 1971 of the British withdrawal. 
i46 Cited in Assiri. op. cit.. p. 220. 
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The long-standing rift in Arab-Iranian relations, however, 
which became a typical collateral to the modern history of the 
region, needs special consideration. In the Gulf's modern history, 
the Shah's ambitions to be the dominant power in the region 
complicated Iran's relations with her Arab neighbours and always 
threatened Gulf stability. The late Shah dreamed of reviving "the 
great Persian Empire of the past. " 547 He anticipated that within 
his lifetime Iran would emerge as the "fifth industrial and 
military power" in the world. 548 In practice, as has been 
explained in chapter six, the Shah sent his troops to seize the 
three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs of the UAE in 
November 1971. Two years later his forces were on their way to 
help Sultan Qabous bin Said of Oman against his rivals. In May of 
the same year, the Shah told Newsweek that "If Kuwait 
government resisted [Iraq's border attack of 1973] and asked for 
my help, they would get it instantly. " 549 These Iranian policies 
and statements demonstrated Iran's intention to gain political and 
military domination of the region and that lesser obstacles would 
550 be similarly dealt with. 
Equally important, in addition to the Shah's dreams, was 
that Iran's oil reserves had not been as promising as expected. It 
was estimated that, "By 1993... Iran will entirely cease to be an 
exporter of oil and will be producing only enough 
for its 
'a Klare, op. cit., p. 20. 
Sax F. Hoveyda. The Fall of the Shah (New York: Wyndham Books. 1980). p. 
78. 
549 Interview. Newsweek (21 May 1973). p. 44. 
"" Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (Neww York: Monthl\ 
Review Press. 197). p. 142 
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domestic needs. "55' As a consequence, Iran's income would be 
reduced very sharply. Therefore, logically the Shah's dreams, in 
combination with Iran's expected economic difficulties, would 
probably someday encourage the Shah to attack the weak, rich 
Arab states. In other words, if Iran's economic situation was as 
serious as reported, wasn't it possible that the Shah or his 
successors would as a result seek military hegemony over 
neighbouring Arab countries? 
American relations with the late Shah of Iran was another 
area that confirmed the United States neglectful attitude towards 
the local sources of instability. Washington did not allow her own 
democratic traditions to prevent support for a dictatorial regime 
like that of the Shah. After deposing Muhammad Mossadiq, Iran's 
Prime Minister (1951-3), the United States helped Muhammad 
Reza Shah to strengthen his hand over the country. A new period 
of dictatorship began. The Shah was at the core of a series of 
circles between which there was little contact, except through 
him. The court, the imperial family, the central government, the 
provincial governments, the armed forces, the Organisation of 
National Security and Intelligence called Sazman-e amniyat va 
ittilaat-e keshvar (SAVAK), and the police, all worked 
independently of each other and each reported directly to the 
Shah. 552 
Forbes 122: 1, (10 JON, 1978). p. 68. 
Haniza Al-Ajmi, The International History of the Gulf. 1958-1 y9 
(Glasgow University: Unpublished Ph. D.. 1988). p. 5 
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During the 1970s, it was in the United States' interest that 
the Shah should continue to rule Iran. Therefore the T1nitPrl 
States Administrations did not make any significant effort to 
assess the social and political foundations on which the Shah's 
conduct of policy was based. In their Analysis of the President's 
1973 Foreign Policy Report 'U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s' 
the Congressional Research Service said "A corollary to the 
Nixon doctrine which appears to be of increasing significance is 
that U. S. foreign policy toward any country is governed by that 
country's foreign policy, not its domestic policy. " 553 Therefore, 
with regards to the Iranian political opposition's demands, the 
instruction of the United States government was, in an American 
diplomatic metaphor, "to wear gags, earmuffs and blinders. " 554 
According to a witness at the May 1972 Tehran meeting, Nixon 
himself endorsed the Shah's dictatorial policies by remarking, "I 
envy the way you deal with your students.... Pay no attention to 
our liberals' griping. "555 
The United States, therefore, failed to predict the outbreak 
of the Iranian revolution. The Democratic President Jimmy Carter 
stated on 15 November 1977, that the United States viewed Iran 
"as a very stabilising force in the world at large. "556 Less than a 
year later, Khomeini's revolution started. In January 1979 the 
Shah was overthrown, which was the last thing the United States 
;; a U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, p. xiii. 
354 Cited in Assiri, pp. cit.. p. 236. 
Hoy eyda. op. cit.. p. 77. 
"Shalianshah of Iran Visits Washington. " Department of 
State Bulletin 
77 (26 December 1979), pp. 908-10. 
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officials wanted to happen in the Gulf. In February, Khomeini 
returned to Tehran from his exile in France as the undisputed 
leader of the Iranian people. A referendum held on 30 and 31 
March resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of an Islamic 
republic. Since then, Iran has been ruled by a government 
unfriendly to both the West and her Arab neighbours. The 
Americans failure could be attributed mainly to their 
concentration upon the Soviets and the threat their local allies 
were supposed to present. 
The Gulf internal political atmosphere persuaded many 
American politicians and observers to question and criticise their 
country's arms policy in the region. They argued that this policy 
contradicted the general objectives of the United States policy in 
the area. In 1973, representative Lee Hamilton reported to the 
Congress that, "Our stated policy has been to try to promote 
regional cooperation of Gulf riparians with the Iranian-Saudi 
relationship the key factors.... In practice, however, we are not 
promoting regional cooperation, partially because of our policies 
and partially because of the acts and ambitions of some of the 
leaders of the area. Our arms supply policy, in particular, creates 
as many suspicions as it alleviates fears. " Hamilton added that 
"The ambitions and policies of the Shah of Iran ... 
do not 
necessarily help create a dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
based on sovereign equality. The Shah speaks of the 
Gulf as 'his 
lake', of a defense perimeter in the Indian 
Ocean, and of his 
intention to intervene militarily on the Arab side of the 
Gulf 
should any change in the political environment 
be detrimental to 
his country's interests. Regional cooperation 
for the Iranians 
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seems to be based on a major or dominant role for Iran in Gulf 
affairs. "557 Senator Edward Kennedy also charged, in February 
1975, that the United States government policy was "an 
apparently indiscriminate policy of selling as much military 
equipment... as [the Gulf] countries can pay for. "558 In 1975, the 
Congress also sent a study mission to Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia. The mission described the United States arms sales policy 
as "a nonpolicy --an ad hoc response to individual arms requests 
rather than a well-formulated plan to protect U. S... . 
interests. 11559 
United States' officials, however, rejected the allegations 
that the United States military exports increased the prospect of 
war in the Gulf. Richard Violette of the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency told a House sub-committee in 1974 that, 
"Iran's military requirements are based on Iran's concern for the 
security of its northern border with the USSR and its western 
border with Iraq. "560 Pentagon spokesperson Amos Jordan stated, 
in 1975, that, "Since war... is expensive and very risky, it seems 
doubtful that nations will resort to arms merely because they 
have them. An arms build-up for defensive and balancing reasons 
11? 
House. New Perspectives. p. N". 
"x Congressional Record (22 February 1975). p. S2409. 
59 U. S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. United 
States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf. Report of a Study Mission to Iran, 
Kuwait. and Saudi Arabia. 94th Congress. Ist Session, 1975. (Washington. 
D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1975), p. 8. 
56" U. S. Congress, House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on 
the New East and South Asia. The Persian Gulf 1974: 
Money. Politics. Arms. 
and Power. Hearings. 93ed Congress. 2nd Session. 1974. (Washington. 
D. C.: 
Government Printing Office. 1975). pp. 7-8. 
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may well reduce the dangers of conflict. "561 Philip Habib, Under- 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, defended, in 1976, the 
American Administration's arms sales to the Shah, "since our 
military sales to Iran add to the strength of a valued ally and that 
nation's ability to continue to carry out a policy on which we and 
the Iranians agree. "562 
These statements were less than frank in several respects. 
First, if the evaluation of United States officials was accurate, 
then the Shah's priority would have been to buy defensive 
weapons such as interceptor aircraft, anti-tank missiles, shore 
batteries, etc, instead, the Shah's military programme was shaped 
exclusively by the acquisition of offensive arms which would be 
suitable for an aggressive expansionist policy. During 1974 and 
1975 alone, Iran had outstanding orders of 400 war-planes, 500 
helicopters, 730 tanks, 18 war-ships and thousands of air-to-air, 
air-to-ground, ground-to-air, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles. 563 
A report published on 25 September 1975 in The Washington Post 
observed that huge stockpiles of munitions were to be found on 
board Iranian ships and in fields. Sophisticated weaponry, 
including planes and helicopters, were left unassembled in their 
crates for weeks. General Tanfanian, the Vice Minister for War, 
in charge of armament "has no doubt about the Shah's rush to 
"'' Amos Jordan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Statement Before 
the Subcommittee on Investigations, House International Relations 
Committee, (18 June 1975). Press release. p. 6. 
i(" U. S. Congress, House. Hearings, Committee on International Relations, 
Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. Proposed 
Foreign Military Sales to Middle Eastern Countries--1976.94th Congress. 
2nd Session, 1976. (Washington. D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1976), 
p. 68. 
563 Klare, op. cit.. p. 1 34. 
235 
United States' Gulf Arms Policy and the Stability of the Region 
become a regional superpower. X 564 Therefore, it inescapably 
follows that the United States endorsed the Shah's policies to 
form a substantial interventionary capability. 565 
Second, if Iran was afraid of an Iraqi or a Soviet attack, as 
suggested by American officials, then Iran's troops should have 
been crowded on her western and northern borders. Instead, the 
Shah moved most of his forces to the south and east. 
Third, the claim that war is "expensive and very risky" has never 
precluded any country from engaging in conflict if it was assured 
that the promising rewards exceeded the expenses or if it felt 
inaction was more risky. Kissinger once remarked about helping 
an ally under attack, "the ultimate consequences of passivity will 
be worse than the immediate results of the conflict_""566 
Moreover, the Shah did not appear as someone who would be 
deterred by such costs. 
Fourth and most important, the argument of selling arms to 'a 
valued ally' who would take into consideration the provider's, i. e. 
the United States, interests was not the right policy. There was 
no guarantee that these arms could not be used without or against 
the approval of the provider. The possibility of a clash of 
interests between the provider and the receiver was one reason. 
The difficulty of ensuring that these huge quantities of massively 
destructive arms would not fall into the wrong hands in future 
"'a The Los Angeles Times. (10 October 1977) Part 1, p. 17. 
Klare, op. cit., p. 155. 
"'`' Patrick Morgan. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (California: Sage 
Publications, 1977). p. 115 
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was another. The overthrow of the Shah in 1979 confirmed this 
argument. 
Indeed the transferring of high-technology arms to a 
potential belligerent, as in the Gulf states, made the temptation 
to initiate a war stronger than the inclination to refrain. Tahtinen 
noted in his 1974 study that, "the last two Arab-Israeli conflicts 
have demonstrated [that] the possession of highly sophisticated 
weapons by potential belligerents in explosive situations enhances 
the possibility that disagreements will be settled by fighting 
instead of diplomacy. " 567 In a response to the dramatic growth of 
military capabilities in the Gulf, the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) also warned in 1974 that "As arms 
become more widespread, so political violence is made easier, 
and any conflict that results more bloody". 568 A year later, the 
earlier mentioned Congress study mission to the region reported 
that "arms buildups may provoke instability in a region by 
promoting an arms race which raises the level of tension in the 
area, and tension plus availability of weapons may create greater 
potential for conflicts. "569 The Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s proved 
how accurate were these prophecies. 
Despite the internal factors of instability, the government 
of the United States sold the Shah almost all types of new 
weaponry American industry produced, except the atomic bomb. 
"'^ Dale Tahtinen. Arms in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D. C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974). p. 30. 
"'x The Stratgic Survey 1973 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 1974). p. 45. 
"'(' House, United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf. p. 8. 
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Indeed there were other American objectives, in addition to 
enhancing Iranian and Saudi Arabian capabilities, for the United 
States arms policy in the region. The arms industries exerted 
enormous influence over the United States' economy and 
therefore over local politics. Arms sales provided for the 
employment of a massive work-force in the American arms 
industry. It had been estimated that every $1 billion in arms 
exports supported some 47,000 jobs. 570 Dwight Eisenhower, 
President of the United States (1953-61), asserted once that the 
arms industry exercised "total influence --political, economic and 
even spiritual-- was felt in every city, every state house, and 
every office of the federal government. X57 But the hard fact 
remained, as some observers rightly predicted, that the United 
States' arms sales to the Gulf, although generating business for 
American arms manufacturers, could provoke war between the 
Gulf states themselves. 572 
Minimising the balance-of-payments deficit that the United 
States experienced in October 1971 for the first time since 1893 
was another American goal. By the 'recycling arms for oil' policy 
the Gulf states, with their high oil revenue, were the most 
suitable buyers for United States military products. As a result, 
the combined United States foreign military sales and commercial 
J71) 
Business Week (11 August 1975). 
" Dwight Eisenhower. Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday, 
1965), p. 616. 
'^, Bob Berman and Stefan Leader. "U. S. Arens to the 
Persian Gulf: $10 
Billion Since 1973", The Defense Monitor (May 1975), p. 4. 
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arms exports to the Gulf states in the period from 1967 to 1977 
reached over $31 billion. 573 
The third objective for the American arms policy in the Gulf 
was that by accelerating the flow of United States arms and 
equipment into the region, United States governments 
endeavoured to keep the Gulf states dependent on her arms 
industry products. 574 The fourth objective was to strengthen the 
repressive forces of pro-United States regimes in the region. A 
diplomat at the State Department admitted, with Saudi Arabia's 
royal family in his mind, that the United States arms sales aimed, 
"to entrench the royal family or to make them more 
575 repressive.... 
In conclusion, the United States arms policy in the Gulf did 
not bring stability to the region, as the American decision-makers 
had planned. The downfall of Muhammad Reza Shah, who was 
once described by Nixon as "a friend of our country and as a 
pillar of stability in a turbulent and vital region"576, and the result 
of the Iranian referendum were clear evidences of the failure of 
the United States arms policy in the 1970s. Kissinger's 
congressional testimony of 1980 reflected this fact. He stated 
that "the United States' future is now at the mercy of a 
53 
Assiri, op. cit., pp. 196-7. 
S-4 Stanley Hoffmann. Primacy or World Order (New York: McGraw-Hill. 
1978), p. 77. 
Cited in op. cit.. p. 229. 
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little. Brown cý Co.. 
1979). p. 126-5 
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precarious political status quo in what is probably the most 
volatile, unstable and crisis prone region of the world. X57 
577 New York Times (17 July 1980), p. 14. 
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Conclusion 
The modern history of the Gulf region is one of continuous 
instability which reached a peak following the official British 
military withdrawal in 1971. The Iranian occupation of the 
United Arab Emirates' three islands of 1971, the eight years 
Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-88), the 1982 and 1986 Bahraini-Qatari 
clashes over the Hawar islands and al-Zubarah, and the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait in 1990 stand as clear evidence of this 
claim. 
The Gulf region was dominated by the British since 1820 
and by the United States since the British withdrawal. Gulf 
instability can be directly attributed to the policies of these two 
countries. Though it is not true to say that internal factors of the 
Gulf states themselves did not contribute to this instability, there 
is no doubt that the external influence of Britain and United 
States played the leading role. This is most clearly evidenced by 
the attitudes of Britain towards Arab Gulf unity and the United 
States' towards Arab-Iranian rivalry. 
Aiming to protect their substantial interests in the Gulf 
region and beyond, successive British and United States 
governments kept to a minimum the peace and stability in the 
Gulf. To achieve this, they kept the other rival powers 
(especially the Russians) out of the region; did not encourage the 
establishment of a strong, unified Arab Gulf state and a working 
relationship between the two sides of the Gulf. The region's 
stability, as viewed by the British and United 
States, did not 
cover the internal sources of unrest and instability. 
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The experiences of the Muwahiddun (Unitarians) and the 
Qawasim of the last decades of the eighteenth century and early 
decades of the nineteenth strengthened the assumption that it 
would be very difficult to control a powerful, united Arab Gulf 
state. Therefore, the British Gulf policy since the General Treaty 
of 1820 was to encourage and support the creation of 
autonomous emirates in the Gulf. The British acknowledged the 
petty Gulf Shaikhs as independent rulers, endowed them with 
protection, defined their territories after the discovery of oil, 
and finally recognised the independence of their emirates and 
helped them to join international organisations as fully sovereign 
states. (Britain's efforts in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the 
settlements of the Versailles and San Remo Peace Conferences 
had also contradicted the British promises of an independent 
united Arab state made to Shareif Hussein of Makkah). As a 
result of these policies, the British contributed to the emergence, 
survival and political evolution of today's inherently unstable 
Arab Gulf states. 
One of the clearest consequences of British 'divide and rule' 
policy is that all the Gulf states became embroiled in border 
10 disputes. The effect of these disputes on the stability of the 
region was, and still is, very serious. The formative role of the 
British in their creation cannot be denied. The frequent British 
policies of giving territory to one side as reward or 
compensation, or removing it as punishment; of forcing border 
settlements between the disputing parties, of creating neutral 
zones between the rival states; and of mollifying big local powers 
only served to further concentrate grievances rather than to 
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alleviate them. When Britain abandoned her dependencies, these 
policies led to conflicts and wars. The border lines between the 
Gulf states were time-bombs waiting to explode. An observer has 
stated that "the British before they left Palestine left their finger 
prints.... They did exactly the same, it seems, in the Gulf. "578 
In order to evaluate the impact of British Gulf policy, it is 
legitimate to speculate on what the present situation would be 
had the British never entered the region. As they had done in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century, the Saudis would have 
continued to extend their authority; in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Even with the absence of the 
Saudis, the region would not have been divided into as many 
states as is now the case. Mutual interests would have brought 
about the integration of most of the emirates. A recent study 
conducted by a former British Ambassador reached the conclusion 
that the fragmentation of the Gulf "would not otherwise have 
survived the rationalising pressures of history, for without 
British patronage these tiny mini-states would long since have 
been absorbed by, or merged into, larger ones of sensible size. "579 
The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proved once more the 
destabilising effect of the legacy of disputed borders and Western 
arms policy in the Gulf. The subsequent 'Iraqgate' affair revealed 
how the West had armed Iraq during the previous decade; a 
regime which had been regarded by many strategic institutes and 
578 Arab Research Centre. Round Table Discussion on "The Dispute over the 
Gulf Islands, " p. 55. 
o Balfour-Paul 
. op. cit.. P. 
103. 
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political observers as a threat to the stability of the region. This 
occurrence was not new to the modern history of the Gulf. It had 
deep roots in American policy-making since Britain's withdrawal 
in 1971. 
Britain's presence in the Gulf region had eased the fears of 
the West in general and of the United States' in particular about 
their interests in the region. Therefore when the British Labour 
government announced in 1968 its intention to withdraw its 
forces from the Gulf the United States was deeply disturbed. 
They viewed the withdrawal as an unmissable opportunity for the 
former Soviet Union to increase her power in the region and 
consequently to control its oil wealth. The United States, as heir 
to the British, decided to arm Iran and Saudi Arabia, her 
strongest allies in the region. Many in the Gulf states believed 
that the United States used the supposed Soviet threat as a way 
to justify her increasingly direct involvement in the Gulf. 
The United States was not concerned with internal causes 
of instability. The dream of the late Shah to control the Arabian 
side of the Gulf, Iran's unsolved territorial disputes with almost 
all the Arab Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia's border disputes with 
some of her small neighbours were all known to the American 
Administration prior to its advocacy of the Nixon Doctrine in the 
region. Therefore, the United States arms policy could only 
perpetuate and add to the general instability. Moreover, despite 
her unique influence in the region, the United States did little to 
promote a close and genuine relationship between the Arabian 
and Iranian sides of the Gulf. 
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As a result of the 1990 Iraqi invasion, most of the GCC 
states signed bilateral defence pacts with the United States, 
Britain and France (a process begun with the United States- 
Kuwaiti agreement of 1991). These agreements, however, cannot 
contribute to regional stability. They are security contracts 
between the Western powers and individual Gulf states, and not 
with the region as a whole. In reality, they were concluded 
against its two strongest powers, Iraq and Iran, thereby creating 
opposing camps. Moreover, these agreements were signed for a 
limited number of years. What is to happen after their expiry? 
These agreements, therefore, are clearly designed to serve 
Western interests not Gulf stability. 
The initiative for Gulf stability must come from within the 
Gulf states. The Arab states, or at least the six monarchies of the 
GCC, must unite, and good relations be established between the 
two sides of the Gulf. This would serve as the pillar to hold 
stability in the region. Undoubtedly, an end to the border 
disputes would be the first step to this end. 
The border disputes have jeopardised, and will continue to 
jeopardise, the stability of the region. To prevent this, the Gulf 
states need to follow the example of the African continent. In 
1963, thirty two governments signed the Charter of the 
Organisation of African Unity which accepted the colonial 
boundaries between their states. Though there were winners and 
losers, it was no doubt the least painful solution. Likewise, 
today's Gulf states should accept their present boundaries. 
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The Iraq-Iran war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait revealed 
that the GCC in its present form is not able to protect its 
members from external threats. Thus these weak states should 
find a new framework for the future. Their 15-years old alliance 
has to become a real union. They have much in common. They 
share one language, religion, and social structure. Politically, 
each of them is governed by a ruling family. They are the richest 
in the world, and do not suffer from a population shortage. The 
UAE federation is an excellent example for the GCC states to 
ponder. In practice, the federation faced, and still faces, many 
obstacles. The integration of the armed forces, the question of 
abolishing borders, transforming the present provisional 
constitution into a permanent one and holding popular elections 
instead of having the seven rulers appoint representatives to the 
advisory National Assembly being the major ones. However, 
despite these difficulties, the federation was unified with relative 
ease and success and became, after 25 years, a matter of fact. 
For Arab-Iranian cooperation, the Iranians should respect 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
small Arab emirates (especially Bahrain) and not to interfere in 
their domestic affairs. Both sides should also accept the principle 
of solving disagreements peacefully. Their mutual interest 
dictates that even if they cannot achieve cooperation they must 
avoid conflicts. 
Finally, though the British and United States governments 
secured the supreme influence in the Gulf to themselves 
for a 
long time, they did not work toward eradicating the origins of 
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disputes and instability. On the contrary, their policies helped in 
creating many of them. In the light of the fact that the West's 
protection would continue only as long as oil remains to be the 
leading source of energy and the Gulf continues to be the world's 
foremost producer, stability in the Gulf can only be guaranteed 
by the region's states themselves, despite the difficulty for them 
in exercising this responsibility in the near future. 
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Appendix no. I: a 
Population Statistics of the Gulf States (In thousands) 
1965 1970 1975 1978 
Bahrain 0.1 8 0.22b 0 . 26 
0.3 5 
Iran 24.81 28.66 33. 02 15.21 
Iraq 8.05 9.44 11. 12 12.33 
Kuwait 0.48 0.74 1 . 
00 1.20 
Oman 0.57 0.65 0 . 
77 0.84 
Qatar 0.07 0.11 0 . 
17 0.20 
Saudi Arabia 5.40 6.20 7 . 
18 7.87 
UAE 0.15 0.23 0 . 
56 0.71 
a. Compiled from United Nations Statistical Pocketbook, World Statistics 
in Brief, pp. 10,66,67,76,102,111,117,141. 
b. United Nations estimate. 
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Appendix no. 2: a 
Oil Exporting Countries of the Gulf 
Date of 1st 
Successful First Date of 
Beginning 
Country Concession Concessionaire Discovery of Exports 
Abu Dhabi 1939 ADPCb 1960 
1962 
Bahrain 1930 Socal 1932 1934 
Iran 1901 D'Arcy (APOC) 1908 1912 
Iraq 1925 TPC (IPC)c 1927 19 34 
Kuwait 1934 KOC 1938 1946 
Oman 1937 PCLd 1967 1967 
Qatar 1935 QPCe 1939 1949 
Neutral Zone 1948 Getty & Aminoil 1953 1954 
Saudi Arabia 1933 Socal (Aramco) 1938 
1939 
a. Zuhayr Mikdashi. A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil 
Concessions: 1901-65, Praeger Special Studies in International 
Economics and Development, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1966), p. 315. 
b. Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company. 
c. Turkish Petroleum Company (Iraq Petroleum Company). 
d. Petroleum Concessions Limited. 
e. Qatar Petroleum Company. 
249 
Appendixes 
Appendix no. 3: a 
Crude Petroleum Production in the Gulf States for Selected Yearsb 
Year Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar UAF S Ar c 
1911 
1912 80 
1915 480 
1918 1.000 
1923 3.775 
1927 5.325 45 
1933 5 6.550 115 
1937 1.060 10.330 4.255 10 
1939 1.040 9.735 3.965 540 
1946 1.095 19.495 4.680 800 8.200 
1949 1.500 27.235 4.085 12.380 100 23.240 
1951 1.505 16.845 8.590 28.225 2.370 37.195 
1952 1.505 1.360 18.520 37.635 3.295 40.510 
1953 1.500 1.490 28.185 43.285 4.060 41.545 
1955 1.500 16.355 33.240 54.760 5.440 47.535 
1957 1.600 36.020 22.000 57.285 6.650 49.005 
1958 2.035 40.905 35.815 70.225 8.220 50.130 
1962 2.250 65.810 49.170 92.175 8.810 795 75.750 
1963 2.255 73.555 56.670 97.200 9.095 2.430 81.050 
1965 2.840 94.125 64.475 109.045 10.960 13.700 101.035 
1966 3.080 105.445 67.960 114.355 13.845 17,480 119.455 
1967 3.490 130.580 59.885 115.175 3.150 15.485 18.530 129.305 
1968 3.795 141.635 73.775 122.090 12.010 16.285 20.005 141.005 
1969 3.820 168.490 74.485 129.550 16.180 17.185 30.345 148.845 
1970 3.825 191.295 76.455 150.6 35 16.585 17.375 37.700 188.410 
1971 3.740 226.830 83.775 161.435 14.535 20.455 51.045 238.680 
a. Fiona Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. pp. 171 -2. 
b. In thousands of metric tons. 
c. Saudi Arabia. 
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Appendix no. 4: a 
Major Gulf Countries' Oil Revenues (1971-78)l 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Iran 1815 2396 4599 17821 18433 22042 21210 19300 
Iraq 840 575 1843 5700 7500 8500 9631 10200 
Kuwait 954 1403 1734 6542 6393 6869 7515 7699 
Qatar 199 255 463 1849 1684 2091 1994 2200 
Saudi Arabia 1884 2744 4340 22573 25675 30754 36538 32233 
UAE 431 551 900 5536 6000 7000 9030 8200 
a. OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1980, p. XLIX. 
b. In millions of U. S. dollars. 
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